OPINION ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
W.C. DAVIS, Judge.
A jury convicted appellant of aggravated robbery. The jury found the enhancement allegations to be true and assessed punishment at confinement for ninety-nine years. See V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 12.42(c). The Fourteenth Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that appellant’s inquiry, made after he was informed of his Miranda rights,1 as to whether an attorney would be appointed when he went to Houston, constituted invocation of his right to counsel. Collins v. State, 701 S.W.2d 304 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th] 1985). The Court of Appeals held the confession which followed this alleged invocation should, therefore, have been suppressed.
We granted the State’s petition for discretionary review to decide whether the Court of Appeals was correct in finding appellant’s inquiry about appointment of counsel to constitute invocation of his right to counsel and to decide, as the Court of Appeals’ seems to hold, whether all questioning of an accused must cease upon any reference to counsel, however ambiguous or equivocal.
On January 15, 1984, appellant was arrested in Garland as a suspect in a robbery that had occurred in Garland.2 Police in [567]*567Houston were notified that appellant had been arrested because he was a suspect in a robbery that had occurred in Houston. Lieutenant R.E. Phillips, a member of the Garland police department, spoke with appellant on January 16. He informed appellant of his rights3 and spoke with him about the robberies, telling him that police from Houston were going to come to Garland to speak to him. Appellant did not request an attorney. Phillips showed appellant a flyer from Houston which had a picture and description of a robbery suspect who looked similar to appellant. Phillips testified that appellant was non-cooperative, did not say much, and just looked at the flyer.
The next day, January 17, two Houston detectives spoke with appellant concerning a robbery in Houston. They advised appellant of his rights 4 and photographed him. They spoke with him about the robberies for about 30 or 40 minutes. Appellant then agreed to give a written statement. Before he did so, he was taken before a magistrate and informed of his rights by the magistrate.5 Phillips, who was present when the magistrate warned appellant, testified that appellant did not request an attorney at this point either. The Houston police then again informed appellant of his rights and appellant gave his written statement to police.
Although the record is not clear as to when it occurred, at some point while the Houston detectives were interviewing him, but before giving his written statement, appellant asked if he would get an appointed lawyer when he went to Houston. The record is not clear as to whether this question occurred before appellant was informed of his rights by the magistrate. Detective Kroschel and Detective Muir both indicated that appellant’s inquiry concerned the future when he went to Houston about the Houston robbery, and whether he would get an attorney appointed in Houston. They testified that appellant’s mention of an attorney was not made in reference to his statement and that they told him if he did not have a lawyer when he got to Houston, one would be appointed for him.
Appellant testified at the Jackson v. Denno6 hearing on the voluntariness of the confession. Not surprisingly his rendition contradicts the State’s witnesses. Appellant testified that he was interrogated “at least a dozen times” by Garland police, and that each time he told them that before he talked to them he wanted to talk to an attorney. Appellant also stated that he told the magistrate and the Houston police officers who questioned him that he wanted a lawyer before he talked.
The trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses in a pretrial hearing and absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, the trial court’s findings will not be disturbed. Hawkins v. State, 613 S.W.2d 720 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). The trial court evidently chose to disbelieve appellant’s version of the circumstances surrounding the confession. We find nothing in the record to show an abuse of discretion and we likewise reject appellant’s version. With this in mind we turn to the issue before us.
[568]*568The admissibility of a confession depends on the result of “two distinct inquiries.” Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 493, 83 L.Ed.2d 488, 493 (1984). First, the courts must determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel. Then, the second inquiry of whether the accused validly waived that right can be examined. We are concerned with the first inquiry, the Court of Appeals’ holding that appellant’s inquiry about a lawyer constituted an invocation of his right to counsel. The Court of Appeals makes much of the fact that appellant’s inquiry about counsel occurred after he was informed of his rights, stating,
“When an accused asks about his right to counsel prior to receiving his Miranda warnings, and does not repeat his query following the warning, it is logical to assume that the warning answered his questions. However, when the question as to counsel is raised after the accused is informed of his rights, it is equally logical to assume that the accused did not fully understand his rights.” (emphasis in original).
Collins, 701 S.W.2d at 306.
We agree with the State that this bright line rule making the point at which a person is warned determinative is not appropriate or correct. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-445, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) the Supreme Court stated, “If however, [the defendant] indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning_” (emphasis added). Surely, the warning and response to it are part of the circumstances to be examined and help show whether the accused “clearly asserted his right to counsel.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). But, it is the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and alleged invocation which determine whether or not an accused has invoked his right to counsel. We reaffirm our past cases which hold that the determination as to whether or not an accused has asserted his right to counsel must be made from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged invocation, including the informing of rights and any discussion at any point about a lawyer. See Massengale v. State, 710 S.W.2d 594 (Tex.Cr.App.1986); Porier v. State, 662 S.W.2d 602 (Tex.Cr.App.1984); Curtis v. State, 640 S.W.2d 615
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OPINION ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
W.C. DAVIS, Judge.
A jury convicted appellant of aggravated robbery. The jury found the enhancement allegations to be true and assessed punishment at confinement for ninety-nine years. See V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 12.42(c). The Fourteenth Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that appellant’s inquiry, made after he was informed of his Miranda rights,1 as to whether an attorney would be appointed when he went to Houston, constituted invocation of his right to counsel. Collins v. State, 701 S.W.2d 304 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th] 1985). The Court of Appeals held the confession which followed this alleged invocation should, therefore, have been suppressed.
We granted the State’s petition for discretionary review to decide whether the Court of Appeals was correct in finding appellant’s inquiry about appointment of counsel to constitute invocation of his right to counsel and to decide, as the Court of Appeals’ seems to hold, whether all questioning of an accused must cease upon any reference to counsel, however ambiguous or equivocal.
On January 15, 1984, appellant was arrested in Garland as a suspect in a robbery that had occurred in Garland.2 Police in [567]*567Houston were notified that appellant had been arrested because he was a suspect in a robbery that had occurred in Houston. Lieutenant R.E. Phillips, a member of the Garland police department, spoke with appellant on January 16. He informed appellant of his rights3 and spoke with him about the robberies, telling him that police from Houston were going to come to Garland to speak to him. Appellant did not request an attorney. Phillips showed appellant a flyer from Houston which had a picture and description of a robbery suspect who looked similar to appellant. Phillips testified that appellant was non-cooperative, did not say much, and just looked at the flyer.
The next day, January 17, two Houston detectives spoke with appellant concerning a robbery in Houston. They advised appellant of his rights 4 and photographed him. They spoke with him about the robberies for about 30 or 40 minutes. Appellant then agreed to give a written statement. Before he did so, he was taken before a magistrate and informed of his rights by the magistrate.5 Phillips, who was present when the magistrate warned appellant, testified that appellant did not request an attorney at this point either. The Houston police then again informed appellant of his rights and appellant gave his written statement to police.
Although the record is not clear as to when it occurred, at some point while the Houston detectives were interviewing him, but before giving his written statement, appellant asked if he would get an appointed lawyer when he went to Houston. The record is not clear as to whether this question occurred before appellant was informed of his rights by the magistrate. Detective Kroschel and Detective Muir both indicated that appellant’s inquiry concerned the future when he went to Houston about the Houston robbery, and whether he would get an attorney appointed in Houston. They testified that appellant’s mention of an attorney was not made in reference to his statement and that they told him if he did not have a lawyer when he got to Houston, one would be appointed for him.
Appellant testified at the Jackson v. Denno6 hearing on the voluntariness of the confession. Not surprisingly his rendition contradicts the State’s witnesses. Appellant testified that he was interrogated “at least a dozen times” by Garland police, and that each time he told them that before he talked to them he wanted to talk to an attorney. Appellant also stated that he told the magistrate and the Houston police officers who questioned him that he wanted a lawyer before he talked.
The trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses in a pretrial hearing and absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, the trial court’s findings will not be disturbed. Hawkins v. State, 613 S.W.2d 720 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). The trial court evidently chose to disbelieve appellant’s version of the circumstances surrounding the confession. We find nothing in the record to show an abuse of discretion and we likewise reject appellant’s version. With this in mind we turn to the issue before us.
[568]*568The admissibility of a confession depends on the result of “two distinct inquiries.” Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 493, 83 L.Ed.2d 488, 493 (1984). First, the courts must determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel. Then, the second inquiry of whether the accused validly waived that right can be examined. We are concerned with the first inquiry, the Court of Appeals’ holding that appellant’s inquiry about a lawyer constituted an invocation of his right to counsel. The Court of Appeals makes much of the fact that appellant’s inquiry about counsel occurred after he was informed of his rights, stating,
“When an accused asks about his right to counsel prior to receiving his Miranda warnings, and does not repeat his query following the warning, it is logical to assume that the warning answered his questions. However, when the question as to counsel is raised after the accused is informed of his rights, it is equally logical to assume that the accused did not fully understand his rights.” (emphasis in original).
Collins, 701 S.W.2d at 306.
We agree with the State that this bright line rule making the point at which a person is warned determinative is not appropriate or correct. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-445, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) the Supreme Court stated, “If however, [the defendant] indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning_” (emphasis added). Surely, the warning and response to it are part of the circumstances to be examined and help show whether the accused “clearly asserted his right to counsel.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). But, it is the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and alleged invocation which determine whether or not an accused has invoked his right to counsel. We reaffirm our past cases which hold that the determination as to whether or not an accused has asserted his right to counsel must be made from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged invocation, including the informing of rights and any discussion at any point about a lawyer. See Massengale v. State, 710 S.W.2d 594 (Tex.Cr.App.1986); Porier v. State, 662 S.W.2d 602 (Tex.Cr.App.1984); Curtis v. State, 640 S.W.2d 615 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Kelly v. State, 621 S.W.2d 176 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Ochoa v. State, 573 S.W.2d 796 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). This Court does not now hold and has not so held in the past, that any reference to counsel constitutes invocation of the right to counsel,7 whether that be after warnings are given after or before. Indeed, in Massengale, supra, and Ochoa, supra, we recognized the dictate of Miranda, supra, that a defendant can indicate “in any manner and at any stage” that he wishes to assert his right to counsel. However, we also recognize that just because that assertion can be done “in any manner” does not mean that mere reference to a lawyer is an “automatic” invocation. Certainly, no magic words must be stated. But, neither is the mention of “lawyer” a talisman for invocation. We always look to the facts and circumstances of the situation. See and cf. Massengale, supra; Curtis, supra; Kelly, supra; Connecticut v. Barrett, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 828, 93 L.Ed.2d 920 (1987).
In the instant case appellant was arrested on January 15 in Garland for a robbery committed in Garland. On January 16, he was informed of his rights and questioned. He was able to speak to his wife on the phone. At no point did he mention wanting to speak with a lawyer either before or after being informed of his rights to do so. Then, on January 17, when the Houston police questioned him about a different robbery committed in Houston he was warned again. Although not clear from the record, at some point during the 30 to 40 minutes in which the detectives talked to him after warning him, appellant inquired of the detectives if he would have [569]*569a lawyer appointed for him when he went to Houston. The detectives told him that if he did not have an attorney when he was brought to Houston he would get one there. No further discussion as to an attorney occurred. The detectives testified that appellant’s inquiry was directed to getting a lawyer “down the road” when he got to Houston. Appellant was then brought before a magistrate and informed of his rights. He did not request a lawyer. He was read the rights included on the statement form, initialed each one to indicate that he understood them, and then gave a written statement to the detectives.
The recent Supreme Court case of Connecticut v. Barrett, supra, is instructive for the instant case. In Connecticut v. Barrett the defendant was advised of his rights and stated that “ ‘he would not give the police any written statements unless his attorney was present but had no problem in talking about the incident.’ ” Connecticut v. Barrett, — U.S. at -, 107 S.Ct. at 830. About thirty minutes later Barrett was again warned and repeated his assertion that he was willing to talk but would not give a written statement until his attorney was present. Barrett then gave an oral statement admitting his involvement in the offense.
The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed Barrett’s conviction, holding that he had invoked his right to counsel by refusing to make written statements without the presence of an attorney. The Connecticut Court held that such invocation constituted an invocation of counsel for all purposes.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Connecticut court, holding that, “To conclude that respondent invoked his right to counsel for all purposes requires not a broad interpretation of an ambiguous statement, but a disregard of the ordinary meaning of respondent’s statement.” This same reasoning applies to the instant case where appellant’s statement referring to a lawyer was an inquiry into whether or not he would get an appointed attorney when he went to Houston for his robbery case there. His statement was not directed to an invocation of his right to have a lawyer for the purpose of questioning.
Connecticut v. Barrett does not draw a line at the warnings given. Rather, the circumstances showing the defendant’s intentions, including the warnings of course, are determinative. A defendant’s limited invocation was upheld to the extent it was invoked and not for all purposes.
The instant case is also similar to Curtis, supra, where the defendant’s inquiry to an officer concerned how he would be provided a court appointed attorney. In that case we held that the inquiry was not “tantamount to invocation of the right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation. Compare Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 480 n. 6, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1882 n. 6, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981).” In the instant case, appellant’s inquiry was directed at whether or not when he left Garland, where he faced robbery charges, he would get a lawyer in Houston for that separate robbery charge. The officers clarified that he would get a lawyer in Houston if he did not then have one when he was brought to Houston. Further, appellant was warned by a magistrate, apparently after this inquiry, and never mentioned anything about desiring a lawyer for any purpose, let alone for the questioning and statement. Appellant was given numerous opportunities to assert his right to an attorney when questioned in reference to the robbery in Garland as well as when questioned in reference to the robbery in Houston. He did not do so. His inquiry about an appointed attorney was directed to a different consideration — would he get an attorney in Houston when and if he had to go there to face the charges against him. Cf. Connecticut v. Barrett, supra; cf. Jordan v. Watkins, 681 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir.1982).
Ochoa, supra, does not control the instant case because the defendant in Ochoa, supra, invoked his right to counsel before further questioning and the giving of a statement: He stated that he “ ‘probably ought to talk to a lawyer or something to this effect or didn’t want to sign anything until he talked to a lawyer ...’” The officer then made idle conversation for [570]*570awhile and resumed questioning. Contrast the instant case in which appellant’s inquiry was directed to the future, “down the road” as his own attorney characterized it,8 and was not an indication that he wanted an attorney for the questioning or before going on. The inquiry was not even an equivocal invocation of counsel. It was simply a question directed by a defendant facing charges in separate cities, as to the possibility of getting an appointed lawyer in the other city when he went there to face the charges. Ochoa, supra, and Porter, supra, are inapplicable. The facts are not similar. Curtis, supra, is an analogous case. Given the facts and circumstances of the instant case, we do not believe that appellant’s inquiry constituted an invocation of the right to counsel.
Because we hold that appellant did not invoke his right to have counsel present during questioning we need not address the issue of whether an ambiguous or equivocal invocation is sufficient to require police to cease questioning an accused.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. This case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of appellant’s remaining grounds of error.
TEAGUE, J., dissents because he finds that the opinion authored by Justice DRAUGHN of the 14th Court of Appeals more than adequately and properly stated all that needs to be stated in the appeal of the cause; therefore, the State’s Petition for Discretionary Review should be refused as having been improvidently granted.