Collins v. Olsen

102 F.2d 828, 26 C.C.P.A. 1017, 41 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 220, 1939 CCPA LEXIS 121
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedMarch 6, 1939
DocketPatent Appeals 4069
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 102 F.2d 828 (Collins v. Olsen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Collins v. Olsen, 102 F.2d 828, 26 C.C.P.A. 1017, 41 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 220, 1939 CCPA LEXIS 121 (ccpa 1939).

Opinion

BLAND, Associate Judge.

This is an appeal in a United States Patent Office interference proceeding which involves the application of William R. Collins, filed December 3, 1928, and assigned to Standard Brands, Inc., and an application of Aksel G. Olsen filed December 3, 1929, and assigned to General Foods Corporation.

Standard Brands, Inc., through its subsidiary, Royal Baking Powder Co., manufactures and distributes “Royal Quick Setting Gelatin Dessert,” while the Jell-O Company, a subsidiary of General Foods Corporation, produces and sells a gelatine product known as “Jell-O.”

Both parties took testimony, and the appellee, being the junior party, was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence his priority of invention in the sole count in issue which had been suggested by the Primary Examiner and which reads as follows: “In a jelly composition the combination of an edible mixture of sugar, gelatine and acid with a buffer salt comprising a salt of a strong base and a weak acid.”

Concerning the invention involved and the state of the art existing at the time the parties made their respective inventions, the record discloses that prior to the invention here involved gelatine food mixtures dissolved in water and set in molds had been used for at least half a century. Prior to this invention, the commercial mixtures consisted of sugar, tartaric or citric acid, gelatine, flavor and color. This kind of mixture would usually set under ordinary conditions in three or four hours dependent upon the method used for cooling. When both parties entered the field and long prior thereto, the food industry was demanding a preparation which would set in a shorter period of time. The problem confronting the inventors was how to promote quick setting without injuriously affecting the edibility of the product. Where somewhat quicker setting was desired, greater amounts of gelatine were sometimes used, which often resulted in a tough, leathery product. Moreover, this treatment reduced the desirable acid content and in this way adversely affected the flavor of the mixture.

The invention in the instant case rests in the discovery that if a buffer salt of a strong base and a weak acid was added to a mixture of gelatine, sugar and acid, the mixture would always jell and the jelling action would take place in a much shorter time than possible under old methods, without adversely affecting the texture or flavor of the product. The edible salts used for buffer purposes were such as sodium bi-tartrate, ammonium citrate and certain phosphates. The buffer salt was added for the purpose of bringing about a buffer action in the mixture which action was the prevention of changes in hydrogen-ion concentration of acid or alkaline solutions. See “Chemical Encyclopaedia”— Kingzett, Fourth Edition, page 89. •

The Examiner of Interferences awarded Olsen a conception date of at least as early as December 7, 1927, and held that he had constructively reduced the invention to practice by filing his application on December 3, 1929. He awarded to Collins a conception date of at least as .early as October 8, 1928, and a date for constructively reducing the invention to practice of December 3, 1928, his application date. He held that since the record discloses that Olsen made no tests which involved ingestion or the consumption by a human being or some animal “whose digestive processes are known to closely parallel those of normal human beings, [etc.],” he had not reduced the invention to practice prior to the conception date awarded to Collins; that Olsen was not diligent from the time Collins entered the field until he filed his application, and that, therefore, since Olsen, being the first to conceive but last to reduce to practice, was lacking in diligence at the critical period, priority of the invention was awarded to Collins. Upon appeal to the Board of Appeals, the board did not review the evidence concerning the tests by Olsen but held that the examiner was in error in holding that said ingestion test was necessary and stated on this phase of the case that: “We believe, therefore, that the Olsen proof upon which the examiner *830 awarded conception as of November 1, 1927, may be relied upon to establish a reduction to practice. * * * ”

From the decision of the board appellant-has appealed here and urges first that, irrespective of the necessity of an ingestion test, appellee has produced no corroborative proof of any test being made meeting the requirements of the law; .second, that the examiner was correct in requiring that the ingestion test be applied to a food product which contained for the first time the use of a chemical substance, which though previously used in other foods was known to have certain undesirable physiological effects if used in certain quantities and under certain circumstances. Other questions were presented which, in view of pur conclusion, we need not state or discuss here.

After carefully examining the record which consists of more than one thousand pages, we are of the opinion that the board was in error in concluding that the Olsen proofs, upon which the examiner awarded conception as of December 1, 1927, could be relied upon to establish a reduction to practice of the invention. In reviewing the record in order to ascertain if Olsen’s proofs showed a proper reduction to practice of the invention, without giving consideration to the question involved relating to the ingestion tests, we do not have the advantage of a discussion by either tribunal of the Patent Office of the testimony and the numerous documentary exhibits introduced.

We agree with both tribunals that Olsen was properly awarded a conception date of the invention of the count as early as December 7, 1927, which was nearly two years prior to his constructive reduction to practice on December 3, 1929. Collins’ conception date, October 8, 1928, although an earlier one is claimed (which is immaterial, being subsequent to - the date properly awarded Olsen) is not seriously questioned by anyone, and the reduction to practice date relied upon by him is his filing date — December 3, 1928. It follows that if Olsen, although first to conceive, did not show a reduction to practice of the invention prior to the date of Collins’ conception, or did not show diligence in perfecting the invention from a period just prior to the date when Collins entered the field to the date of reduction to practice, he cannot, upon the instant record, be awarded priority.

Although appellee contends that testing as to setting time was all that was required for the completion of his reduction to practice, it is too clear to require extended discussion that the invention of the count could not be said to have been reduced to practice when the facts relating to setting time alone were ascertained, because the material might set quickly and be inedible. Different proportions of the ingredients had to be tried out. The resulting product could not be said to be-edible or to possess utility if its texture was so leathery or its tart flavor so far reduced that it was not satisfactory as a food. We think the record shows that in order to determine its edibility, it had to be tasted for the purpose of determining its texture and flavor. Moreover, since the object of the invention was to reduce the setting time without affecting its taste and edibility, it was' very important to test it as to setting time.

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Bluebook (online)
102 F.2d 828, 26 C.C.P.A. 1017, 41 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 220, 1939 CCPA LEXIS 121, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/collins-v-olsen-ccpa-1939.