Collier v. Gray

157 So. 40, 116 Fla. 845, 1934 Fla. LEXIS 1176
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedOctober 13, 1934
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 157 So. 40 (Collier v. Gray) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Collier v. Gray, 157 So. 40, 116 Fla. 845, 1934 Fla. LEXIS 1176 (Fla. 1934).

Opinions

Ellis, J.

This is an application for a temporary restraining order pending an appeal from an order made by Honorable J. B. Johnson, Judge of the Circuit Court for Leon County, denying an application by D. B. Collier, a citizen of Manatee County, Florida, for an injunction to restrain Honorable R. A. Gray, as Secretary of State, from continuing to advertise in newspapers in various counties in the State a proposed constitutional amendment, said to have been submitted at the last general session of the Legislature, and from expending any public funds upon the preparation, mailing or certifying the supposed proposition to the Boards of County Commissioners of the State of Florida for the purpose of having the same printed upon the official ballots to bd used at the November election. ■

From the order denying the injunction, which does not appear to have been recorded except by the notice of the entry of. the appeal, D. B. Collier appealed to this Court. The appeal was taken on September 29, 1934, the same day that the order denying the injunction was made.

*848 This Court is by the present application petitioned to exercise the power of granting to the complainant an injunction to restrain the Secretary of State from performing the very same public service which the Circuit Court refused to restrain him from performing.

The application is signed by twenty-two attorneys at law as solicitors for appellant.

The Court is requested to exercise the power under Section 5 of Article V of the Constitution which authorizes it to issue “all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction.”

This short cut to an expeditious determination of Mr. Collier’s appeal is an anomalous proceeding and seems hardly to be justified by the exigencies of the situation. It is true that the appeal may not be determined in due course before the election, as to the notices they have doubtless already been published, so the expense to be saved which justifies the taxpayer in seeking an injunction is the cost of printing the proposition on the ballots and the supposed confusion which a wrongful submission of the proposed amendment to a vote of the electors would entail. See Crawford v. Gilchrist, 64 Fla. 41, 59 South. Rep. 963.

In that case an application for a supersedeas was denied. A temporary injunction was granted against the Secretary of State, who on appeal applied for a supersedeas. The Court, considering that the public was vitally interested, decided to hear and determine the case on its merits, ques-r tions of law only being involved.

In this case the injunction was denied, so this Court is urged to issue the necessary writ in order that it may completely exercise its jurisdiction. If this argument is considered at all it follows that we will be required to consider the case on its merits as it is obviously too narrow a ground to consider only the fact' that the election will be held and *849 all the money spent for ballots before the record in the appeal can, in due course reach this Court and the cause be submitted on briefs.

The solicitors for appellant and the Attorney General have in view of the public interest requested the Court to dispose of the cause on the merits upon the application for a pendente lite injunction under Section 5 of Art. V. Const.

The proposed amendment to the Constitution, as the same has been advertised and will be printed on the ballots unless this Court grants the injunction sought, reads as follows as' the same appears in the transcript of the record:

“Be It Resolved by the Legislature oe the State oe Florida :

“That the following amendment to Article V of the Constitution of this State relating to the Judiciary by adding thereto additional Section 45 as hereinafter set forth, be and the same is hereby agreed to and shall be submitted to the qualified voters of the State of Florida, for ratification or rejection at the next ensuing general election, that is to say, that an addtional section to be designated as Section 45 of Article V of the Constitution of Flórida be adopted to read as follows, to-wit:

“Section 45.

“(a) There shall be no more than fifteen judicial circuits of the State of Florida to be appropriately designated, numbered and defined by a suitable law enacted by the Legislature for that purpose in accordance with the amendment; provided that no judicial circuit as defined by law hereunder shall embrace less than fifty thousand inhabitants according to the last preceding State or Federal Census; and provided further that no judicial circuit existing at the time of the ratification of this amendment shall be affected, altered or abolished, except in the manner provided in this amendment for carrying the same into execution, nor shall *850 any existing Circuit Judge or State Attorney be disturbed in the tenure of his office until the expiration of any commission held by him on the date this amendment is ratified.

“(b) It shall be the duty of the Legislature at its next regular session after the amendment shall have been ratified to pass suitable laws to carry this amendment into effect, and to make effective the reapportionment and reduction of judicial circuits and Circuit Judges hereby contemplated.

“(c) There shall be one Circuit Judge to each Judicial Circuit, but additional Circuit Judges for Judicial Circuits may be provided for by law as authorized by Section 43 of the amended Article V of this Constitution, but the total number of Circuit Judges apportioned to any one judicial circuit shall not exceed one Circuit Judge for every fifty thousand inhabitants, or major fraction thereof after this amendment shall have been put 'into effect.

“(d) In Circuits having more than one Judge the Legislature may designate the place of residence of any such additional Judge or Judges.

“(e) The reapportionment of Circuits and Judges thereof hereby provided for shall become effective sixty days after the Act providing for same shall have become a law.”

That resolution originated in the Senate and was known as “Senate Joint Resolution No. 582.”

It appears to have passed that body by the requisite three-fifths vote required by the Constitution on May 19, 1933.

After the resolution was proposed in the Senate it was amended, so the Senate Journal discloses, by adding as SubSection “d” the following:.

“In Circuits having more than one Judge, the Legislature may designate the place of residence of any such additional Judge or Judges;”

The resolution was agreed to as amended, the vote being thirty-seven yeas. No vote was cast in the negative.

*851 The resolution was duly transmitted to the House on the following day and was entered in full upon the Journal of that House. It had been previously entered in full in the Senate Journal without Sub-Section “d” above quoted. That entry appears on the Journal of May 11, 1933.

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Bluebook (online)
157 So. 40, 116 Fla. 845, 1934 Fla. LEXIS 1176, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/collier-v-gray-fla-1934.