Collier v. Collier

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Irina COLLIER and for her son, Case No.: 23-cv-1029-AGS-KSC 4 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 5 v. PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 6 Charles COLLIER, Martha Collier, and (ECF 2), DISMISSING THE CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE, AND 7 Carter Garber, DENYING AS MOOT MOTIONS 8 Defendants. FOR ATTORNEY APPOINTMENT AND TRANSFER TO AN MDL 9 PANEL (ECF 3 & 4) 10 11 “Plaintiff [Irina Collier] and her claims are not new to the court system.” Collier v. 12 Collier, No. 23-CV-00170-DMS-DDL, 2023 WL 1767012, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2023). 13 Like this case, the “crux of plaintiff’s claims in the federal court system appear to stem 14 from two family law matters in California state court.” Id. Plaintiff, having lost her previous 15 attempts, has now once again filed functionally the same lawsuit. (See generally ECF 1.) 16 In support of that effort, she moves to proceed in forma pauperis. She qualifies to proceed 17 without paying the initial filing fee, but her complaint must be dismissed as frivolous and 18 duplicative of past failed attempts. 19 MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 20 Typically, parties instituting a civil action in a United States district court must pay 21 filing fees of $402.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). But if granted the right to proceed in forma 22 pauperis, a plaintiff can proceed without paying the fee. Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 23 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). 24 25 26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay a $52 administrative 27 fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (effective Dec. 1, 2020). 28 1 Plaintiff asserts that she owns no assets, has a negative bank account balance, and 2 must pay “$5,800 or more” in monthly expenses. (ECF 2, at 5.) Her only income is 3 “$6,640” in alimony, but her spouse does “not consistently” pay. (Id. at 3.) The Court finds 4 that plaintiff has sufficiently shown an inability to pay the initial fees. See Blount v. Saul, 5 No. 21-CV-0679-BLM, 2021 WL 1561453, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2021) (“It is well- 6 settled that a party need not be completely destitute to proceed IFP.”). 7 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) SCREENING 8 When reviewing an IFP motion, the court must screen the complaint and dismiss it 9 if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim,” or seeks monetary relief from a 10 defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 11 1122, 1126‒27 (9th Cir. 2000). Also, “IFP complaints which are duplicative or repetitious 12 litigation of virtually identical causes of action are subject to dismissal.” Collier, 2023 WL 13 1767012, at *3 (cleaned up). “In assessing whether the second action is duplicative of the 14 first, courts examine whether the causes of action and relief sought, as well as the parties 15 or privies to the action, are the same.” Id. (cleaned up). 16 In February 2023, this Court documented Collier’s history of extensive litigation 17 here, the Northern District of California, the Ninth Circuit, and the Federal Circuit. See id. 18 at *1–2 (setting out that history). The Court dismissed her claims because they were 19 “duplicative” with her “previous lawsuits” and “frivolous” because the “facts in the 20 Complaint” did not support her claims and “the legal conclusions Plaintiff asks the Court 21 to reach are not viable.” Id. at *3. In particular, the Court concluded that Collier ran afoul 22 of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which forbids attempts to functionally appeal alleged 23 “legal errors by a state court” to a federal district court. Id. Although Collier filed an appeal, 24 the Ninth Circuit dismissed it “for failure to prosecute.” See Collier v. Collier, No. 23- 25 55126, slip op. at 1 (9th Cir. Apr. 10, 2023). 26 Undeterred, Collier filed—and had dismissed—yet more cases generally arising out 27 of the same family-court issues. See generally Case Nos. 23-cv-0368-GPC-BGS; 23-cv- 28 0385-RSH-MDD; 23-cv-0678-RSH-DEB. Then, she filed this case, in which she seeks to 1 enforce and receive damages based on the “DVRO [California Domestic Violence 2 Restraining Order] statute,” “[p]rompt divorce and division of [assets] secreted for over 25 3 years of this plaintiff’s marriage to Charles Collier,” and “punitive relief” for his alleged 4 failure to pay “alimony and child support.”2 (ECF 1, at 3.) But as the Northern District of 5 California has already explained to Collier, “California family-law matters are within the 6 purview of the state court, such that federal courts do not have jurisdiction.” Collier v. 7 President of Stanford, No. 4:22-cv-05375-KAW, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 30, 2022) 8 report and recommendation adopted by Collier v. President of Stanford, No. 4:22-cv- 9 05375-KAW, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2023). And to the extent she is attempting to 10 relitigate her custody arrangement or other orders in those cases, this Court is barred from 11 doing so by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Collier, 2023 WL 1767012, at *3 12 (explaining the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to plaintiff). 13 But even more to the point, back in February 2023 this Court already concluded that 14 her DVRO-based claims were duplicative of even earlier cases. See id. And in the same 15 case as the February 2023 Order, Collier made DVRO-based claims against the same 16 defendants she’s suing here. (See 23-cv-0170-DMS-DDL, ECF 1, at 1 (“Charles Wade 17 Collier”, “Martha Collier,” and “Garber”).) So if the DVRO claims were duplicative back 18 in February 2023, before both that case and the raft of cases that came after, they’re doubly 19 so now. 20 Thus, like her other cases, this case is subject to screening for being duplicative and 21 a meritless attempt to undermine state-court orders and family-law jurisdiction. 22 23

24 25 2 She also claims to seek service from a United States marshal and transfer of this and all her previous cases to an MDL panel as forms of relief. (See ECF 1, at 2.) But those 26 are court actions available by rule or motion, not remedies from the defendants. See Fed. 27 R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (authorizing the Court to “order service be made by a United States marshal,” especially for those “authorized to proceed in forma pauperis”); 28 U.S.C. 28 I CONCLUSION 2 Plaintiff's case is dismissed with prejudice. See Collier, 2023 WL 1767012, at *4 3 (screening her last attempt at the same litigation “with prejudice, and without leave to 4 ||amend”). Plaintiff is warned that if she makes any further duplicative filings in this court, 5 may be deemed a malicious filer. If so, the court could institute a prefiling bar requiring 6 ||her to seek permission before she can file any further lawsuits. Her other pending 7 motions—seeking appointment of counsel (ECF 3) and transfer to a multidistrict litigation 8 || panel (ECF 4)—are denied as moot. 9 Dated: June 8, 2023 10 2 | fi 11 Andrew G. Schopler United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28