Collier v. Collier

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: February 3, 2023
• Docket: 3:23-cv-00170
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 IRINA COLLIER, Case No.: 23-CV-00170-DMS-DDL

12 Plaintiff, ORDER 13 v. 14 CHARLES WADE COLLIER, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Plaintiff, a non-prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a Complaint (ECF No. 1) along 19 with a request to proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 2), a request for appointment of 20 counsel (ECF No. 3), a Motion for Writ of Mandamus (ECF No. 3), and an Emergency 21 Application for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 4). For the following reasons, 22 Plaintiff’s request to proceed In Forma Pauperis is granted, and the complaint is dismissed 23 with prejudice. All pending motions are therefore denied as moot. 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 1 I. 2 BACKGROUND 3 Plaintiff and her claims are not new to the court system. The crux of Plaintiff’s 4 claims in the federal court system appear to stem from two family law matters in California 5 state court—a marital dissolution case filed in 2018 in Santa Clara County Superior Court, 6 Case No. 18FL000889, and a domestic violence restraining order case, also filed in 2018 7 in Santa Clara County Superior Court, Case No. 18DV000161. 8 In 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the 9 Northern District of California seeking relief under the False Claims Act. Irina Collier v. 10 University of California, Berkeley, 21-cv-00502. The district court dismissed her 11 complaint. Id. Plaintiff appealed, and the Ninth Circuit denied her appeal as frivolous. 12 Irina Collier v. University of California, Berkeley, No. 21-15369, cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 13 2719 (U.S. May 16, 2022) (No. 21-7285). Plaintiff appealed the district court order to the 14 Federal Circuit, and the Federal Circuit denied the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Collier 15 v. University of California, Berkeley, No. 2022-1442, 2022 WL 1676223, at *1 (Fed. Cir. 16 My 26, 2022). In connection with the same district court case, Plaintiff also filed a petition 17 for issuance of an emergency writ. The Federal Circuit denied this petition. See Collier v. 18 Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, No. 2022-1442 (Fed. Cir. June 29, 2022). Plaintiff additionally 19 filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Federal Circuit Court. The Federal Circuit 20 denied the petition based on lack of jurisdiction. In re Collier, No. 2022-165, 2022 WL 21 17075046, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 18, 2022). 22 Plaintiff then sought relief again in the United States District Court for the Northern 23 District of California, this time for alleged civil rights violations and related family law 24 matters. Collier v. President of Stanford et al., 22-cv-5375, ECF No. 1 (N.D. Cal.). The 25 magistrate judge granted IFP status, but recommended the case be dismissed pursuant to a 26 sua sponte screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Id. at ECF No. 12 (recommending dismissal 27 due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the underlying issues involve California 28 family law matters and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests the court of jurisdiction). 1 Plaintiff appealed, and the Ninth Circuit dismissed her appeal as premature. Collier v. 2 President of Stanford, et al., No. 22-16529 (9th Cir. Oct. 21, 2022). Plaintiff thereafter 3 appealed the Ninth Circuit decision to the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit dismissed 4 Plaintiff’s appeal because it lacked jurisdiction. See Collier v. President of Stanford, No. 5 23-1185 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 30, 2022) (stating “this is now our fourth decision this year 6 explaining to Ms. Collier the statutory limits of this court’s jurisdiction over her civil 7 matters arising from the Northern District of California”). 8 In the same district court case, Collier v. President of Stanford et al., 22-cv-5375, 9 Plaintiff filed an ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO). ECF No. 44. 10 Plaintiff sought to “enjoin defendants from allegedly retaliating against her and violating a 11 Domestic Violence Restraining Order.” Id. at 1. The court denied the TRO because 12 Plaintiff failed to provide notice to the adverse party, and had not otherwise met her burden 13 for a TRO. Collier v. President of Stanford et al., 22-cv-5375, ECF No. 46 (N.D. Cal.). A 14 few weeks later, the district court judge adopted the recommendation of the magistrate 15 judge and dismissed the case with prejudice. Id. at ECF No. 49. Plaintiff now brings 16 essentially the same claims before this Court. 17 Here, Plaintiff alleges a litany of causes of action against the defendants, including: 18 violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, violation of a Domestic Violence Restraining 19 Orders (DVRO), violation of the Victims Against Women Act (VAWA), violation of her 20 son’s First Amendment rights, human trafficking, sexual assault, labor exploitation, bank 21 fraud, insurance fraud, educational discrimination, stalking, cyberstalking, surreptitious 22 smart house surveillance, health damage to a minor, drugging, threats to victims’ lives, 23 home invasions, United States Postal Service (USPS) violations, and obstruction of justice 24 by the Florida and California Sheriff’s offices. See generally Pl. Compl. (ECF No. 1). 25 Plaintiff contends the defendants conspired to commit these causes of actions under RICO. 26 Throughout the complaint, Plaintiff asks this Court to consolidate all of her cases, and to 27 change the status of this case and the others from civil to criminal. 28 / / / 1 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 2 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 3 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 4 $402. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); Civil Local Rule 4.5. An action may proceed despite a 5 plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed In 6 Forma Pauperis (IFP) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 7 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). This Court finds Plaintiff’s affidavit is sufficient to show she 8 is unable to pay the fees or post securities required to maintain this action. See Civil Local 9 Rule 3.2(d). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant 10 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).1 11 II. SUA SPONTE SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 12 Notwithstanding payment of any filing fee or portion thereof, a complaint filed by 13 any person proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject to a mandatory and 14 sua sponte review and dismissal by the court to the extent it is frivolous, malicious, fails to 15 state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant 16 immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 17 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to 18 prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Prior to 19 its amendment by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) 20 permitted sua sponte dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Id. at 1130. The 21 newly enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), however, mandates that the court reviewing a 22 complaint filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of section 1915 make and rule on its own 23 motion to dismiss before directing that the complaint be served by the U.S. Marshal 24 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2). Lopez, 203 F.3d 1127 (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only 25

26 1 Two weeks ago, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California revoked 27 Plaintiff’s IFP status because Plaintiff “failed to state a valid claim and has filed multiple convoluted and frivolous” actions. Collier v. President of Stanford et al., 22-cv-5375 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2023). 28 1 permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to 2 state a claim.”); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting 3 the “the language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil 4 Procedure 12(b)(6).”). 5 IFP complaints which are “[d]uplicative or repetitious litigation of virtually identical 6 causes of action [are] subject to dismissal.” Anderson Adams v. Hernandez, 1993 WL 7 548812, at *2. (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 1993). Where a plaintiff repeats pending or previously 8 litigated claims, it is proper to dismiss it as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Cato v. 9 United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 10 U.S. 25, 30 (1992) (recognizing Congress's concern that “a litigant whose filing fees and 11 court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive 12 to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits”) (quotation omitted). 13 “[I]n assessing whether the second action is duplicative of the first, [courts] examine 14 whether the causes of action and relief sought, as well as the parties or privies to the action, 15 are the same.” Adams v. Cal. Dep't of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 689 (9th Cir. 2007), 16 overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 904 (2008). 17 As summarized above, Plaintiff’s claims are not new to the federal courts. The Court 18 takes judicial notice of the records of each of Plaintiff’s previous cases noted above. See 19 Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted) (a court may 20 take judicial notice of “proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal 21 judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’”). Here, 22 Plaintiff has already brought nearly identical claims before the Northern District of 23 California, the Ninth Circuit, the Federal Circuit, and the United States Supreme Court. 24 The Plaintiff is the same in each case, Irina Collier, as are the defendants. In the complaint 25 here, Plaintiff lists Charles Wade Collier, Collier-Garbers IDEAS Inc., and Colliers Trust 26 Fund. However, throughout the complaint, Plaintiff also alleges harms by the University 27 of California, Berkeley, Marty Collier, and the President of Stanford. Collectively, these 28 1 are the same defendants in Plaintiffs previous lawsuits noted above. Therefore, the Court 2 finds Plaintiff’s complaint here is duplicative and subject to dismissal. 3 Additionally, in order to prevent abusive litigation, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permits 4 courts to dismiss a claim filed IFP if it is frivolous. A complaint is legally “frivolous where 5 it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 6 (1989). The term “‘frivolous,’ when applied to a complaint, embraces not only the 7 inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.” Id. As set forth in 8 the prior federal district court case, Collier v. President of Stanford et al., 22-cv-5375 (N.D. 9 Cal.), Plaintiffs claims stem from claims regarding an application for a Domestic Violence 10 Restraining Order (DVRO) in a California state court case.2 Plaintiff does make numerous 11 allegations, e.g. claims under RICO, VAWA, and the First and Thirteenth Amendments, 12 over which a federal court may have jurisdiction. However, the facts in the Complaint do 13 not support such claims, and the legal conclusions Plaintiff asks the Court to reach are not 14 viable. 15 Plaintiff’s allegations here stem from a California family law matter, which began 16 in 2018 according to the Complaint. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts 17 are deprived of jurisdiction to hear appeals to final, and non-final, orders and judgments 18 issued by a state court. See Doe & Assoc. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 19 (9th Cir. 2001); Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003). An action constitutes 20 a de facto appeal when the plaintiff is asserting legal errors by a state court and is seeking 21 a relief from the state court judgment. Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th 22 Cir. 2004) (citing Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163). Here, Plaintiff is doing just that. Plaintiff has 23 already appeared before the Santa Clara County Superior Court regarding the custody of 24 her child. Although in addition to her allegations regarding alleged DVRO violations, 25 Plaintiff asserts numerous federal violations, the underlying conduct stems from an alleged 26

27 2 Based upon review of the court records in case no. 18DV000161, it is not clear whether a restraining 28 1 || disagreement regarding child custody. As such, the Court finds Plaintiffs complaint here 2 ||is frivolous and subject to dismissal without leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 3 1122, 1127 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[w]hen a case may be classified as frivolous or 4 ||malicious, there 1s, by definition, no merit to the underlying action and so no reason to 5 || grant leave to amend.”). 6 Tf. 7 CONCLUSION 8 In light of the above, Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP is GRANTED and the 9 || Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice, and without leave to amend. In light of this 10 |/ruling, Plaintiff's remaining motions for appointment of counsel, writ of mandamus, and 11 ||emergency application for temporary restraining order are denied as moot. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 Dated: February 3, 2023 14 15 2 nn ym. 44\ 16 Hon. Dana M. Sabraw, Chief Judge 7 United States District Court 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28