Coletta Hummel v. Regional Transit Authority and/or Transdev Services, Inc. (Formerly Known as Veolia Transportation Services, Inc.) and Nigel Talley

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: November 10, 2021
• Docket: 2021-CA-0226
• Status: Published

Opinion

COLETTA HUMMEL * NO. 2021-CA-0226

VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL REGIONAL TRANSIT * AUTHORITY AND/OR FOURTH CIRCUIT TRANSDEV SERVICES, INC. * (FORMERLY KNOWN AS STATE OF LOUISIANA VEOLIA TRANSPORTATION ******* SERVICES, INC.) AND NIGEL TALLEY

APPEAL FROM CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH NO. 2016-06965, DIVISION “E” Honorable Omar Mason, Judge ****** Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase ****** (Court composed of Chief Judge James F. McKay, III, Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase, Judge Dale N. Atkins)

Charles M. Thomas Brian Marcelle Alex T. Robertson HUBER THOMAS & MARCELLE, LLP 1100 Poydras Street, Suite 2200 New Orleans, LA 70163

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

Geraldine Broussard Baloney Abril B. Sutherland Jose Carlos Mendez BROUSSARD BALONEY LAW FIRM 3852 Napoleon Avenue New Orleans, LA 70125

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE

APPEAL CONVERTED TO SUPERVISORY WRIT; WRIT GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

NOVEMBER 10, 2021 TGC JFM DNA Coletta Hummel (hereinafter “Ms. Hummel”) seeks review of the trial

court’s January 26, 2021 judgment denying her motion to enforce settlement. For

the reasons that follow, we convert Ms. Hummel’s appeal to a supervisory writ,

grant the writ, and deny the relief requested.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 15, 2016, Ms. Hummel sustained injuries when she was struck by a

bus driven by defendant Nigel Talley which was owned by the Regional Transit

Authority (hereinafter “the RTA”), a political subdivision. Ms. Hummel filed a

petition for damages, naming as defendants Mr. Talley; his employer, TransDev

Services; and the RTA. The parties maintain that four days prior to trial, on June

22, 2020, the RTA agreed to settle the case for $225,846.86. On July 22, 2020, Ms.

Hummel sent a letter to the RTA, which provided:

Please allow this letter to confirm that Ms. Hummel has accepted the RTA’s offer to pay $225,000 plus costs of $846.86 to resolve all matters between the parties in this lawsuit. We ask that the funds be made payable to ‘Coletta Hummel and Huber Thomas & Marcelle, LLP.’ Our firm’s Tax ID number is [XX-XXXXXXX] and I have included our W-9 for reference. If you need anything further from us to process this settlement, please contact us.

On September 11, 2020, following numerous emails, Ms. Hummel filed a

motion to enforce settlement. She maintained that the RTA failed to pay the

1 settlement or forward the requisite settlement documents. Ms. Hummel sought a

judgment from the trial court ordering the RTA to immediately remit the

settlement funds. The RTA opposed the motion to enforce settlement maintaining

that it is a political subdivision and funding for its settlements requires legislative

approval. The RTA further argued that installment payments were already initiated

and judicial intervention was not warranted. The RTA’s argument was premised on

the fact that after Ms. Hummel filed the motion to enforce settlement the parties

executed “The Release and Indemnity Agreement” on November 11, 2020, which

does not contain any language stating the manner in which payment would be

submitted. Ms. Hummel subsequently filed a reply brief asserting that the parties

never agreed to installment payments and reiterated her position that the settlement

should be paid in a lump sum.

At the hearing on the motion to enforce settlement, the trial court orally

denied the motion, and signed a written judgment on January 26, 2021. 1 In its

reasons for judgment, the trial court stated that there are limitations on the

judiciary’s ability to order governmental entities as to how settlement payments

should be executed. It also noted that there was insufficient evidence to compel a

lump sum payment. This appeal followed.

MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL

After the appeal was filed, the RTA filed a motion to dismiss the appeal

contending that this Court lacks jurisdiction. The RTA argues that Ms. Hummel

failed to properly invoke the jurisdiction of this Court because the trial court’s

judgment on the motion to enforce settlement is an interlocutory judgment that is

1 The Notice of Signing of Judgment is dated February 22, 2021.

2 not appealable. The RTA also asserts that Ms. Hummel’s notice of appeal fails to

seek any specified relief. Although the RTA has raised the issue of whether this

Court has jurisdiction to review the trial court’s judgment, we recognize that

appellate courts have the duty to examine sua sponte whether subject matter

jurisdiction exists. See Crown Pine Timber 4, LP v. Crosby Land & Res., L.L.C.,

2020-0356, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/25/20), 311 So.3d 434, 439. The trial court’s

January 26, 2021 judgment denies Ms. Hummel’s motion to enforce settlement and

does not dispose of the matter in its entirety.2 A trial court’s judgment denying a

motion to enforce settlement is an interlocutory judgment. New Orleans

Firefighters Ass’n Local 632 v. City of New Orleans, 1999-0011, p. 5 (La.App. 4

Cir. 11/24/99), 750 So.2d 1069, 1072.

The proper method to seek review of an interlocutory judgment is through

an application for supervisory writs. See Id.; Gerhold v. Giles, 2011-0992, p. 9

(La.App. 4 Cir. 1/25/12), 83 So.3d 1170, 1175; Ducksworth v. Ducksworth, 1998-

1812, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/27/99), 727 So.2d 1254, 1256. Accordingly, in the

interest of justice, and considering that this appeal was filed within the delays

allowed for applying for supervisory writs3, we convert the pending appeal to an

application for supervisory writs and review the matter under our supervisory

jurisdiction. See Kurz v. Milano, 2008-1090 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/18/09), 6 So.3d 916;

Lalla v. Calamar, N.V., 2008-0952 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/11/09), 5 So.3d 927; 800

2 Ms. Hummel’s motion to compel the deposition of the RTA’s corporate representative remains outstanding. 3 See Uniform Rules-Courts of Appeal, Rule 4-3, in pertinent part:

The judge who has been given notice of intention as provided by Rule 4-2 shall immediately set a reasonable return date within which the application shall be filed in the appellate court. The return date in civil cases shall not exceed 30 days from the date of notice, as provided in La. C.C.P. art. 1914.

3 Iberville St. Ltd. P’ship v. V Rest. Grp., L.L.C., 2016-0799 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/7/17),

221 So.3d 205.

DISCUSSION

Ms. Hummel asserts three assignments of error on appeal relative to the

denial of her motion to enforce settlement. However, we find the threshold issue

before this Court is whether the trial court erred in refusing to compel the RTA to

pay the settlement in a lump sum. Ms. Hummel asserts that despite the RTA’s

status as a political subdivision4, it could be ordered to pay the settlement in a lump

sum. The determination of whether a political subdivision can legally be required

to pay a settlement in a specific manner is purely a question of law. “Questions of

law are reviewed by appellate courts de novo, without deference to the legal

conclusions of the lower court.” Washington v. Cannizzaro, 2020-0470, p. 7

(La.App. 4 Cir. 3/17/21), 317 So.3d 826, 832-33 (citing Louisiana Mun. Ass’n v.

State, 2004-0227, p. 35 (La. 1/19/05), 893 So.2d 809, 836).

La. R.S. 13:5109, which governs the State’s authority to compromise and

settle claims presented through litigation, provides in pertinent part:

Any judgment rendered in any suit filed against the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision, or any compromise reached in favor of the plaintiff or plaintiffs in any such suit shall be exigible, payable, and paid only out of funds appropriated for that purpose by the legislature, if the suit was filed against the state or a state agency, or out of funds appropriated for that purpose by the named political subdivision, if the suit was filed against a political subdivision.

La. R.S. 13:5109(B)(2) (emphasis added). A settlement compromise is an

agreement which, when properly executed, a party can seek to have enforced

through a judgment obtained from a motion to enforce settlement. See Banque De

4 In her petition for damages, Ms. Hummel names RTA as a political subdivision of the State of Louisiana. Thus, there is no dispute that RTA is a political subdivision.

4 Depots v. Bozel Mineracao E Ferroligas, 1998-0742, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir.

1/27/99), 728 So.2d 533, 538. However, “[a] court’s power to hold a political

subdivision in contempt in order to punish it or coerce it to pay a money judgment

is prohibited by certain Louisiana provisions of the constitution, statutory laws and

jurisprudential authorities.” Plaquemines Par. Gov’t v. Hinkley, 2019-0929, p. 5

(La.App. 4 Cir. 4/22/20), ___ So.3d ___, 2020 WL 1937301 *3.

Three distinct branches of the government are established by Article II, § 1

of the Louisiana Constitution: the legislative, executive, and judicial. La. Const.

art. II, § 2 states, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this constitution, no one of

these branches, nor any person holding office in one of them, shall exercise power

belonging to either of the others.” Therefore, “[t]his trichotomous branching of

authority furnishes the basis for the existence of an inherent judicial power which

the legislative and executive branches cannot abridge. Similarly the judicial branch

may not usurp those powers which are vested in the other two branches.”

Plaquemines Par. Gov’t, 2019-0929, p. 6, 2020 WL 1937301 at *3 (quoting Hoag

v. State, 2004-0857, p. 4 (La. 12/1/04), 889 So.2d 1019, 1022).

Nevertheless, Article XII, § 10(A) of the Louisiana Constitution allows the

judiciary some power over the other branches by waiving the State’s immunity in

suits in contract and tort. Plaquemines Par. Gov’t, 2019-0929, p. 6, 2020 WL

1937301 at *3; See also Jones v. City of Baton Rouge-E. Baton Rouge Par., 388

So.2d 737, 740 (La. 1980). As such, the judicial branch is empowered to render

judgments against the State. Plaquemines Par, Gov’t, 2019-0929, p. 6, 2020 WL

1937301 at *3 (citation omitted). “However, the constitution does not provide the

judiciary with the ability to force when and how the legislative branch of

government should pay those monetary judgments. That power of choice is

5 specifically and exclusively reserved to the legislative branch of government… .”

Id. (emphasis added).

“[T]he jurisprudence is replete with cases that speak only to the fact that

when a ‘judgment’ is rendered against a legislative body, only the legislative body

has the authority to determine when and how that judgment should be paid.”

Plaquemines Par. Gov’t, 2019-0929, p. 10, 2020 WL 1937301 at *5 (emphasis

added); See also Hoag, 2004-0857, 889 So.2d at 1024-26; Newman Marchive

P’ship, Inc. v. City of Shreveport, 2007-1890 (La. 4/8/08), 979 So.2d 1262; Vogt v.

Bd. of Comm’rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 2001-0089 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/27/02), 814

So.2d 648.

At the hearing on Ms. Hummel’s motion to enforce settlement the trial court

stated:

[B]ecause of the nature of the [RTA] being a governmental entity, and the limitations on governmental entities in paying out settlements, [t]he Court’s going to deny the motion to enforce. The Court will recognize that there’s been an amount tendered pursuant to the representations of Counsel for both parties, that there’s been a tendered amount – there’s been a tender of $25,000.00, and whatever those terms are as to what the [RTA] has agreed to pay shall be enforced as such. But as far as the lump sum payment, [t]he Court’s not going to compel the [RTA] to make a lump sum payment. The Court does recognize that there is a settlement, and [t]he Court does recognize that pursuant to the representations made by counsel that those $25,000.00 payments shall be made in quarterly installments. And that’s the order of [t]he Court.

The trial court correctly determined that the RTA’s status as a political subdivision

limits the trial court’s ability to dictate the manner in which the RTA pays its

settlements. The judicial branch does not have the authority to determine how

compromises of suits against political subdivisions, such as the RTA, should be

paid. As such, the trial court did not err in denying Ms. Hummel’s request to

6 enforce the settlement payment as a lump sum because the RTA is a political

subdivision.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we convert the appeal to a supervisory writ, grant

the writ, and deny the relief requested. The trial court’s January 26, 2021 judgment

denying Ms. Hummel’s motion to enforce settlement is affirmed.

APPEAL CONVERTED TO SUPERVISORY WRIT; WRIT GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED