COLEMAN v. WAINMAN

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana
DecidedMarch 11, 2022
Docket2:21-cv-00389
StatusUnknown

This text of COLEMAN v. WAINMAN (COLEMAN v. WAINMAN) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
COLEMAN v. WAINMAN, (S.D. Ind. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

ROBERT COLEMAN, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 2:21-cv-00389-JPH-DLP ) WAINMAN, ) YARD, ) FRANK VANIHEL, ) HOLCOMB, ) ) Defendants. )

ORDER SCREENING AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND PROVIDING OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND

Plaintiff Robert Coleman, an Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC) inmate currently housed at Westville Correctional Facility brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon allegations related to his incarceration at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility (Wabash). Dkt. 1. Because Mr. Coleman is a "prisoner" as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), this Court has an obligation under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) to screen his complaint. I. Screening Standard Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the Court must dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017). To survive dismissal, [the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Pro se complaints such as that filed by Mr. Coleman are construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). II. The Complaint

Mr. Coleman names as defendants Officers, Wainman, Yard, and Holcomb, and Warden Vanihel, all IDOC employees at Wabash. Dkt. 1. Mr. Coleman alleges that on May 13, 2021, "correctional officers" on his unit were conducting pat down searches as inmates exited the range to go to outside recreation. Id. at 2. He states that when officers previously searched another inmate, they found that the inmate had a shampoo bottle that contained a liquid substance determined to be feces. Id. at 3. When officers then searched a group of inmates, including Mr. Coleman, one of these inmates also possessed a similar bottle that went undetected by the officers. Id. This inmate made it outside with the bottle and threw it on Mr. Coleman. Id. Mr. Coleman alleges that because the officers had already confiscated one bottle from another inmate, they "should of known something was up and should of conducted a strip search

on each inmate." Id. Mr. Coleman states that the inmate who assaulted him was wearing a pair of gym shorts and the bottle was visible through his clothing and should have been detected. Id. He claims that the staff said that Mr. Coleman spit on this inmate and they were aware that there was "an incident" between the inmates. Id. at 4. But, instead of taking this inmate to another empty holding space away from Mr. Coleman, the officers uncuffed the inmate, made Mr. Coleman cuff up, and allowed the inmate to throw feces on him. Id. at 4. Mr. Coleman states that he was told he could not have a shower until after photographs were taken to document the incident. Id. at 3. When he was in the shower, Mr. Coleman claims the first inmate who was caught with the shampoo bottle was in the shower wrestling with officers and the bottle of feces broke open in the shower, shower cuff port, and floor. Id. Mr. Coleman alleges that he was made to shower in the same shower that had not been cleaned or decontaminated. Id. When he was in the shower, Warden Vanihel, Lt. Holcomb, and Captain Wainman entered the range, and Mr. Coleman "tried to explain the incidents" but they walked

away. Id. He claims that Lt. Holcomb "was present for most of the incident already [and] knew of the conditions and unhealthy environment. Id. He claims that prison staff failed to protect him and exposed him to an unhealthy environment. Id. Mr. Coleman seeks compensatory and punitive damages, and mental and emotional damages, by way of his complaint. Id. at 5. III. Discussion

Mr. Coleman's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted for several reasons, and as such, must be dismissed. A. Claims Related to the Assault Mr. Coleman has not sufficiently pled any failure to protect claims regarding the assault. To state a claim for failure to protect, Mr. Coleman must allege that (1) the defendants' failure to protect him from the other inmate's assault with a bodily fluid posed a substantial risk of serious harm and (2) the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to that risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Dale v. Poston, 548 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 2008). Damages for such claim "cannot be predicated merely on knowledge of general risks of violence," Weiss v. Cooley, 230 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 1996). Here, Mr. Coleman has not named the defendants in the section of the complaint that discusses the assault and therefore has not alleged that they were responsible for any alleged failure to protect him from harm. Colbert v. City of Chi., 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017) ("Individual liability under § 1983 . . . requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.") (internal quotation omitted) (citing Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir. 1983). Further, he has not alleged that the defendants knew that the other inmate posed a specific threat to him—or that he was in possession of a bodily fluid that he was going to use on Mr. Coleman to harm him. A general risk that inmates may smuggle prohibited items

outside to recreation does not establish a failure to protect claim. B. Claims Related to the Contaminated Shower Mr. Coleman's claim that he was made to take a shower in the same area where a confiscated shampoo bottle of feces had broken open, and that the shower was not decontaminated, must also be dismissed. Mr. Coleman does not allege that any individual defendant was responsible for forcing him to take a shower during this time or in this area. Mr. Coleman specifically states that "[d]uring the time he was in the shower," he tried to talk to Warden Vanihel, Lt. Holcomb, and Captain Wainman, but they walked away. This allegation does not indicate that any of these defendants forced Mr. Coleman to shower in a contaminated area, or that the Warden or Captain knew what occurred in the shower, until after it happened. Indeed, the allegations indicate that Mr.

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Related

Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Morritz J. Weiss v. Brad Cooley
230 F.3d 1027 (Seventh Circuit, 2000)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Dale v. Poston
548 F.3d 563 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Charles Beal, Jr. v. James Beller
847 F.3d 897 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)
Colbert v. City of Chicago
851 F.3d 649 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)
Cesal v. Moats
851 F.3d 714 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)
Johnson v. Pelker
891 F.2d 136 (Seventh Circuit, 1989)

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Bluebook (online)
COLEMAN v. WAINMAN, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/coleman-v-wainman-insd-2022.