Coleman v. State
This text of 630 N.E.2d 1376 (Coleman v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
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Aaron Coleman appeals his conviction of burglary, a Class C felony.1 He presents two issues for our review:
I. Whether Coleman knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.
II. Whether the trial court committed fundamental error in instructing the jury.
We affirm.
The evidence most favorable to the State discloses that Coleman and Larry Dunfee planned to burglarize Cast Products in Elk-hart, Indiana to obtain copper and money. Coleman broke into the Cast Products building while Dunfee waited outside in Coleman's vehicle. Dunfee was apprehended at the burglary scene and provided information which led to Coleman's arrest.
I.
Waiver of Right to Counsel
Coleman represented himself at trial, with the assistance of appointed stand-by counsel. He now contends that his waiver of his right to representation by counsel was involuntary because the trial court's advisement concerning self-representation was inadequate.
In Faretta v. California (1975), 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, the Supreme Court held that the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guaranteed an accused the right to represent himself. However, the election for self-representation must be made voluntarily and intelligently. The record must affirmatively disclose that the defendant is aware of the implications, consequences and risks of self-representation. Leonard v. State (1991), Ind., 579 N.E.2d 1294, 1295.
The trial court must conduct a hearing to determine the defendant's competency to represent himself and to establish a record of the waiver. Martin v. State (1992), Ind.App., 588 N.E.2d 1291, 1293. The court may inquire into the defendant's educational background, familiarity with legal procedures and general mental capabilities. However, no specific requirement to explore each of these areas is imposed upon the trial court. It is sufficient if the record reveals that a defendant has been apprised of the advantages of representation by counsel and the pitfalls of self-representation but nevertheless voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently chooses self-representation. Id.
At a pre-trial hearing, Coleman requested that he be allowed to represent himself. In response to the trial court's ingui-ries, Coleman stated that he had completed high school and could read, write and understand English He indicated his awareness that he was charged with committing a Class C felony and faced a potential penalty of eight years imprisonment.
The trial court advised Coleman that he would be treated as if he were an attorney and that he would be responsible for making arguments, questioning witnesses and selecting jurors. The court indicated that he could not explain evidentiary objections to Coleman. Finally, the court advised Coleman that he could not testify during his final argument, but was responsible for arguing the merits of his defense and attacking any defects in the State's case. The court appointed stand-by counsel "to answer Coleman's questions." Supp.Record, p. 7..
The record reveals that Coleman was adequately advised of the consequences of self-[1378]*1378representation. His waiver of representation by counsel was knowing and voluntary.
IL.
Jury Instruction
Coleman challenges certain language included within Preliminary Instruction 7 and Final Instruction 11:
"A reasonable doubt is an actual and substantial doubt that arises in the mind after a fair and impartial consideration and weighing of all the evidence and cireum-stances in the case.... [It is your personal duty to vote for conviction as long as you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt as charged."
Record, pp. 352-53.
Coleman lodged no objection to the foregoing instruction; therefore, our review is limited to ascertaining whether fundamental error was committed. Faulisi v. State (1992), Ind.App., 602 N.E.2d 1032, 1038, trams. denied. Fundamental error is error so blatant and prejudicial that, if not corrected, it would deny the defendant due process. Id.
Coleman admits that the giving of mandatory instructions concerning the duty to convict upon proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is not fundamental error. Barker v. State (1982), Ind., 440 N.E.2d 664, 670-71, reh. denied. By his failure to interpose a trial objection to the language "[I]t is your personal duty to vote for conviction as long as you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt," Coleman has waived his right to challenge that language on appeal.
However, Coleman contends that the portion of the instruction equating a "reasonable doubt" with a "substantial doubt" allowed a finding of guilt based upon a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause. He relies upon Cage v. Louisiana (1990), 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 LEd.2d 339, wherein the Supreme Court stated:
"It is plain to us that the words 'substantial and 'grave, as they are commonly understood, suggest a higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard."
Id. at 40, 111 S.Ct. at 329-30.
Although the use of the word "substantial" suggests a higher degree of doubt than that properly required for acquittal, here the constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Fundamental error in giving instructions is subject to a harmless error analysis. Collins v. State (1991), Ind., 567 N.E.2d 798, 801. This court must review the record in its entirety to determine whether, based upon the evidence presented, an honest and fair-minded jury would have rendered a guilty verdict absent the use of the erroneous instruction. Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705; Larimer v. State (1975), 163 Ind.App. 673, 326 N.E.2d 277, 279.
The evidence of Coleman's guilt is overwhelming. The instruction did not contribute to his conviction.
Brian Conwell, accounting controller of Cast Products, testified that he arrived at work on November 7, 1991 and discovered that a window had been broken and a cash box was missing.
Larry Dunfee testified that, while he and Coleman were residents at the Faith Mission in Elkhart and temporary employees of Cast Products, they planned a burglary of Cast Products. Dunfee further testified that he waited in Coleman's vehicle while Coleman executed the burglary plan in the following manner. Coleman proceeded toward the Cast Products building and shortly thereafter returned to the vehicle. He indicated that he had broken a window and needed to determine if an alarm was activated.
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630 N.E.2d 1376, 1994 Ind. App. LEXIS 305, 1994 WL 89792, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/coleman-v-state-indctapp-1994.