Coleman v. Newsom

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 30 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RALPH COLEMAN; et al., No. 24-2263 D.C. No. Plaintiffs - Appellees, 2:90-cv-00520-KJM-DB v. MEMORANDUM* GAVIN NEWSOM; et al.,

Defendants - Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Kimberly J. Mueller, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 15, 2025 San Francisco, California

Before: S.R. THOMAS, M. SMITH, and BRESS, Circuit Judges. Dissent by Judge BRESS.

Gavin Newsom and other California state officials (collectively, the State)

appeal the district court’s order staying the State’s proposed program of tours of

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) prisons. “We

have jurisdiction to determine whether we have jurisdiction to hear the case.”

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Aguilar v. Walgreen Co., 47 F.4th 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Childs v.

San Diego Fam. Hous. LLC, 22 F.4th 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2022)). We conclude

that we lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s order, and we accordingly

dismiss. Because the parties are familiar with the facts of this case, we do not

recount them here except as necessary to provide context to our ruling.

1. The district court’s order is not a final decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. “In the context of postjudgment proceedings in which the district court has

retained jurisdiction to enforce a permanent injunction,” a final order “should not

anticipate any further proceedings on the same issue and should have some real-

world significance.” Flores v. Garland, 3 F.4th 1145, 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 2021).

The district court’s order does not satisfy these criteria. Because it does not clearly

foreclose the State’s ability to conduct tours, and suggests that the State could

renew its request for tours upon a “threshold showing” of their relevance, the order

implicitly “contemplat[es] further proceedings on the same issue.” Id. at 1153.

Further, the order lacks “real-world significance,” id., because it does not affect

class members and “each case management order implementing a consent decree

cannot readily be considered a final post judgment order,” Plata v. Brown, 754

F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2014). As a result, we lack jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1291.

2. The district court’s order is also not an injunction pursuant to 28

2 24-2263 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). “The three fundamental characteristics of an injunction are

that it is (1) ‘directed to a party,’ (2) ‘enforceable by contempt,’ and (3) ‘designed

to accord or protect “some or all of the substantive relief sought by a complaint” in

more than preliminary fashion.’” Orange Cnty. v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking

Corp., 52 F.3d 821, 825 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting 16 Charles A. Wright et al.,

Federal Practice and Procedure § 3922 at 29 (1977)). Here, as in National

Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Service, the district court’s order

is directed to the State, and could be enforced through contempt, but it does not

affect or vindicate any of the substantive rights Plaintiffs assert in this action. 886

F.3d 803, 825 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding an order is not an injunction where it purely

“‘concern[s] the conduct of the parties or their counsel’ in litigation” (alteration in

original) (quoting In re Lorillard Tobacco Co., 370 F.3d 982, 986–87 (9th Cir.

2004))). Similarly, the order does not grant or deny the relief that the State might

seek from a motion to terminate this action pursuant to the Prison Litigation

Reform Act. As a result, the district court’s order, which falls more clearly into the

category of case management, “is not considered an injunction and therefore is not

appealable under § 1292(a)(1).” Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas

Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 279 (1988).

3. There is no other basis for jurisdiction. The order is not appealable as

a collateral order because it is not “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final

3 24-2263 judgment.” Plata, 754 F.3d at 1075 (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349

(2006)). We also decline to construe the appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus

because there is no indication that the district court has “usurped its power or

clearly abused its discretion.” Id. at 1076 (citing Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889,

895 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)).

DISMISSED.

4 24-2263 FILED MAY 30 2025 Coleman v. Newsom, 24-2263 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS BRESS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

My disagreement here is narrow. Unlike the majority, I believe we have

jurisdiction over this appeal. But I would affirm the district court’s order on the

merits.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal of a post-judgment order under 28

U.S.C. § 1291 because the district court’s order does “not anticipate any further

proceedings on the same issue” and “ha[s] some real-world significance.” Flores v.

Garland, 3 F.4th 1145, 1153 (9th Cir. 2021). As to the former, the order disallows

the State’s requested tours. And although the State may renew the request for tours,

that would necessarily be at a different time and on a different record. I do not regard

the district court’s order as anticipating any further proceedings on the State’s

present request for tours. Given the State’s position that one of the purposes of the

tours is to collect evidence for the State to decide whether to file a termination

motion, “if the government complies with the [appealed order], as apparently it has

done, it is unlikely to have any opportunity to appeal it unless we exercise

jurisdiction under section 1291.” Id. I also think the order has sufficient “real-world

significance” because it prevents the tours from happening now, and therefore

“govern[s] future interactions” between the parties. Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger,

622 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2010). That said, I would affirm the district court’s case-management order because

the district court did not abuse its discretion. The order barring the tours was a

“reasonable response to the problems” arising from the parties’ dispute over the tours

amidst the sprawling remedial phase of this long-running litigation. Dietz v.

Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 45 (2016) (quotations omitted); see Coleman v. Newsom, 131

F.4th 948, 955–56 (9th Cir. 2025).

2 24-646