Coleman v. Dist. Ct. (Incorp Serv.'s, Inc.)

Nevada Supreme Court

Coleman v. Dist. Ct. (Incorp Serv.'s, Inc.)

DecidedSeptember 11, 2015

Docket67924

StatusUnpublished

This text of Coleman v. Dist. Ct. (Incorp Serv.'s, Inc.) (Coleman v. Dist. Ct. (Incorp Serv.'s, Inc.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nevada Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Coleman v. Dist. Ct. (Incorp Serv.'s, Inc.), (Neb. 2015).

Pincite

Opinion

755; see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-76 (1985). While the defendant's physical presence in the forum state is not required, a mere showing that the plaintiff contracted with the defendant is not sufficient. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476, 478. Instead, the court must evaluate the parties' prior negotiations, anticipated future consequences, and actual course of dealings, along with the contract terms Id. at 479. Here, real party in interest Incorp Services, Inc. (plaintiff below) alleged, and the district found, that Incorp is a Nevada corporation and that petitioner Christopher J. Coleman (defendant below), a Florida resident, purposefully directed his activities toward Nevada when he telephoned Incorp's office, requesting information about its resident agent services, and made payments over an extended period of time on forms showing Incorp's Nevada address. But nothing in the record demonstrates that Coleman knew he was calling a Nevada company when he initiated contact with Incorp, and he averred that he dialed a toll-free number and believed he was calling a Florida corporation, as Incorp is also registered as a domestic Florida company. Further, while emails and invoices from Incorp bore its Nevada address, nothing in the record shows that Coleman made any payments to Incorp in Nevada, and the fact that Incorp is a Nevada-based corporation, alone, is insufficient to establish jurisdiction. See id. at 478. As many courts have explained, "making telephone calls and mailing payments into the forum state are insufficient bases for jurisdiction." Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Corp. v. Inland Power & Light Co., 18 F.3d 389, 395 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596, 604 (7th Cir. 1979), Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Certain Lloyds Underwriters, 487 F. Supp. 1115 (W.D.

SUPREME COUFtT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A 491010 Wis. 1980), and Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Logicon, 487 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. III. 1980)); see also Kerry Steel, Inc. v. Paragon Indus., Inc., 106 F.3d 147, 151 (6th Cir. 1997) (telephone calls, faxes, letters, and payments to the forum state are not sufficient contacts with the forum state in a breach of contract action); Sunbelt Corp. v. Noble, Denton & Assocs., 5 F.3d 28, 31-32 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that minimum contacts were not established by contracting and making informational communications with the forum company, when services were performed in another state); Initiatives, Inc. v. Korea Trading Corp., 991 F. Supp. 476, 479 (E.D. Va. 1997) (same). But cf. Peccole v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 111 Nev. 968, 971, 899 P.2d 568, 570 (1995) (explaining that a telephone call can be a sufficient contact for personal jurisdiction when the cause of action arises from that call). Moreover, Nevada was not among the states for which Coleman hired Incorp to provide ongoing resident agent services. Levinson v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 103 Nev. 404, 407, 742 P.2d 1024, 1026 (1987) ("The performance of professional services within the forum, at the request of a nonresident defendant, is sufficient to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction where the contract clearly contemplates that the plaintiff would perform substantial services within the forum."). Thus, Incorp has not presented evidence that Coleman purposefully directed his activities toward Nevada sufficient to make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, and we need not review the reasonableness factor. As Incorp has not established a prima facie showing of jurisdiction over Coleman, we conclude that extraordinary relief is warranted, Ful bright & Jaworski LLP v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 131 Nev., Adv. Op. 5, 342 P.3d 997, 1001 (2015) (explaining that, as the right

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (0) 1947A to appeal is inadequate, extraordinary relief is warranted when the district court acts in excess of its jurisdiction over a person). Therefore, we ORDER the petition GRANTED AND DIRECT THE CLERK OF THIS COURT TO ISSUE A WRIT OF prohibition instructing the district court to dismiss the action against petitioner.

Parraguirre

, J.

J.

cc: Hon. Timothy C. Williams, District Judge Christopher J. Coleman Fox Rothschild, LLP, Las Vegas Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4 (0) ]947A 4010

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755; see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-76 (1985). While the defendant's physical presence in the forum state is not required, a mere showing that the plaintiff contracted with the defendant is not sufficient. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476, 478. Instead, the court must evaluate the parties' prior negotiations, anticipated future consequences, and actual course of dealings, along with the contract terms Id. at 479. Here, real party in interest Incorp Services, Inc. (plaintiff below) alleged, and the district found, that Incorp is a Nevada corporation and that petitioner Christopher J. Coleman (defendant below), a Florida resident, purposefully directed his activities toward Nevada when he telephoned Incorp's office, requesting information about its resident agent services, and made payments over an extended period of time on forms showing Incorp's Nevada address. But nothing in the record demonstrates that Coleman knew he was calling a Nevada company when he initiated contact with Incorp, and he averred that he dialed a toll-free number and believed he was calling a Florida corporation, as Incorp is also registered as a domestic Florida company. Further, while emails and invoices from Incorp bore its Nevada address, nothing in the record shows that Coleman made any payments to Incorp in Nevada, and the fact that Incorp is a Nevada-based corporation, alone, is insufficient to establish jurisdiction. See id. at 478. As many courts have explained, "making telephone calls and mailing payments into the forum state are insufficient bases for jurisdiction." Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Corp. v. Inland Power & Light Co., 18 F.3d 389, 395 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596, 604 (7th Cir. 1979), Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Certain Lloyds Underwriters, 487 F. Supp. 1115 (W.D.

SUPREME COUFtT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A 491010 Wis. 1980), and Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Logicon, 487 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. III. 1980)); see also Kerry Steel, Inc. v. Paragon Indus., Inc., 106 F.3d 147, 151 (6th Cir. 1997) (telephone calls, faxes, letters, and payments to the forum state are not sufficient contacts with the forum state in a breach of contract action); Sunbelt Corp. v. Noble, Denton & Assocs., 5 F.3d 28, 31-32 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that minimum contacts were not established by contracting and making informational communications with the forum company, when services were performed in another state); Initiatives, Inc. v. Korea Trading Corp., 991 F. Supp. 476, 479 (E.D. Va. 1997) (same). But cf. Peccole v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 111 Nev. 968, 971, 899 P.2d 568, 570 (1995) (explaining that a telephone call can be a sufficient contact for personal jurisdiction when the cause of action arises from that call). Moreover, Nevada was not among the states for which Coleman hired Incorp to provide ongoing resident agent services. Levinson v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 103 Nev. 404, 407, 742 P.2d 1024, 1026 (1987) ("The performance of professional services within the forum, at the request of a nonresident defendant, is sufficient to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction where the contract clearly contemplates that the plaintiff would perform substantial services within the forum."). Thus, Incorp has not presented evidence that Coleman purposefully directed his activities toward Nevada sufficient to make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, and we need not review the reasonableness factor. As Incorp has not established a prima facie showing of jurisdiction over Coleman, we conclude that extraordinary relief is warranted, Ful bright & Jaworski LLP v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 131 Nev., Adv. Op. 5, 342 P.3d 997, 1001 (2015) (explaining that, as the right