Pearson, J.
This case involves a recall petition filed against members of the Shoreline School Board. The issue presented is whether the charges propounded in the petition allege sufficient grounds for recall. The trial court, pursuant to RCW 29.82, as amended by Laws of 1984, ch. 170, conducted a hearing to determine the sufficiency of the charges and adequacy of the ballot synopsis and concluded that charges 1, 2, 4 and 5 were sufficient. We hold that charges 1 and 2 are legally insufficient, charges 4 and 5 are factually insufficient and the trial judge should have allowed voir dire examination of the recall petitioners to ascertain whether they had sufficient knowledge of the facts alleged in the charges.
The facts in this case are clear. In early 1984 Shoreline School District 412 began considering its long-range facility utilization plan. On May 7, 1984, the superintendent of Shoreline School District filed an initial plan recommending in part the closure of Shoreline High School and two elementary schools. Thereafter hearings were held pursuant to RCW 28A.58.031 to discuss the closures. On June 4, 1984, the superintendent made his final recommendations, including the closures outlined above. Thereafter, the school board, after making a few modifications, approved the plan including the closure of Shoreline High School and the two elementary schools.
On July 30, 1984, George R. Webster and Donald La-Verne LaMontagne filed recall petitions against the five elected board members of Shoreline School District 412. The charges were essentially as follows: All five members were charged with wasting taxes when they voted to close Shoreline High School and renovate Shorecrest High School which was located on leased land. A similar allegation was made concerning the two elementary schools. The members were charged with improperly withholding minutes of school board meetings from the public. A fourth [283]*283charge asserted participation in a meeting in violation of the Open Public Meetings Act of 1971, RCW 42.30. The fifth charge asserted the Board had retained an incompetent superintendent.
Thereafter, pursuant to the new statutory provisions, the prosecuting attorney formulated ballot synopses and transmitted them to the Superior Court for approval and determination of the sufficiency of the charges. Laws of 1984, ch. 170, § 3, p. 823. On August 31, 1984, a hearing was held in the Superior Court for King County wherein the board members argued not only that the recall petitions were insufficient, but also that they had a right to voir dire the petitioners concerning their knowledge of the alleged charges. The Superior Court refused to allow the voir dire and found charges 1, 2, 4 and 5 sufficient, charge 3 insufficient and the ballot synopsis adequate. The school board members immediately appealed.1
This case involves the interpretation of Washington's constitutional and statutory recall provisions. These provisions were recently analyzed in Chandler v. Otto, 103 Wn.2d 268, 693 P.2d 71 (1984), wherein this court held that the 1976 and 1984 amendments to the recall statute, RCW 29.82, clearly disclose an intent by the Legislature to limit the scope of the recall right to recall for cause and thereby free public officials from the harassment of recall elections grounded on frivolous charges or mere insinuations. As we indicated in Chandler, such a rule is consistent with the original intent of the framers of the constitution's recall provision. Chandler, at 271.
In Chandler, we held that a recall petition must be both legally and factually sufficient. Chandler, at 274. The opinion also states that discretionary acts of a public official are not a basis for recall insofar as those acts are an appropriate exercise of discretion by the official in the performance of his or her duties. Chandler, at 274. We believe this rule is applicable to the first two charges of wasting taxes in the [284]*284instant case.
Discretion implies knowledge and prudence and that discernment which enables a person to judge critically what is correct and proper. It is judgment directed by circumspection. Merritt Sch. Dist. 50 v. Kimm, 22 Wn.2d 887, 891, 157 P.2d 989 (1945); Ledgering v. State, 63 Wn.2d 94, 102, 385 P.2d 522 (1963). The Board's decision to close Shoreline High School and the two elementary schools was certainly a discretionary act. As stated by the United States Supreme Court:
The construction of new schools and the closing of old ones are two of the most important functions of local school authorities and also two of the most complex. They must decide questions of location and capacity in light of population growth, finances, land values, site availability, through an almost endless list of factors to be considered.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 20, 28 L. Ed. 2d 554, 91 S. Ct. 1267 (1971); see also 16A E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 46.07b, at 419 (3d rev. ed. 1984). The Board's decision clearly required judgment guided by knowledge, prudence and circumspection. In addition, the right to make such a decision is essential to the Board's satisfactory completion of the responsibilities entrusted to the school districts by the Legislature, RCW 28A.58.758, and is necessary to the fulfillment of the State's paramount duty to provide for public education. See Seattle Sch. Dist. 1 v. State, 90 Wn.2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978).2 We are therefore compelled to hold that the decision to close schools is a discretionary act and members of a school board cannot be recalled unless they arbitrarily or unreasonably exercised such discretion.
A clear abuse of discretion may be shown by dem[285]*285onstrating the discretion was exercised in a manner which was manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. Wilson v. Board of Governors, 90 Wn.2d 649, 656, 585 P.2d 136 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979). We are unable to find any facts in the recall petition which might suggest that the school board exercised its discretion in a manner which was arbitrary, unreasonable or untenable. A general statement that public funds are being wasted is insufficient evidence of an abuse of discretion. State ex rel. Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Brooks, 80 Wn.2d 121,
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Pearson, J.
This case involves a recall petition filed against members of the Shoreline School Board. The issue presented is whether the charges propounded in the petition allege sufficient grounds for recall. The trial court, pursuant to RCW 29.82, as amended by Laws of 1984, ch. 170, conducted a hearing to determine the sufficiency of the charges and adequacy of the ballot synopsis and concluded that charges 1, 2, 4 and 5 were sufficient. We hold that charges 1 and 2 are legally insufficient, charges 4 and 5 are factually insufficient and the trial judge should have allowed voir dire examination of the recall petitioners to ascertain whether they had sufficient knowledge of the facts alleged in the charges.
The facts in this case are clear. In early 1984 Shoreline School District 412 began considering its long-range facility utilization plan. On May 7, 1984, the superintendent of Shoreline School District filed an initial plan recommending in part the closure of Shoreline High School and two elementary schools. Thereafter hearings were held pursuant to RCW 28A.58.031 to discuss the closures. On June 4, 1984, the superintendent made his final recommendations, including the closures outlined above. Thereafter, the school board, after making a few modifications, approved the plan including the closure of Shoreline High School and the two elementary schools.
On July 30, 1984, George R. Webster and Donald La-Verne LaMontagne filed recall petitions against the five elected board members of Shoreline School District 412. The charges were essentially as follows: All five members were charged with wasting taxes when they voted to close Shoreline High School and renovate Shorecrest High School which was located on leased land. A similar allegation was made concerning the two elementary schools. The members were charged with improperly withholding minutes of school board meetings from the public. A fourth [283]*283charge asserted participation in a meeting in violation of the Open Public Meetings Act of 1971, RCW 42.30. The fifth charge asserted the Board had retained an incompetent superintendent.
Thereafter, pursuant to the new statutory provisions, the prosecuting attorney formulated ballot synopses and transmitted them to the Superior Court for approval and determination of the sufficiency of the charges. Laws of 1984, ch. 170, § 3, p. 823. On August 31, 1984, a hearing was held in the Superior Court for King County wherein the board members argued not only that the recall petitions were insufficient, but also that they had a right to voir dire the petitioners concerning their knowledge of the alleged charges. The Superior Court refused to allow the voir dire and found charges 1, 2, 4 and 5 sufficient, charge 3 insufficient and the ballot synopsis adequate. The school board members immediately appealed.1
This case involves the interpretation of Washington's constitutional and statutory recall provisions. These provisions were recently analyzed in Chandler v. Otto, 103 Wn.2d 268, 693 P.2d 71 (1984), wherein this court held that the 1976 and 1984 amendments to the recall statute, RCW 29.82, clearly disclose an intent by the Legislature to limit the scope of the recall right to recall for cause and thereby free public officials from the harassment of recall elections grounded on frivolous charges or mere insinuations. As we indicated in Chandler, such a rule is consistent with the original intent of the framers of the constitution's recall provision. Chandler, at 271.
In Chandler, we held that a recall petition must be both legally and factually sufficient. Chandler, at 274. The opinion also states that discretionary acts of a public official are not a basis for recall insofar as those acts are an appropriate exercise of discretion by the official in the performance of his or her duties. Chandler, at 274. We believe this rule is applicable to the first two charges of wasting taxes in the [284]*284instant case.
Discretion implies knowledge and prudence and that discernment which enables a person to judge critically what is correct and proper. It is judgment directed by circumspection. Merritt Sch. Dist. 50 v. Kimm, 22 Wn.2d 887, 891, 157 P.2d 989 (1945); Ledgering v. State, 63 Wn.2d 94, 102, 385 P.2d 522 (1963). The Board's decision to close Shoreline High School and the two elementary schools was certainly a discretionary act. As stated by the United States Supreme Court:
The construction of new schools and the closing of old ones are two of the most important functions of local school authorities and also two of the most complex. They must decide questions of location and capacity in light of population growth, finances, land values, site availability, through an almost endless list of factors to be considered.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 20, 28 L. Ed. 2d 554, 91 S. Ct. 1267 (1971); see also 16A E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 46.07b, at 419 (3d rev. ed. 1984). The Board's decision clearly required judgment guided by knowledge, prudence and circumspection. In addition, the right to make such a decision is essential to the Board's satisfactory completion of the responsibilities entrusted to the school districts by the Legislature, RCW 28A.58.758, and is necessary to the fulfillment of the State's paramount duty to provide for public education. See Seattle Sch. Dist. 1 v. State, 90 Wn.2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978).2 We are therefore compelled to hold that the decision to close schools is a discretionary act and members of a school board cannot be recalled unless they arbitrarily or unreasonably exercised such discretion.
A clear abuse of discretion may be shown by dem[285]*285onstrating the discretion was exercised in a manner which was manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. Wilson v. Board of Governors, 90 Wn.2d 649, 656, 585 P.2d 136 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979). We are unable to find any facts in the recall petition which might suggest that the school board exercised its discretion in a manner which was arbitrary, unreasonable or untenable. A general statement that public funds are being wasted is insufficient evidence of an abuse of discretion. State ex rel. Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Brooks, 80 Wn.2d 121, 492 P.2d 536 (1972). Therefore, charges 1 and 2 must be dismissed on the grounds that they are legally insufficient.
It is also our conclusion that charge 4, alleging violation of the Open Public Meetings Act of 1971, RCW 42.30, and charge 5, retention of an incompetent superintendent, must be dismissed on the grounds that they are factually insufficient. The specificity requirements of RCW 29.82.010 mandate that the charges alleged in a recall petition taken as a whole state sufficient facts to identify to the electors and to the official being recalled, acts or failure to act which without justification would constitute a prima facie showing of misfeasance, malfeasance, or a violation of the oath of office. Chandler, at 274. See Tolar v. Johns, 147 So. 2d 196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); see also Amberg v. Welsh, 325 Mich. 285, 38 N.W.2d 304 (1949).3
These specificity requirements leave intact the inherent right of the people to recall elected officials for cause. Const. art. 1, §§ 33, 34 (amend. 8). The only burden is that recall must be based on specific and definite charges. This is not a cumbersome burden when one considers the [286]*286harassment to which public officials can be subjected if charges need only be general in nature. Furthermore, the requirement is consistent with the fact that Washington's Constitution differs from most other states; it is the only constitution that allows recall only for cause. See Cohen, Recall in Washington: A Time for Reform, 50 Wash. L. Rev. 29 (1974). This distinction is well analyzed in 4 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 12.251b, at 334 (3d rev. ed. 1979):
The reasons or grounds for the recall of the officer must be stated and may relate to reasons which are purely political in nature according to the minority view. The general rule apparently is that the grounds stated are sufficient if they do so relate. In jurisdictions in which political reasons may be grounds for recall, it is immaterial whether the officer is charged with misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office. In some jurisdictions, however, it is held that the charges, grounds, or reasons given for the recall must be more than disagreement with matters of policy, and must, in effect, constitute misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office.
(Footnotes omitted.) Hence, the right of recall in Washington is clearly distinguishable from the right provided by other states. See Noel v. Oakland Cy. Clerk, 92 Mich. App. 181, 284 N.W.2d 761 (1979).
Based on the specificity requirements outlined above, we find charge 4 insufficient because it is couched in very general terms. There is nothing in the petition indicating the time or place where the alleged illegal meeting took place. See Herron v. McClanahan, 28 Wn. App. 552, 560, 625 P.2d 707, review denied, 95 Wn.2d 1029 (1981).
Charge 5 is also insufficient. It alleges the School Board knowingly and willingly retained an incompetent superintendent.4 Incompetent is defined as "lacking the [287]*287qualities . . . necessary to effective independent action". Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1144 (1961). Accepting the allegations as true, charge 5 does not amount to a prima facie showing that the Board retained a superintendent who lacked the qualities necessary to effective independent action. To the contrary, the allegations show that the superintendent was willing and able to make difficult and controversial recommendations and decisions. This alone shows his competency to take independent action. A superintendent cannot be expected to make decisions with which everyone will agree. Such decisions require the use of judgment and discretion. The use of such judgment does not as a matter of law establish incompetency. Without allegations showing the superintendent's incompetency, the Board cannot be subject to recall for retaining the superintendent.
Our holding does not mean that courts have the authority to look at the truthfulness of the charges. The Legislature has made it clear that courts do not possess such authority. Laws of 1984, ch. 170, § 4, p. 823. However, we believe the Legislature intended to limit the recall right by [288]*288allowing courts to review the sufficiency of charges as a matter of law and decide whether the facts, if true, establish a prima facie act of misfeasance, malfeasance, or a violation of the oath of office.
In accordance with our conclusion herein, the following cases are overruled insomuch as they are inconsistent with our holding herein: Danielson v. Faymonville, 72 Wn.2d 854, 435 P.2d 963 (1967); State ex rel. LaMon v. Westport, 73 Wn.2d 255, 438 P.2d 200 (1968); State ex rel. Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Brooks, 80 Wn.2d 121, 492 P.2d 536 (1972); and Bocek v. Bayley, 81 Wn.2d 831, 505 P.2d 814 (1973).
Finally, in addition to finding the charges sufficient, the trial court refused to allow a voir dire examination of the recall petitioners. The current statute requires persons submitting charges to have knowledge of the facts upon which the stated grounds for recall are based, rather than simply a belief that the charges are true. Laws of 1984, ch. 170, § 1, p. 821. This provision was recommended in Cohen, Recall in Washington: A Time for Reform, wherein the author notes:
The purpose of this amendment is to discourage frivolous, scurrilous and baseless charges against a public officer made solely for the purpose of harassing that officer in the performance of his elective duties.
Cohen, 50 Wash. L. Rev. at 46. The current statute also imposes on the superior court the duty to determine the sufficiency of the recall charges. Laws of 1984, ch. 170, § 4, p. 823. We believe these two provisions, contrary to the trial court's determination, allow a voir dire examination by the judge of the recall petitioners. This voir dire is limited to questions directed at the petitioners' knowledge and/or basis of their knowledge of the charges contained in the recall petition. No questions may be asked concerning the truth or falsity of the charges. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's decision not to allow a voir dire examination. However, because we conclude that all charges are insufficient, a remand is not necessary. Furthermore, because we [289]*289have found the charges insufficient, we need not reach the issue raised by the Board that the recall petitions were technically insufficient in that they failed to contain petitioners' addresses. Accordingly, the charges are dismissed.
Williams, C.J., and Brachtenbach, Dolliver, Dimmick, and Andersen, JJ., concur.
Utter, J.
I adhere to my views in Bocek v. Bayley, 81 Wn.2d 831, 839-40, 505 P.2d 814 (1973).