Cole v. Days Inn

Colorado Court of Appeals·Decided December 12, 2024·No. 24CA0395·Unpublished

Opinion

24CA0395 Cole v Days Inn 12-12-2024 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0395 El Paso County District Court No. 24CV9 Honorable Gregory R. Werner, Judge

Jack Cole, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Days Inn, Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI

Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE Welling and Brown, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced December 12, 2024

Jack Cole, Pro Se No Appearance for Defendant-Appellee

¶1 Plaintiff, Jack Cole, also known as Jackie-DeVere Allen Cole and Jackie-Devere A. Cole, appeals the district court’s judgment prohibiting him from proceeding pro se to seek affirmative relief in the Fourth Judicial District. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Cole filed a complaint against defendant, Days Inn, alleging, among other things, that he was wrongfully ejected from defendant’s property located in El Paso County. Cole initially filed his complaint in Denver District Court. But that court sua sponte transferred venue to the El Paso County District Court after determining — based on the allegations in Cole’s pleadings — that the parties and the alleged incident forming the basis of Cole’s complaint were based in Colorado Springs.

¶3 After venue transferred, the El Paso County District Court sua sponte reviewed the case file and issued an order that dismissed Cole’s complaint without prejudice and prohibited him from “filing [pro se] any lawsuits, pleadings, motions, briefs, suggestions, advisement or other paper of any kind” in cases seeking affirmative relief in the Fourth Judicial District (the order).

¶4 In imposing the restriction, the court found that

Cole has long engaged in a vexatious pattern of filing lawsuits for the purpose of either annoying defendants, causing them to incur fees[,] or perhaps hoping to obtain some sort of settlement from them. Acting pro se, Cole does not appear to have incurred any attorney fees for his filings. In fact, it appears that Cole has not even incurred the expense of filing[]

fees due to his claimed indigency status. The [d]efendants, on the other hand, have presumably incurred attorney fees.

....

In some cases, it appears that Cole is seeking to gain leverage or exact revenge over victims, law enforcement, records custodians[,] and prosecuting attorneys that were involved in cases involving criminal prosecution against him.

¶5 The district court observed that, since January 2020, Cole had filed twenty-seven civil cases, twenty-three of which had been dismissed. During that same period, Cole filed at least seven appeals with this court that resulted in dismissal and at least eight cases with the supreme court, five of which had been dismissed while the other three remained pending. The district court noted that Cole had not prevailed in any of the cases he has filed since January 2020.

¶6 Furthermore, the district court noted that a different judge in the Fourth Judicial District previously “attempted to rein in Cole’s conduct” by requiring Cole to “follow procedural rules, follow [c]ourt [o]rders[,] and obtain an attorney.” After also finding that none of the orders entered by the El Paso County District Court or other courts “appear to have provided an effective deterrent,” the court determined that enjoining Cole from seeking affirmative relief pro se was “necessary to protect the scant and finite resources of the [c]ourt as well as prevent lawsuits from being filed which have no merit yet tax the resources of defendants.” The court then dismissed Cole’s complaint.

¶7 Cole doesn’t appeal the dismissal of the underlying complaint; rather, he seeks review of the district court’s order restricting his pro se filings.

II. Standard of Review

¶8 We review a district court’s order enjoining a litigant from proceeding pro se in cases that seek affirmative relief for an abuse of discretion. Carbajal v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2020 COA 49,

¶ 41. A district court abuses its discretion when its ruling is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or when it misapplies the law. Rains v. Barber, 2018 CO 61, ¶ 8.

III. Legal Principles

¶9 While “[e]very person has an undisputed right of access to the Colorado courts[,] . . . this right may not be abused” and must “yield to the principle that ‘right and justice should be administered without sale, denial or delay.’” GHP Horwath, P.C. v. Kazazian, 2024 CO 8, ¶ 66 (first quoting People v. Dunlap, 623 P.2d 408, 410 (Colo. 1981); and then quoting Colo. Const. art. II, § 6).

¶ 10 A district court may enjoin a litigant from filing suits pro se within any county in its district upon a finding of a serious abuse of judicial process. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Winslow, 706 P.2d 792, 795 (Colo. 1985) (Winslow I). A court is justified in issuing an injunction to stop a litigant’s abuse of the judicial process when the litigant “hampers the efficient administration of justice to an intolerable degree.” Kazazian, ¶ 66. And such injunctions don’t infringe upon a litigant’s constitutional right of access to the courts so long as the litigant may still obtain access by retaining an attorney. See id. at ¶ 80.

¶ 11 The supreme court has considered the following actions as hampering the efficient administration of justice to an intolerable degree, such that enjoining litigants from affirmatively proceeding pro se was warranted:

(1) filing a multitude of meritless claims;

(2) bringing claims that appear to be aimed at harassing opposing parties; or

(3) using procedures to expand litigation in ways that strain judicial resources.

Kazazian, ¶ 67 (citing first Shotkin v. Kaplan, 180 P.2d 1021, 1022 (Colo. 1947); then Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Barday, 594 P.2d 1057, 1058 (Colo. 1979); and then Dunlap, 623 P.2d at 410-11).

IV. Application

¶ 12 Cole asserts that (1) he has not filed frivolous and vexatious actions against opposing parties; (2) he didn’t disrupt the lives of opposing parties; and (3) his filings “were not numerous under the guise of harassment, vexati[ous,] and repetitive,” unlike those in Board of County Comm’rs v. Winslow, 862 P.2d 921, 924 (Colo. 1993) (Winslow II), where the litigants initiated 162 civil proceedings, most of which were dismissed as meritless.

¶ 13 We could reject Cole’s assertions as they are wholesale conclusory and unsupported by the record. See People v. Wallin, 167 P.3d 183, 187 (Colo. App. 2007) (declining to review issues presented in a perfunctory or conclusory manner); see also People v. Diefenderfer, 784 P.2d 741, 752 (Colo. 1989) (reviewing court needs to be informed of specific errors and the grounds, supporting facts, and authorities therefor). But given the importance of the subject matter here — Cole’s ability to proceed pro se in seeking affirmative relief — and Cole’s timely appeal, we review his contentions nonetheless. See Warner v. Barnard, 304 P.2d 898, 900 (Colo. 1956) (noting that an appellate court may “take[] appropriate action to protect the right of a litigant to have his cause determined under well-established principles of law”).

A. Meritless Claims

¶ 14 The order summarized approximately seventeen cases Cole initiated in the Fourth Judicial District since January 2020 and their subsequent appellate history.

¶ 15 The district court found that Cole has “long engaged in a vexatious pattern of filing lawsuits” and “[sought] to gain leverage or exact revenge over victims, law enforcement, [and] records

custodians” and concluded that enjoining Cole’s ability to file claims for affirmative relief pro se was “necessary to protect the scant and finite resources of the Court as well as prevent lawsuits from being filed which have no merit.” Cole, quoting Karr v. Williams, 50 P.3d 910, 912 (Colo. 2002), contests these findings and asserts that he hasn’t engaged in “frivolous [and] vexatious lawsuits against his adversaries [or] egregious actions harassing ‘every witness to have ever testified against [him].’”

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Related

Board of County Commissioners v. Winslow
862 P.2d 921 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1993)
People v. Dunlap
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706 P.2d 792 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1985)
Warner v. Barnard
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People v. Diefenderfer
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Karr v. Williams
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People v. Wallin
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Shotkin v. Kaplan
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In re Rains—Rule 59(d)—Proper Grounds for New Trial
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