Cohen v. City of Lynn

132 N.E.2d 664, 333 Mass. 699, 1956 Mass. LEXIS 796
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedMarch 8, 1956
StatusPublished
Cited by26 cases

This text of 132 N.E.2d 664 (Cohen v. City of Lynn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cohen v. City of Lynn, 132 N.E.2d 664, 333 Mass. 699, 1956 Mass. LEXIS 796 (Mass. 1956).

Opinion

Whittemore, J.

This petition, filed June 8, 1953, is brought in the Land Court under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 240, § 14A, and c. 185, § 1 (jK), both inserted by St. 1934, c. 263, to determine the validity of a 1946 amendment to the zoning ordinance of the city of Lynn which reclassified a block of land on Lynn Shore Drive, in which the petitioner’s residence stands, from a general residence district *700 to a restricted type apartment district. The intervener is the owner of much of the land in the block and is the holder of a permit to erect an apartment house on this land. According to the findings the intervener stated in open court that he desires to have his rights established.

The findings include, “I find as a fact that the placing of petitioner’s and intervener’s land in a restricted apartment zone and use is not indispensable to and does not promote the health, safety, convenience and general welfare of the city of Lynn.” “The effect ... is to single out one block within an area of essentially the same characteristics and in the same use district and to impose upon this block less onerous restrictions than those imposed upon the remaining portion of what is really the same zoning district (a condition sometimes referred to as 'spot zoning’).”

Subsidiary findings include the following (summarized): The area is more like a single residence than a general residence area; most of the two family houses in the area do not appear such from the street; the location is ideal for those wishing the benefits of an excellent beach, nearness to the ocean, and living not too far from a business area; there has been no substantial change in locus and surrounding area over the years and except for the building of the Nahant Garden Apartments on land across the street from the locus and rezoned at the same time and in the same way, the change has been decidedly toward single family homes; the evidence that the new zone would lessen the fire hazard is not substantial and, on the contrary, the increase in the number of families with apartments increases street occupancy by automobiles and the new zoning permits third class construction of the house if the house is of three stories or less; the planning consultant, who favored the change and favored more restricted apartment areas than Lynn now has, had a city wide view as to its justification, and his impelling reason seemed “to be demand and keeping the city from shrinking in population rather than the existing status of the locus; he depended on a trend rather than any existing substantial or actual change in the *701 zone”; "I find no substantial reason for the restricted apartment zoning in locus; it cannot be said to be reasonable or necessary to uphold the integrity of the zoning system as existing in the city”; rather than advance public interest it unquestionably increases the population materially, would add to street congestion, induce taller structures, and not preserve the character of the property.

"On an appeal from a decision of the Land Court, the findings of fact appearing in the decision . . . must ordinarily be accepted as final.” Barney & Carey Co. v. Milton, 324 Mass. 440, 449.

We construe the judge’s ultimate conclusions, although expressed as "findings,” to include the rulings that the amendment of 1946 exceeded the power of the city council because as matter of law it was spot zoning and could not reasonably have been found by the council to promote the health, safety, convenience, and general welfare of the city, and hence was outside the basic zoning purpose as stated in the statute. The judge, in granting and denying requests, made rulings consistent with the foregoing. The intervener and the city of Lynn took exception to the rulings and to the “decision and determination of the court,” namely, that the subject 1946 amendment ordinance "is invalid with respect to said petitioner’s and intervener’s land and of no force or effect in reference thereto.” We hold that the facts found do not justify the judge’s rulings and determination.

The block in question is bounded southerly by Lynn Shore Drive, easterly by Wave Street, northerly by Ocean Street, and westerly by Nahant Street, and contains in round figures 330,000 square feet of land. At the same meeting at which this block was rezoned another parcel directly opposite it across Nahant Street and containing in round figures 177,000 square feet (now the site of the Nahant Garden Apartments) was also rezoned from a general residence district to a restricted type apartment house district. The total area thus rezoned contained something over 507,000 square feet.

The rezoned area is near the westerly boundary of the *702 general residence district as it existed prior to the subject 1946 amendments. The extension of Lynn Shore Drive to the west beyond Nahant Street for three short blocks is called Beach Road. Except for the corner lot the entire frontage on Beach Road is in an apartment house district. Directly to the west of the Nahant Garden Apartments site there was a general residence district for a distance approximating the frontage of the subject locus on Ocean Street, but the area farther to the west beyond this general residence area was zoned for apartments. The southeast corner of an apartment house district lying generally to the northwest of the subject area was directly across Sagamore Street from the northwest corner of the Nahant Garden Apartments site. There was some nonconforming use of property in the locus and across Wave Street including a four family building, a three story single apartment structure, and an apartment house, or hotel, The Breakers, a sizable seven story brick building. “It was agreed that a number of the resident owners took boarders or leased rooms, as permitted, but it could not be observed from viewing the houses.” The city council in 1948 and again in 1950 rezoned other areas for apartment house districts.

The zoning ordinance permitted, in general residence districts, one family detached houses and semidetached and two family dwellings, the taking of boarders and leasing of rooms, boarding and lodging houses, hotels, a telephone exchange, municipal and community-function buildings of listed kinds, private clubs, farms, greenhouses, nurseries and truck gardens, real estate signs, and accessory uses. The ordinance permitted, in restricted type apartment house districts, the same uses except that boarding and lodging houses, telephone exchanges, private clubs, farms, greenhouses, nurseries, and truck gardens were not permitted, and restricted type apartment houses were permitted. The permitted restricted type apartment houses may not exceed five stories in height, must be designed to be used for dwelling purposes by families occupying separate apartments or suites, and if more than three stories in height they must *703 have elevators and be of acceptable fireproof construction. Each room is required to have direct light from windows in outside walls except bathrooms and reception halls. In apartment house districts under the ordinance all the uses permitted in general residence districts are permitted and also apartment houses and row houses. An apartment house other than the restricted type is defined as a dwelling for more than two families under one roof.

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Bluebook (online)
132 N.E.2d 664, 333 Mass. 699, 1956 Mass. LEXIS 796, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cohen-v-city-of-lynn-mass-1956.