Cogo v. Central Council of the Tlingit & Haida Indians

465 F. Supp. 1286, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13937
CourtDistrict Court, D. Alaska
DecidedMarch 7, 1979
DocketCiv. J78-10
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 465 F. Supp. 1286 (Cogo v. Central Council of the Tlingit & Haida Indians) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Alaska primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cogo v. Central Council of the Tlingit & Haida Indians, 465 F. Supp. 1286, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13937 (D. Alaska 1979).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

VON DER HEYDT, Chief Judge.

THIS CAUSE comes before the court on defendant’s motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs are enrolled members of the Tlingit and Haida Indians of Alaska who are suing the Central Council of Tlingit and Haida Indians of Alaska on the behalf of their grandchildren as guardians ad litem. The plaintiffs seek to have their grandchildren enrolled as members of the tribe and the Central Council ordered to prepare and submit a plan to the Secretary of the Interior for the utilization of the judgment fund that resulted from Tlingit and Haida Indians of Alaska v. United States, 389 F.2d 778, 182 Ct.Cl. 130 (1968). This case was originally filed in the Superior Court of the State of Alaska and removed to this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).

The defendant contends that this suit must be dismissed on three grounds: 1) The court lacks jurisdiction over the Central Council because it is immune from suit; 2) The State court from which this case was removed lacked jurisdiction and therefore this court lacks jurisdiction; and 3) The United States, as trustee of the judgment funds managed by the Central Council, is an indispensable party that has not been joined and cannot be joined because it is immune from suit. The court finds merit in all three of the defendant’s grounds for dismissal.

Sovereign Immunity

As one court has noted, “An impressive body of law has developed recognizing the immunity of Indian tribes from suit.” Morgan v. Colorado River Indian Tribe, 103 Ariz. 425, 443 P.2d 421, 423 (1968). See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978); Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Dept. of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 97 S.Ct. 2616, 53 L.Ed.2d 667 (1977); United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 60 S.Ct. 653, 84 L.Ed. 894 (1940); Adams v. Murphy, 165 F. 304 (8th Cir. 1908); Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe, 66 F. 372 *1288 (8th Cir. 1895); Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151 (Alaska 1977). The doctrine of sovereign immunity has been applied to Indian tribes for at least three reasons. First, the Indian tribes were once sovereign nations and were accorded the common-law immunity traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers. Santa Clara Peublo, 436 U.S. at 58, 98 S.Ct. 1670. Second, the sovereign immunity of the dominant sovereign, the United States, also provides protection for the dependent sovereign, the Indian tribe, where the United States acts as trustee for the tribe. Cf. United States v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. at 512, 60 S.Ct. at 656 (“The public policy which exempted the dependent as well as the dominant sovereignties from suit without consent continues this immunity even after dissolution of the tribal government.”) See also Hamilton v. Nakai, 453 F.2d 152, 158—59 (9th Cir. 1972). Third, sovereign immunity is intended to protect what assets the Indians still possess from loss through litigation. “That has been the settled doctrine of the government from the beginning. If any other course were adopted, the tribes would soon be overwhelmed with civil litigation and judgments.” Adams v. Murphy, 165 F. at 308-09. If tribal assets could be dissipated by litigation, the efforts of the United States to provide the tribes with economic and political autonomy could be frustrated.

The plaintiffs contend that sovereign immunity does not apply to the Central Council of Tlingit and Haida Indians of Alaska because it is not a “tribe” but simply an organization created or recognized by Congress. The plaintiffs argue that the tribal entities that possess governmental powers are the village councils in the Tlingit-Haida region organized traditionally or under the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1976).

The Act of June 19, 1935, 49 Stat. 388, authorized the Court of Claims to hear and determine the damage and land claims “of said Tlingit and Haida Indians of Alaska.” § 3, 49 Stat. 388. In the Court of Claims decisions that resulted from this jurisdictional act, the Tlingit and Haida Indians of Alaska were awarded $7,546,053.80. Tlingit and Haida Indians of Alaska v. United States, 177 F.Supp. 452, 147 Ct.Cl. 315 (1959), 389 F.2d 778, 182 Ct.Cl. 130 (1968). The Act of August 19, 1965, Public Law 89—130, 79 Stat. 543, amended the 1935 Act by designating the defendant Council as “the official Central Council of Tlingit and Haida Indians for purposes of this Act” and authorized the Council to prepare plans for the use of the judgment funds. 1

*1289 In 1968 the money to pay the judgment was appropriated by the Congress. 82 Stat. 307. In 1970 Congress finally authorized the distribution of the appropriated money. The Congress stated that the funds “may be advanced, expended, invested or used for any purpose and in any manner authorized by the Central Council of the Tlingit and Haida Indians of Alaska and approved by the Secretary of the Interior.” 25 U.S.C. § 1211 (1976). 2 In the Constitution of the Central Council of the Tlingit and Haida Indians of Alaska adopted on April 17,1973, the function of the Council is described in Article I.

The functions of the Central Council of the Tlingit and Haida Indians of Alaska shall be to serve as the general governing body of the Tlingit and Haida Indians of Alaska, to promote their welfare, and to exercise the powers granted by the Act of June 19, 1935 (49 Stat. 388), as amended by the Act of August 19, 1965 (79 Stat. 543), and such other powers as it may lawfully exercise or be granted.

“Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department.” Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565, 23 S.Ct. 216, 221, 47 L.Ed. 299 (1903). See also United States v. Kagama,

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Bluebook (online)
465 F. Supp. 1286, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13937, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cogo-v-central-council-of-the-tlingit-haida-indians-akd-1979.