Coffin-Redington Co. v. Porter
This text of 156 F.2d 113 (Coffin-Redington Co. v. Porter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
This appeal is from a decree enjoining appellant from selling whisky, directly or indirectly, (1) to purchasers whose orders are accepted only on condition that they also buy other beverages or commodities, (2) at prices in excess of those set by Maximum Price Regulation 445.
The first objection urged is to the finding of the trial court that distilled spirits were sold at prices higher than the maximum permitted by the regulation, whereas the parties had stipulated that “each item, itself, was within the ceiling.” However, the court found that there were tying agreements or combination sales in violation of § 7.8(b) of Regulation 445.1 If this finding has support in the evidence, then the finding of sides at prices in excess of those allowable logically follows. We accordingly turn at once to the major contention, which is that the. finding of the existence of prohibited tying agreements or combination sales is without evidentiary support.
Appellant is a wholesale liquor dealer. In 1942, owing to a scarcity of whisky, it instituted a system of allocation on the basis of previous purchases made by customers. The court found that from February to July, 1944, in addition to the allocation program, appellant had its salesmen force customers to purchase more abundant and less sought-after liquors as a condition precedent to getting any whisky. Retail customers called as wit[114]*114nesses on behalf of the Price Administrator ' in terms testified that they were not coerced into buying any commodity they did not want in order to get whisky, this despite the fact that prior to the trial they had given the Administrator signed, statements to the contrary. However, a study of the testimony as a whole lends support to the view that, although the customers were not in so many words told that they would get no whisky if they did not give simultaneous orders for other beverages or commodities, nevertheless the attitude and conduct of the salesmen indicated that such was in fact the case— in other words, that a subtle form of coercion was practiced by the salesman, less crude, perhaps, but no less effective than forthright compulsion. For example, it is inferable from the testimony of one customer — a tavern operator — that a purchase of unwanted anchovies and liquors had to be made in order to induce appellant’s salesman to take an order for whisky which the customer desired.2 Like inferences are drawable from the testimony of other customers. The witnesses in question, although nominally testifying for the Administrator, were obviously hostile. The trial court observed their conduct and demeanor while on the stand, and was in better position than we are to appraise the situation and to draw inferences. We are not able to say that the finding in question was clearly erroneous and are therefore obliged to accept it. Columbian National Life Ins. Co. v. A. Quandt & Sons, 9 Cir., 154 F.2d 1006.
Appellant argues that in addition to establishing the existence of a tying agreement, it must be shown that the agreement illegally required the purchaser to pay more than the ceiling price for the whisky and other commodities. No evidence, it is said, was presented, as to the ceiling price of whisky or as to the aggregate sales price of the whisky and other commodities. However, no such objection was voiced in the trial court; in fact, on the trial, it was assumed by all parties that prices charged were ceiling prices as to each individual item. In the course of the trial counsel for appellant stated its contention to be “that all items were sold at the ceiling price placed upon them by the O.P.A.” This statement was more than once repeated. It is not now open to appellant to attack the assumption on which it presented the case below.
We are satisfied that § 7.8(b) of Regulation 445 fairly covers the conduct shown, and we conclude that the granting of injunctive relief was warranted. Cf. Bowles v. Royal Wine & Liquor, Inc., 7 [115]*115Cir., 155 F.2d 137, in which similar conduct was held to be within the scope of the regulation.
Affirmed.
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156 F.2d 113, 1946 U.S. App. LEXIS 2538, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/coffin-redington-co-v-porter-ca9-1946.