Coe v. Hirsch

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedDecember 1, 2021
Docket2:21-cv-00478
StatusUnknown

This text of Coe v. Hirsch (Coe v. Hirsch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Coe v. Hirsch, (D. Ariz. 2021).

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Katriona Coe, No. CV-21-00478-PHX-SMM (MTM)

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Patrick Hirsch, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Before this Court1 is Plaintiff Katriona Coe’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Default 16 Judgment against Defendants Patrick Hirsch d/b/a Outlaw Roadside Service, Patrick 17 Hirsch, and Jane Doe Hirsch (collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. 15). For the following 18

19 1 The matter is before the undersigned pursuant to General Order 18-20, which states:

20 When a United States Magistrate Judge to whom a civil action has been 21 assigned pursuant to Local Rule 3.7(a)(1) considers dismissal to be appropriate but lacks the jurisdiction to do so under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) 22 due to incomplete status of election by the parties to consent or not consent 23 to the full authority of the Magistrate Judge,

24 IT IS ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge will prepare the dismissal order for signature of the Chief United States District Judge or designee. 25

26 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED designating the following District Court Judges to review and, if deemed suitable, to sign the order of dismissal on 27 my behalf: 28 Phoenix/Prescott: Senior United States District Judge Stephen M. McNamee 1 reasons, the Court will grant the Motion, enter default judgment accordingly, and order the 2 payment of $8,352.00 to Plaintiff. The Court defers consideration of an appropriate 3 attorney fees and costs award pending the filing of a motion pursuant to LRCiv 54.2. 4 I. BACKGROUND 5 On March 22, 2021, Plaintiff brought this action for the recovery of unpaid wages 6 under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Arizona Minimum Wage Act 7 (AMWA). (Doc. 1). Plaintiff alleges that during the eight weeks she worked for Defendants 8 as a dispatcher for their roadside assistance business, she did not receive the applicable 9 federal and state minimum wage for hours worked or an overtime wage for hours worked 10 in excess of 40 per week. (Id.). Defendants were served with the Summons and Complaint 11 but did not file an answer or otherwise participate in the action. (Docs. 7–9). On July 9, 12 2021, default was entered against Defendants pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). (Docs. 12, 13 13). On September 22, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for default judgment 14 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). (Doc. 15). 15 II. JURISDICTION 16 “When entry of judgment is sought against a party who has failed to plead or 17 otherwise defend, a district court has an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction over 18 both the subject matter and the parties.” In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999). 19 The Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because Plaintiff’s claims arise 20 from Defendants’ business activities in Arizona and alleged failure to comply with federal 21 and state employment laws during the course of those activities (doc. 1 ¶¶ 5, 7, 10). Picot 22 v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2015); Tolano v. El Rio Bakery, No. CV-18- 23 00125-TUC-RM, 2019 WL 6464748, at *2 (D. Ariz. Dec. 2, 2019). 24 The Court has federal question jurisdiction over Counts One and Two (id. ¶¶ 63– 25 81) because they arise under FLSA, a federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court has 26 supplemental jurisdiction over Count Three (id. ¶¶ 78–81), the AWMA claim, because it 27 is “part of the same case or controversy” as the FLSA claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 28 . . . 1 III. DEFAULT JUDGMENT 2 A. Legal Standard 3 A party may move for default judgment against a party in default. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 55(a), (b); Twentieth Century Fox Film. Corp. v. Streeter, 438 F.Supp.2d 1065, 1070 (D. 5 Ariz. 2006). Whether to grant default judgment is discretionary and based on consideration 6 of the following: “‘(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of 7 plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at 8 stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether 9 the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal 10 Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.’” NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, 11 LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471– 12 72 (9th Cir. 1986)). 13 B. Analysis 14 1. Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiff 15 Plaintiff would be prejudiced by failure to enter default judgment as continuation of 16 this action despite Defendants’ failure to participate in it precludes Plaintiff’s ability to 17 either obtain relief or litigate her case on its merits. Therefore, this factor supports entering 18 default judgment. Constr. Laborers Trust Funds for S. Cal. Admin. Co. v. Anzalone 19 Masonry, Inc., 316 F.Supp.3d 1192, 1198 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (“Defendants have failed to 20 participate in this action, and without a default judgment, Plaintiff will have no other 21 recourse for recovery.”). 22 2. Merits & Sufficiency of the Complaint 23 These two factors, taken together, “require that plaintiffs’ allegations ‘state a claim 24 on which [she] may recover.’” Dr. JKL Ltd. v. HPC IT Educ. Ctr., 749 F.Supp.2d 1038, 25 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Danning v. Lacine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978)); 26 see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). In considering these factors, “well-pleaded factual allegations 27 in the complaint are accepted as true, with the exception that allegations as to the amount 28 of damages must be proved.” Anzalone, 316 F.Supp.3d at 1198 (citing Televideo Sys., Inc. 1 v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917–18 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hoa 2 Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A] defendant is not held to admit facts that 3 are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law.”) (internal quotes and citation 4 omitted). 5 To state a claim under FLSA, “the plaintiff must allege at least one workweek when 6 [s]he worked in excess of forty hours and was not paid for the excess hours in that 7 workweek, or was not paid minimum wages.” Landers v. Quality Communications, Inc., 8 771 F.3d 638, 646 (9th Cir. 2014); see 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a)(1)(C), 207(a)(1). To state a 9 claim under AMWA, the plaintiff must allege that she was not paid the applicable 10 minimum wage for hours worked. A.R.S.

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Coe v. Hirsch, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/coe-v-hirsch-azd-2021.