1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RITA CODERRE, et al., No. 2:21-cv-00965-TLN-DMC 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. ORDER 14 ROBERT BURTON, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 This matter is before the Court on Defendants M. Moreno, J. Walters, X. Lor, J. Duran, J. 18 Sloan, and V. Xiong’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss.1 (ECF No. 37.) Plaintiff 19 Rita Coderre (“Plaintiff”) filed an opposition. (ECF No. 39.) Defendants filed a reply. (ECF No. 20 41.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ 21 motion. 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 1 Defendants Shereef Aref and Robert Burton filed an answer (ECF No. 27) and did not join 28 in the instant motion to dismiss. 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 On May 31, 2020, inmate Aaron Coderre was found unresponsive in the showers at 3 California Health Care Facility in Stockton, California. (ECF No. 23 at ¶ 22.) Joshua Rudiger 4 (“Rudiger”), another inmate, had stabbed Aaron Coderre in the neck, killing him. (Id. at ¶ 25.) 5 Plaintiff is Aaron Coderre’s mother and successor in interest and sues on behalf of herself and her 6 deceased son. (Id. at ¶¶ 5, 87.) Defendants were correctional officers at the facility. (Id. at ¶ 9.) 7 During an interview that took place the day before the attack, the decedent told Moreno that 8 Rudiger threatened him and other inmates with violence and threats to suck their blood. (Id. at ¶ 9 58.) The decedent asked Moreno to be moved to a mental health crisis bed for his safety. (Id.) 10 Moreno denied the request. (Id.) On the day of the attack, Walters was assigned to monitor video 11 feeds showing the location where the attack occurred and allowed Rudiger to enter the decedent’s 12 single-person shower by failing to monitor the surveillance. (Id. at ¶¶ 35, 37, 69.) Lor, Duran, 13 Sloan, and Xiong were assigned as floor officers who monitored and controlled the movements of 14 inmates on the floor where the attack occurred, including access to the showers. (Id. at ¶ 38.) 15 Plaintiff initiated this action on May 28, 2021. (ECF No. 1.) On September 6, 2023, 16 Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), alleging: (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 17 1983 claim (“§ 1983”) for failure to protect in violation of the Eighth Amendment against 18 Walters, Moreno, Lor, Duran, Sloan, and Xiong; (2) a § 1983 claim for supervisory liability 19 against Burton, Aref, Walters, and Moreno; (3) a claim for violation of California Government 20 Code § 845.6 against Walters, Moreno, Lor, Sloan, and Xiong; and (4) negligence/wrongful death 21 against Walters, Moreno, Lor, Sloan, Xiong, Burton, and Aref. (ECF No. 23.) Defendants filed 22 the instant motion to dismiss on October 26, 2023. (ECF No. 37.) 23 II. STANDARD OF LAW 24 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. 26 Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading contain 27 “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 28 Civ. P. 8(a); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). Under notice pleading in 1 federal court, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 2 grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal 3 citation and quotations omitted). “This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal 4 discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose 5 of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). 6 On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. 7 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court must give the plaintiff the benefit of every 8 reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail 9 Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege 10 “‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to 11 relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (internal citation omitted). 12 Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of 13 factual allegations.” U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). 14 While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an 15 unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 16 pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 17 elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 18 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 19 statements, do not suffice.”). Thus, “[c]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences 20 are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss” for failure to state a claim. Adams v. Johnson, 355 21 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). 22 Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough 23 facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim 24 has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 25 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 26 680. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more 27 than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. This plausibility 28 inquiry is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 1 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, only where a plaintiff fails to “nudge [his or 2 her] claims . . . across the line from conceivable to plausible[,]” is the complaint properly 3 dismissed. Id. at 680 (internal quotations omitted). 4 If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “‘[a] district court should grant leave to 5 amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading 6 could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 7 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)); 8 see also Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of discretion in 9 denying leave to amend when amendment would be futile). 10 III. ANALYSIS 11 A. Claim One 12 In Claim One, Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to protect the decedent in violation of the 13 Eighth Amendment. (ECF No.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RITA CODERRE, et al., No. 2:21-cv-00965-TLN-DMC 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. ORDER 14 ROBERT BURTON, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 This matter is before the Court on Defendants M. Moreno, J. Walters, X. Lor, J. Duran, J. 18 Sloan, and V. Xiong’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss.1 (ECF No. 37.) Plaintiff 19 Rita Coderre (“Plaintiff”) filed an opposition. (ECF No. 39.) Defendants filed a reply. (ECF No. 20 41.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ 21 motion. 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 1 Defendants Shereef Aref and Robert Burton filed an answer (ECF No. 27) and did not join 28 in the instant motion to dismiss. 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 On May 31, 2020, inmate Aaron Coderre was found unresponsive in the showers at 3 California Health Care Facility in Stockton, California. (ECF No. 23 at ¶ 22.) Joshua Rudiger 4 (“Rudiger”), another inmate, had stabbed Aaron Coderre in the neck, killing him. (Id. at ¶ 25.) 5 Plaintiff is Aaron Coderre’s mother and successor in interest and sues on behalf of herself and her 6 deceased son. (Id. at ¶¶ 5, 87.) Defendants were correctional officers at the facility. (Id. at ¶ 9.) 7 During an interview that took place the day before the attack, the decedent told Moreno that 8 Rudiger threatened him and other inmates with violence and threats to suck their blood. (Id. at ¶ 9 58.) The decedent asked Moreno to be moved to a mental health crisis bed for his safety. (Id.) 10 Moreno denied the request. (Id.) On the day of the attack, Walters was assigned to monitor video 11 feeds showing the location where the attack occurred and allowed Rudiger to enter the decedent’s 12 single-person shower by failing to monitor the surveillance. (Id. at ¶¶ 35, 37, 69.) Lor, Duran, 13 Sloan, and Xiong were assigned as floor officers who monitored and controlled the movements of 14 inmates on the floor where the attack occurred, including access to the showers. (Id. at ¶ 38.) 15 Plaintiff initiated this action on May 28, 2021. (ECF No. 1.) On September 6, 2023, 16 Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), alleging: (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 17 1983 claim (“§ 1983”) for failure to protect in violation of the Eighth Amendment against 18 Walters, Moreno, Lor, Duran, Sloan, and Xiong; (2) a § 1983 claim for supervisory liability 19 against Burton, Aref, Walters, and Moreno; (3) a claim for violation of California Government 20 Code § 845.6 against Walters, Moreno, Lor, Sloan, and Xiong; and (4) negligence/wrongful death 21 against Walters, Moreno, Lor, Sloan, Xiong, Burton, and Aref. (ECF No. 23.) Defendants filed 22 the instant motion to dismiss on October 26, 2023. (ECF No. 37.) 23 II. STANDARD OF LAW 24 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. 26 Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading contain 27 “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 28 Civ. P. 8(a); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). Under notice pleading in 1 federal court, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 2 grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal 3 citation and quotations omitted). “This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal 4 discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose 5 of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). 6 On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. 7 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court must give the plaintiff the benefit of every 8 reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail 9 Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege 10 “‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to 11 relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (internal citation omitted). 12 Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of 13 factual allegations.” U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). 14 While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an 15 unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 16 pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 17 elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 18 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 19 statements, do not suffice.”). Thus, “[c]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences 20 are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss” for failure to state a claim. Adams v. Johnson, 355 21 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). 22 Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough 23 facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim 24 has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 25 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 26 680. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more 27 than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. This plausibility 28 inquiry is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 1 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, only where a plaintiff fails to “nudge [his or 2 her] claims . . . across the line from conceivable to plausible[,]” is the complaint properly 3 dismissed. Id. at 680 (internal quotations omitted). 4 If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “‘[a] district court should grant leave to 5 amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading 6 could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 7 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)); 8 see also Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of discretion in 9 denying leave to amend when amendment would be futile). 10 III. ANALYSIS 11 A. Claim One 12 In Claim One, Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to protect the decedent in violation of the 13 Eighth Amendment. (ECF No. 23 at 23.) Defendants argue the Court should dismiss Claim One 14 as to Walters, Lor, Duran, Sloan, and Xiong because Plaintiff fails to allege those Defendants 15 knew Rudiger posed a substantial risk of serious harm to the decedent.2 (ECF No. 37-1 at 17.) 16 “The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to protect inmates from violence.” Wilk 17 v. Neven, 956 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 18 (1994)). “It is not, however, every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another that 19 translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety.” 20 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “Specifically, a prison official violates an inmate’s Eighth Amendment 21 right only if that official is ‘deliberately indifferent’ — in other words, if the official is 22 subjectively aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate and disregards that risk by 23 failing to respond reasonably.” Wilk, 956 F.3d at 1147. 24 In the SAC, Plaintiff alleges Rudiger was known in the facility as the “Modern Day 25 Vampire.” (ECF No. 23 at ¶ 31.) Plaintiff further alleges Defendants knew of Rudiger’s violent 26 history and continued proclivity for slashing the throats of others and drinking their blood. (Id. at 27 2 Defendants do not move to dismiss Claim One as alleged against Moreno, the correctional 28 officer who interviewed the decedent the day before his death about Rudiger’s threats. 1 ¶¶ 31, 32.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants also knew Rudiger would pose a substantial risk of harm 2 if placed in close contact with another inmate. (Id. at ¶ 32.) Plaintiff specifically alleges the 3 decedent requested Defendants protect him from Rudiger and reported to Defendants that Rudiger 4 threatened him. (Id. at ¶¶ 89, 90.) 5 Although Defendants argue the allegations in the SAC are too conclusory to show 6 Defendants’ subjective knowledge of the threat Rudiger posed to the decedent, the Court notes 7 that none of the cases Defendants cite in support of dismissing Claim One were decided on a Rule 8 12(b)(6) motion. (See ECF No 37-1 at 16–20.) In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court 9 must take the factual allegations in the SAC as true and draw all reasonable inferences in 10 Plaintiff’s favor. Applying that standard, the Court finds the SAC sufficiently alleges Defendants 11 subjectively knew Rudiger posed a substantial risk of serious harm based on Plaintiff’s 12 allegations that Defendants knew of Rudiger’s violent tendencies and threats made to the 13 decedent. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (“Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge 14 of a substantial risk is a question of fact . . . and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official 15 knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.”). 16 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Claim One. 17 B. Claim Two 18 In Claim Two, Plaintiff alleges Walters and Moreno are liable under § 1983 as 19 supervisors. (ECF No. 23 at 29.) Defendants argue the Court should dismiss Claim Two because 20 Plaintiff fails to allege Walters and Moreno acted as policymakers or failed to train or supervise 21 subordinate correctional officers. (ECF No. 37-1 at 20–22.) 22 To establish supervisory liability under § 1983, there must exist either “(1) [the official’s] 23 personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection 24 between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Rodriguez v. City of 25 L.A., 891 F.3d 776, 798 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). “The causal connection is established 26 ‘by setting in motion a series of acts by others or by knowingly refus[ing] to terminate a series of 27 acts by others, which [the supervisor] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others 28 to inflict a constitutional injury.’” Id. (citation omitted). A supervisor can be liable “for his own 1 culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his 2 acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous 3 indifference to the rights of others.” Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 4 1998) (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted). 5 In the instant case, the Court finds the SAC adequately alleges Walters and Moreno were 6 personally involved in the constitutional deprivation as supervisors. As to Walters, the SAC 7 alleges Walters was assigned to monitor the video feeds from the cameras located inside the unit 8 on the day of the incident. (ECF No. 23 at ¶ 35.) The SAC alleges the video feed showed 9 Rudiger engaging in suspicious activity that should have triggered intervention, such as Rudiger 10 entering the single-cell shower occupied by the decedent and placing a towel over the window of 11 the shower. (Id. at ¶¶ 37, 64.) As to Moreno, the SAC alleges Moreno interviewed the decedent 12 the day before the incident regarding the facts and circumstances of alleged deadly threats made 13 to him by Rudiger. (Id. at ¶ 58.) The decedent allegedly told Moreno that Rudiger threatened 14 him and other inmates with violence and threatened to suck their blood. (Id.) The decedent also 15 asked Moreno to move him to a mental health crisis bed for his safety, but Moreno denied the 16 request. (Id.) 17 The Court concludes the foregoing allegations support a plausible claim that Walters and 18 Moreno knew Rudiger posed a substantial risk of serious harm to the decedent and disregarded 19 that risk by failing to take any action to protect the decedent. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 20 1206–07 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A showing that a supervisor acted, or failed to act, in a manner that 21 was deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights is sufficient to demonstrate 22 the involvement — and the liability — of that supervisor.”). 23 Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Claim Two. 24 C. Claim Three 25 In Claim Three, Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to summon medical care in violation of 26 California Government Code § 845.6. (ECF No. 23 at 33.) Defendants argue the Court should 27 dismiss Claim Three because there are no allegations the decedent was alive when he was found 28 or that any of Defendants knew the decedent needed immediate medical care. (ECF No. 37-1 at 1 23.) Plaintiff concedes Claim Three should be dismissed and does not request leave to amend. 2 (ECF No. 39 at 17.) 3 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Claim Three without leave to amend. 4 D. Claim Four 5 In Claim Four, Plaintiff alleges Defendants are liable for negligence/wrongful death. 6 (ECF No. 23 at 35.) Like their argument as to Claim One, Defendants argue the Court should 7 dismiss Claim Four against Walters, Lor, Xiong, and Sloan because the SAC does not sufficiently 8 allege Defendants knew of the substantial risk of serious harm Rudiger posed to the decedent. 9 (ECF No. 37-1 at 25.) Defendants also argue Moreno and Walters cannot be liable solely based 10 on their status as supervisors pursuant to California Government Code § 820.8 (“§ 820.8”). (Id. 11 at 26.) Lastly, Defendants argue Plaintiff cannot obtain punitive damages for the wrongful death 12 claim because Defendants were not convicted of homicide in relation to decedent’s death and 13 Plaintiff is not entitled for attorney’s fees for state law claims. (Id.) 14 As to Defendants’ first argument, for the reasons already discussed in the context of Claim 15 One, Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to support at the very least a reasonable inference that 16 Defendants knew Rudiger posed a threat to the decedent. As to Defendants’ second argument, as 17 discussed, Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to establish Moreno and Walters are liable for their 18 own involvement in the constitutional deprivation, not for the acts or omission of others. 19 Therefore, § 820.8 does not apply. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.8 (“[A] public employee is not 20 liable for an injury caused by the act or omission of another person. Nothing in this section 21 exonerates a public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by his own negligent or 22 wrongful act or omission.”). For these reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss 23 Claim Four. However, Plaintiff fails to respond to Defendants’ remaining arguments about 24 Plaintiff’s inability to obtain punitive damages or attorney’s fees for this claim. Accordingly, the 25 Court deems those requests abandoned and GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to 26 punitive damages and attorney’s fees for Claim Four without leave to amend. 27 /// 28 /// 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ 3 | Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 37) as follows: 4 1. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Claim Three without leave to 5 amend; 6 2. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff's request for punitive 7 damages and attorney’s fees as to Claim Four without leave to amend; and 8 3. The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion in all other respects. 9 Defendants Moreno, Walters, Lor, Duran, Sloan, and Xiong shall file an answer not later 10 | than twenty-one (21) days from the electronic filing date of this Order. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 | Date: August 23, 2024 13 /) 14 “ ! : / of IS Troy L. Nuhlep> ] 16 United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28