1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RITA CODERRE, et al., No. 2:21-cv-00965-TLN-DMC 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. 14 ORDER ROBERT BURTON, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 This matter is before the Court on Defendants Robert Burton (“Burton”) and Shereef 18 Aref’s (“Aref”) (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff Rita 19 Coderre (“Plaintiff”) opposed the motion. (ECF No. 10.) Defendants replied. (ECF No. 12.) 20 For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 On May 31, 2020, an inmate named Aaron Coderre was found unresponsive in the 3 showers at California Health Care Facility (“CHCF”). (ECF No. 1 at 6.) Another inmate, Joshua 4 Rudiger (“Rudiger”), had stabbed Aaron Coderre in the neck, causing his death. (Id.) Rita 5 Coderre is the decedent’s biological mother and successor in interest. (Id. at 2.) On May 28, 6 2021, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Burton (the acting warden of CHCF), Aref (the 7 Healthcare Executive at CHCF), and unidentified correctional staff (“Does 1–10”). (Id. at 4.) 8 Plaintiff alleges the following claims: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”) claims against 9 Does 1–10, Burton, and Aref for First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations; (2) § 1983 10 claims for supervisory liability against Does 1–10, Burton, and Aref; (3) violation of the 11 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act against Does 1–10, 12 Burton, and Aref; (4) violation of California Government Code § 845.6 against Does 1–10; and 13 (5) negligence/wrongful death against Does 1–10, Burton, and Aref. (ECF No. 1 at 19–34.) 14 II. STANDARD OF LAW 15 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 16 Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th 17 Cir. 2001). Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 18 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 19 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the complaint must “give the 20 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic 21 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citation and quotations omitted). “This simplified 22 notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to 23 define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema 24 N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). 25 On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. 26 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court must give the plaintiff the benefit of every 27 reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail 28 Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege 1 “‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to 2 relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (internal citation omitted). 3 Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of 4 factual allegations.” U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). 5 While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an 6 unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 7 pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 8 elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 9 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 10 statements, do not suffice.”). Thus, ‘[c]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences 11 are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 12 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume the 13 plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws 14 in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State 15 Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 16 Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough 17 facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim 18 has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 19 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 20 680. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more 21 than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. This plausibility 22 inquiry is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 23 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, only where a plaintiff fails to “nudge [his or 24 her] claims . . . across the line from conceivable to plausible[,]” is the complaint properly 25 dismissed. Id. at 680 (internal quotations omitted). 26 If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “‘[a] district court should grant leave to 27 amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading 28 could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)); 2 see also Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of discretion in 3 denying leave to amend when amendment would be futile). Although a district court should 4 freely give leave to amend when justice so requires under Rule 15(a)(2), “the court’s discretion to 5 deny such leave is ‘particularly broad’ where the plaintiff has previously amended its 6 complaint[.]” Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d 502, 520 (9th Cir. 7 2013) (quoting Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2004)). 8 III. ANALYSIS 9 Defendants argue all of Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed based on a lack of factual 10 allegations. (ECF No. 8-1.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues she adequately alleges facts to support 11 each claim. (ECF No. 10.) 12 The Court agrees with Defendants.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RITA CODERRE, et al., No. 2:21-cv-00965-TLN-DMC 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. 14 ORDER ROBERT BURTON, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 This matter is before the Court on Defendants Robert Burton (“Burton”) and Shereef 18 Aref’s (“Aref”) (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff Rita 19 Coderre (“Plaintiff”) opposed the motion. (ECF No. 10.) Defendants replied. (ECF No. 12.) 20 For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 On May 31, 2020, an inmate named Aaron Coderre was found unresponsive in the 3 showers at California Health Care Facility (“CHCF”). (ECF No. 1 at 6.) Another inmate, Joshua 4 Rudiger (“Rudiger”), had stabbed Aaron Coderre in the neck, causing his death. (Id.) Rita 5 Coderre is the decedent’s biological mother and successor in interest. (Id. at 2.) On May 28, 6 2021, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Burton (the acting warden of CHCF), Aref (the 7 Healthcare Executive at CHCF), and unidentified correctional staff (“Does 1–10”). (Id. at 4.) 8 Plaintiff alleges the following claims: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”) claims against 9 Does 1–10, Burton, and Aref for First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations; (2) § 1983 10 claims for supervisory liability against Does 1–10, Burton, and Aref; (3) violation of the 11 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act against Does 1–10, 12 Burton, and Aref; (4) violation of California Government Code § 845.6 against Does 1–10; and 13 (5) negligence/wrongful death against Does 1–10, Burton, and Aref. (ECF No. 1 at 19–34.) 14 II. STANDARD OF LAW 15 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 16 Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th 17 Cir. 2001). Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 18 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 19 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the complaint must “give the 20 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic 21 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citation and quotations omitted). “This simplified 22 notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to 23 define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema 24 N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). 25 On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. 26 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court must give the plaintiff the benefit of every 27 reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail 28 Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege 1 “‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to 2 relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (internal citation omitted). 3 Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of 4 factual allegations.” U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). 5 While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an 6 unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 7 pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 8 elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 9 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 10 statements, do not suffice.”). Thus, ‘[c]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences 11 are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 12 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume the 13 plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws 14 in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State 15 Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 16 Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough 17 facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim 18 has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 19 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 20 680. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more 21 than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. This plausibility 22 inquiry is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 23 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, only where a plaintiff fails to “nudge [his or 24 her] claims . . . across the line from conceivable to plausible[,]” is the complaint properly 25 dismissed. Id. at 680 (internal quotations omitted). 26 If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “‘[a] district court should grant leave to 27 amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading 28 could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)); 2 see also Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of discretion in 3 denying leave to amend when amendment would be futile). Although a district court should 4 freely give leave to amend when justice so requires under Rule 15(a)(2), “the court’s discretion to 5 deny such leave is ‘particularly broad’ where the plaintiff has previously amended its 6 complaint[.]” Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d 502, 520 (9th Cir. 7 2013) (quoting Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2004)). 8 III. ANALYSIS 9 Defendants argue all of Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed based on a lack of factual 10 allegations. (ECF No. 8-1.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues she adequately alleges facts to support 11 each claim. (ECF No. 10.) 12 The Court agrees with Defendants. The Complaint is devoid of factual allegations 13 suggesting the only named Defendants — Burton and Aref — individually participated in the 14 actions that give rise to any of Plaintiff’s claims. The Complaint includes over 50 paragraphs of 15 factual allegations that describe various actions taken by unidentified individuals at CHCF. (ECF 16 No. 1 at ¶¶ 21–79.) Very few of these factual allegations are specific to Burton or Aref. Further, 17 the factual allegations are later incorporated by reference within five causes of action which are 18 unclear, conclusory, and asserted against all Defendants collectively. (Id. at ¶¶ 80–122.) 19 This lack of clarity permeates the entire Complaint and is a sufficient basis for dismissal 20 under Rule 8. See Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming a district 21 court’s dismissal of an entire complaint that made “everyone did everything allegations” without 22 leave to amend because “[t]he district court made clear . . . that plaintiffs must amend their 23 ‘shotgun pleading’ to ‘state[ ] clearly how each and every defendant is alleged to have violated 24 plaintiffs’ legal rights” and plaintiffs failed to do so). If Plaintiff opts to file an amended 25 complaint, she should identify which party did what specifically and which specific facts are 26 allocated to the elements of each claim. See Hughey, 2014 WL 5473184, at *4; see also 27 McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1176 (“[P]laintiffs would be well advised to . . . focus on linking their 28 factual allegations to actual legal claims.). 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with leave 3 | toamend. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint not later than thirty (30) days 4 | from the electronic filing date of this Order. Defendants shall file their responsive pleading not 5 | later than twenty-one (21) days thereafter. If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint, the 6 | Court will dismiss this action and close the case. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. a> /) 8 | DATED: September 26, 2022 “ \ / of ma
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