Cockrum v. Fox

199 S.W.3d 69, 359 Ark. 508

• Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas
• Decided: December 2, 2004
• Docket: 04-42
• Status: Published

Opinions

Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice.

On January 23, 2003, Barbara and David Abies, and on behalf of their unborn child, a viable fetus, filed suit against petitioner, Holly Cockrum, M.D., and ten unidentified John Does and Jane Does employed at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences (UAMS). In their complaint for obstetrical medical malpractice, the Abies assert the following claims of negligence against Dr. Cockrum:

14. Dr. Cockrum was negligent in failing to diagnose the condition of Ms. Abies and Baby Abies, in failing to treat Ms. Abies and her unborn child for such condition as should have reasonably been diagnosed, and in failing to exercise ordinary care in the delivery of Ms. Ables’s child. Dr. Cockrum failed to exercise and apply the reasonable degree of skill, learning, and care exercised and applied by members of her profession in good standing. Additionally, Dr. Cockrum was negligent in the following particulars:

a. Failing to diagnose the condition of Ms. Abies and Baby Abies;

b. Failing to provide adequate information on the condition of Baby Abies to qualified physicians in a timely manner;

c. Failing to adequately monitor Baby Abies’ fetal heart tones;

d. Failing to induce labor while Baby Abies was viable and healthy;

e. Failing to use ordinary care for the safety of Mrs. Abies and Baby Abies.

£ Failing to anticipate the necessity of delivering Baby Abies by Cesarean section, and ultimately failing to deliver Taylor Nicole Abies by Cesarean section;

g. Failing to provide adequate documentation of Mrs. Ables’s and Baby Ables’s condition;

h. Failing to use ordinary care for the safety of Mrs. Abies and Baby Abies.

With regard to their claims for damages, the Abies seek to recover damages on behalf of and as next of kin of the unborn fetus, as set forth in paragraph 16 of the complaint:

16. Baby Abies died as a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ above-described negligence. Plaintiff Barbara Abies and James David Abies, on behalf of Baby Abies, are entitled to compensatory damages for which Defendants are jointly and severally liable. Plaintiffs, on behalf of and as next of kin of Baby Abies, are entitled to recover damages from Defendants for the following: (a) the death of Baby Abies; (b) the reasonable expense of any necessary medical care, treatment and services; (c) any pain, suffering, and mental anguish experienced in the past and reasonably certain to be experienced in the future; (d) the value of services and contributions of Baby Abies which Plaintiffs Barbara and David Abies are reasonably certain to lose in the future; and (e) loss of life suffered by Baby Abies.

(Emphasis added). In the next paragraph of the complaint, the Abies also seek to recover compensatory damages in their individual capacity:

17. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendants’ above-described negligence which caused the death of their child, Plaintiffs Barbara Abies and David Abies, individually, have experienced extreme mental anguish, and, in all likelihood, will experience extreme mental anguish in the future. Plaintiffs Barbara and James David Abies, in their individual capacity, are entitled to recover damages from Defendants for the following: (a) any mental anguish experienced in the past and reasonably certain to be experienced in the future; and (b) the reasonable expense of any necessary medical or mental healthcare, treatment and services received in the past, including transportation, board, and lodging expenses necessarily incurred in securing such care, treatment and services, and the present value of such expense reasonably certain to be required in the future.

(Emphasis added).

On September 15, 2003, Dr. Cockrum filed a motion to dismiss, in which she alleged that “no personal representative has been appointed, and all of Baby Abies’ heirs at law have not been named as parties plaintiff to the suit.”¹ According to Dr. Cockrum, the Abies lack standing to bring this action because all statutory beneficiaries under the wrongful-death statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-62-102 (Supp. 2003), must be named as heirs at law in the complaint if there is no personal representative. Further, Dr. Cockrum asserted to the trial court that this court’s decision in Ramirez v. White County Circuit Court, 343 Ark. 372, 38 S.W.3d 298 (2001), mandated dismissal of the action. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that the surviving parents are “heirs at law” pursuant to the tables of descent set forth in Ark. Code Ann. § 28-9-214(3) (Repl. 2004). Dr. Cockrum then filed a motion to reconsider the order denying the motion to dismiss, which motion was also denied by the trial court. Shortly thereafter, Dr. Cockrum filed this original action seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent the Pulaski County Circuit Court from proceeding with the wrongful-death action brought by the Abies, individually and on behalf of their unborn fetus.²

We recently reiterated the well-established standards for determining the propriety of a writ of prohibition:

The writ of prohibition is extraordinary relief that is appropriate only when the trial court is wholly without jurisdiction. Finney v. Cook, 351 Ark. 367, 94 S.W.3d 333 (2002). The writ is appropriate only when there is no other remedy, such as an appeal, available. Id. Prohibition is a proper remedy when the jurisdiction of the trial court depends upon a legal rather than a factual question. Id. This court confines its review to the pleadings in the case. Id. Morever, prohibition is never issued to prohibit a trial court from erroneously exercising its jurisdiction. Arkansas Dept. of Human Servs. v. Collier, 351 Ark. 506, 95 S.W.3d 772 (2003). Additionally, a writ of prohibition is not the appropriate remedy for the denial of a motion to dismiss. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Southall, 281 Ark. 141, 661 S.W.2d 383 (1983).

Conner v. Simes, 355 Ark. 422, 425-26, 139 S.W.3d 476, 478 (2003). Based on our review of the pleadings at issue here, we conclude that the plaintiffs in the underlying action may have filed claims against the defendants not only for the wrongful death of the unborn fetus, but also for medical malpractice in the treatment of Mrs. Abies. More specifically, the complaint alleges that Dr. Cockrum was negligent in the treatment of Mrs. Abies. Furthermore, the Abies seek to recover compensatory damages in their individual capacity, as well as on behalf of and as next of kin of the unborn fetus. While the parties do not raise this issue on appeal, the question of whether an order is final and subject to appeal is a jurisdictional question that this court will raise sua sponte. Moses v. Hanna’s Candle Co., 353 Ark. 101, 110 S.W.3d 725 (2003)(citing Reed v. Ark. State Highway Comm’n, 341 Ark. 470, 17 S.W.3d 488 (2000)).

If the complaint states a separate claim for negligence in the treatment of Mrs. Abies, the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss is not a final appealable order in that it does not dismiss the parties from the court, discharge them from the action, or conclude their rights to the subject matter in controversy. Conner v. Simes, supra., (citing Fisher v. Chavers, 351 Ark. 318, 92 S.W.3d 30 (2002)). Granting a writ in this situation will permit a piecemeal appeal that merely tests the correctness of an interlocutory order. Conner v. Simes, supra. Similarly, in Conner, we refused to treat the petition for writ of prohibition as one for certiorari because the case did not present a situation where the remedy by appeal was inadequate. Id.

With regard to the instant matter, once the trial court has disposed of all claims that may have been alleged in the pleadings, Dr. Cockrum can appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss, as an appeal from a final order also brings up for review any intermediate order. Ark. R. App. P.—Civ. 2(b)(2004). While we at one time appeared to endorse the use of an extraordinary writ to prevent untold time and expense, as well as unnecessary grief to the parties, Fore v. Circuit Court of Izard County, 292 Ark. 13, 727 S.W.2d 840 (1987), we have retreated from that overreaching language in Lupo v. Lineberger, 313 Ark. 315, 855 S.W.2d 293 (1993). Conner v. Simes, supra. In any event, this court has never used an extraordinary writ to narrow the claims alleged in a complaint. Id. “If the asserted threat of‘an unwarranted trial’ were a sufficient basis for declaring the remedy by appeal to be inadequate, then a defendant could always appeal from the trial court’s action in overruling a demurrer to the complaint. That, again, would be a piecemeal appeal merely testing the correctness of an interlocutory order.” Burney v. Hargraves, 264 Ark. 680, 682, 573 S.W.2d 912, 913 (1978). In short, we have never retreated from the unequivocal statement in Burney v. Hargraves, supra, that an asserted threat of an unwarranted trial is an insufficient basis to conclude that the remedy by appeal is not adequate.

For the above-stated reasons, we deny Dr. Cockrum’s petition for writ of prohibition.

Thornton, J., dissents.

1 The Abies have two other children, James David Abies III, born August 3, 1985, and Felicia Day Abies, born April 9, 1987.

2 Although Dr. Cockrum has named the individual judge as the respondent to her petition, prohibition lies to the circuit court and not the individual judge. Premium Aircraft Parts, LLC v. Circuit Court of Carroll County, 347 Ark. 977, 69 S.W.3d 849 (2002). Accordingly, we treat the petition as one against the circuit court. Id.