Cochran v. The Commissioner of Dept. of Corrections

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 23, 2021
Docket1:21-cv-06929
StatusUnknown

This text of Cochran v. The Commissioner of Dept. of Corrections (Cochran v. The Commissioner of Dept. of Corrections) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cochran v. The Commissioner of Dept. of Corrections, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JOSEPH COCHRAN, Plaintiff, -against- 21-CV-6929 (LTS) THE COMMISSIONER OF DEPT. OF ORDER TO AMEND CORRECTIONS; THE WARDEN OF RIKERS ISLAND OBCC/C-76; KENT MACKZUM, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Bellevue Hospital Prison Ward, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He asserts claims for violations of his civil rights during a six- day period from August 4-9, 2021, when he was detained at the Otis Bantum Correction Center (OBCC). By order dated August 17, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the

court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND The following allegations are from Plaintiff’s complaint. Beginning on August 4, 2021, Plaintiff was detained in a pen or cell in the intake area at OBCC. (ECF 2 at 4.) He remained there for six days, without a sheet, blanket, or shoes. Correction officers turned off the cameras wherever Plaintiff went. In cell/pen 13, correction officers “cut [Plaintiff’s] water supplies off.” (Id.) He “had to urinate into a milk carton [and he] dr[a]nk all of the urine.” (Id.) Plaintiff was also given insufficient food, and no mattress to lay down on the cement floors. Both of his feet

continue to hurt. Plaintiff, who is not currently at OBCC, “want[s] to sue for money to the max.” (Id. at 5.) He names as defendants the Commissioner of the New York City Department of Correction (DOC), the OBCC Warden, and attorney Kent Mackzum. DISCUSSION A. Official-Capacity Claims against DOC Commissioner and OBCC Warden Plaintiff’s claims against the DOC Commissioner and the OBCC Warden in their official capacities are, in essence, claims against the City of New York. See, e.g., Nassau County Emp. “L” v. County of Nassau, 345 F. Supp .2d 293, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that “[a] claim against a municipal employee in his or her official capacity may be treated as an action against the municipality itself” (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991)).

When a plaintiff sues a municipality, such as the City of New York, under section 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of the municipality’s employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff’s rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may be liable under this section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.”) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011). In other words, to state a section 1983 claim against a municipality the plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the existence of a municipal policy, custom, or practice, and (2) that the policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v.

Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (internal citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied water and other necessities at some point during a five-day period that he was detained at OBCC. Plaintiff does not plead any facts, however, suggesting that a custom or policy of the City of New York caused the unconstitutional conditions of his confinement. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim against the DOC Commissioner and OBCC Warden in their official capacities. B.

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Bluebook (online)
Cochran v. The Commissioner of Dept. of Corrections, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cochran-v-the-commissioner-of-dept-of-corrections-nysd-2021.