C.O. v. N.G.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania·Decided April 26, 2016·No. 808 MDA 2015·Unpublished

Opinion

J-A06018-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

C.O. A/K/A C.G. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

N.G.

Appellant No. 808 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered April 8, 2015 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Domestic Relations at No(s): 824 DR 2011

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED APRIL 26, 2016

N.G. (Father) appeals pro se from the order, entered in the Court of

Common Pleas of Dauphin County, dismissing his petition for modification of

child support which sought a reduction in his support obligation due to his

chronic medical condition which makes him unable to work full-time. After

careful review, we affirm based on the opinion authored by the Honorable

Jeannine Turgeon.

The parties were married in 2007 and separated in 2011; one child

was born of the marriage (born 9/10). C.O. (Mother) filed a complaint

seeking child support in May 2011. Mother maintained primary physical

custody of Child. On July 11, 2011, the court entered an order requiring

Father to pay $780/month in child support, plus $2,086.18 in arrears. The

court’s order was based on a determination that Father’s monthly net

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income was $2,248.35. On January 13, 2012, the court entered an order

decreasing Father’s support payment to $670.80/month, plus $64/month in

arrears. Finally, on May 21, 2013, the court further decreased Father’s

support payments to $642.82/month, plus $64.28 in arrears/month,

effective April 24, 2013.

On August 15, 2014, Father filed a petition to modify his support

obligation, claiming that he is unemployed and unable to work full time due

to a medical condition, Thalassemia Major,1 that makes him transfusion

dependent. A conference on the petition was held on October 20, 2014,

after which an officer denied Father’s petition, and determined that Father’s

earning capacity is $50,000/year.

On November 5, 2014, Father filed a de novo appeal from the

conference officer’s determination. On April 8, 2015, the trial court held a

hearing, after which it dismissed Father’s appeal, noting that based on the

evidence of record the court found him to be “certainly capable of working

from home . . . to earn money” and that he could “do tax returns from home

while [he is] getting transfusions.” Id. at 19. The court also noted that

1 Thalassemia is an inherited blood disorder in which the body makes an abnormal form of hemoglobin, the protein in red blood cells that carries oxygen. The disorder results in large numbers of red blood cells being destroyed, which leads to anemia. See https://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000587.htm (last visited March 28, 2016). Father testified that both of his parents carry the Thalassemia trait which gave him a 25% chance of being born with the disease. N.T. Appeal De Novo, 4/8/15, at 8.

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when, and if, Father becomes unable to work, he can file for social security

disability benefits which would go towards his support obligation. Id.

Father filed the instant pro se appeal which raises the following issues

for our consideration:

(1) Did the trial court correctly deny the appeal even after hearing credible testimony from the Appellant and viewing Exhibits presented by Appellant’s counsel including but not limited to the duly completed and signed Physician Verification Form?

(2) Did the trial court judge correctly hold Appellant to a full time earning capacity of $50,000 ignoring the assertion by Appellant’s Hematologist on the Physician Verification Form that Appellant is unable to work and that it was undetermined when his health condition would allow him to return to work?

(3) Did the trial judge correctly hold Appellant to a full time earning capacity of $50,000 ignoring Appellant’s credible testimony that he was unable to work full time?

(4) Did the trial judge correctly hold Appellant to a full time earning capacity of $50,000 ignoring credible testimony that the Defendant was currently unemployed, was not receiving unemployment compensation and yet was being assessed child support based on unemployment compensation that he last received in 2012?

(5) Was the trial judge correct in ignoring credible testimony that Appellant was sustaining himself with the help of programs such as Supplemental Nutrition Assistance, LIHEAP and Medical Assistance, on a monthly pension of $189 per month and by parents, family and friend, and yet he was [sic] being assessed child support based on a national net monthly income of $2,200 (approximate) derived from unemployment compensation he last received in the year 2012?

(6) Was the trial court correct in assessing child support on the Appellant given that child support laws and regulations were created to ensure that the custodial parent does not

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become a ward of the state yet in this case the custodial parent (obligee) who earns an income of $60,000 per year is awarded child support of $7,713.84 per year from a non-custodial parent (obligor) whose only income is $2,268 per year from a pension and who is dependent on federal and state benefits to sustain himself?

(7) Did the trial court correctly ignore credible testimony from Defendant and Plaintiff exhibits identified 12, 13, and 14 which show that he was looking for ways to generate whatever income he could given his medical condition and instead assessed him a full-time earning capacity of $50,000?

(8) Was the trial court correct in not reducing Appellant’s child support burden based on his actual earnings until he applied for and was approved for Social Security Disability?

(9) Was the trial court judge correct in ignoring the trier of fact [sic] compiled by the conference officer and presented at the hearing by Kim Robinson, Director of the Domestic Relations Office?

The amount of a child support order is largely within the discretion of

the trial court, whose judgment should not be disturbed on appeal absent a

clear abuse of discretion. Isralsky v. Isralsky, 824 A.2d 1178, 1187 (Pa.

Super. 2003) (citation omitted). An abuse of discretion is not merely an

error of judgment, but rather a misapplication of the law or an unreasonable

exercise of judgment. Id. A finding that the trial court abused its discretion

must rest upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence, and the trial

court will be upheld on any valid ground. Id.

While Father’s brief lists nine separate issues, the essence of his claims

boils down to the single contention that the court improperly attributed him

a $50,000 earning capacity and failed to reduce his support obligation where

his medical condition prevents him from working full-time.

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A person’s support obligation is determined primarily by the parties’

actual financial resources and their earning capacity. Baehr v. Baehr, 889

A.2d 1240 (Pa. Super. 2005). Earning capacity is the amount that a person

realistically could earn under the circumstances, considering his age, health,

mental and physical condition, training, earnings history, and child care

responsibilities. Woskob v. Woskob, 843 A.2d 1247 (Pa. Super. 2004).

See Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(d)(4).

“A provision of an agreement regarding child support, visitation or

custody shall be subject to modification by the court upon a showing of

changed circumstances.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 3105(b). When a party petitions to

modify support, due to a substantial change in circumstances, a court may

modify the amount, as follows:

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