Cluett v. Toole

11 Conn. Super. Ct. 303, 11 Conn. Supp. 303, 1942 Conn. Super. LEXIS 151
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedJune 2, 1942
DocketFile 59965
StatusPublished

This text of 11 Conn. Super. Ct. 303 (Cluett v. Toole) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cluett v. Toole, 11 Conn. Super. Ct. 303, 11 Conn. Supp. 303, 1942 Conn. Super. LEXIS 151 (Colo. Ct. App. 1942).

Opinion

Memorandum of decision in action involving maintenance ■of restaurant entrance.

FOSTER, J.

On March 24, 1940, at about 4 p.m., the plaintiff fell and was seriously injured upon leaving a building *304 owned by the defendants and operated by their lessees as a restaurant. The injuries suffered by the plaintiff were so serious that, if judgment be rendered in her favor, the amount of damages awarded will necessarily be of a substantial amount. ( If judgment be rendered against the plaintiff, her loss will be equally great. In another way the determination’ of the case is also important to the defendants. , If judgment be awarded ' against them, .they will not only be liable for the plaintiff’s damages, but they will necessarily be subject to heavy expenses in the reconstruction of the entrance of'the building at which the plaintiff fell. The court is, therefore, warranted in expressing in some detail the reasons for the conclusion reached.

The complaint is in two counts, alleging that the defendants maintained the entrance to the building in such manner as to constitute a nuisance, and in that they were guilty of negligence; which nuisance or negligence was or were a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.

The plaintiff in the first count of her complaint claims that on March 24, 1940, and for a long time prior thereto, the defendants were the owners of the building and premises known as No. 94 College Street in New Haven; that on that day and ’for a long time prior thereto, the defendants leased such premises to one Esther Kuritch, who conducted thereon a public restaurant and' tavern; that the only public means of exit from the premises was by way of a revolving door which opened directly onto the public sidewalk in front of the premises; that the floor level of the revolving door was approximately six inches (admittedly five inches) higher than the level of the adjoining sidewalk and that there was a single six-inch (admittedly five-inch) step between the two levels; that at about 4 p.m. on that day the plaintiff was an invitee on such premises and had had dinner in the restaurant; that as the plaintiff was leaving the restaurant she passed through the revolving door and fell and received injuries, because of the difference in levels of the floor upon which the door revolved and the sidewalk; that the difference in levels between the floor and the sidewalk presented an inherently dangerous condition in that it was located at, a place where proper and safe construction required a level footing, in that it was so constructed as to create a dangerous condition and a situation calculated to cause injury to persons lawfully using the same, in that its location close to the revolving door concealed it and made it dangerous to persons using the door and in that it was a single *305 isolated step not marked in any way to attract the attention of persons lawfully on the premises; that the defendants knew, or should have known, that a step, located as was the step in question, was a menace to life and limb and created an inher' ently dangerous condition and knew the purpose for which the premises were leased, and that such condition made the premises unfit for the purposes for which they were leased, and knew, or should have known, that a dangerous condition existed and was maintained on the premises, and that such condition created a nuisance; that the plaintiff by her fall suffered a compound comminuted fracture of the right ankle with complete break of the medical malleolus, fracture of the posterior portion of the tibia at its lower end, fracture of the fibula, comminute for a distance of about two inches from its lower end, complete dislocation of the astragalus, parting of the ankle ligaments, severe nervous shock, great pain and suffering.

In the second count of her complaint the plaintiff claims that in creating such conditions the defendants were guilty of negligence. The defendants deny that they maintained a condition in their building that constituted a nuisance, and they deny that they were guilty of any negligence in main' taining their premises in their then condition, and they allege that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence that was a proximate cause of her fall and subsequent injuries. The plaintiff denies that she was guilty of any negligence contributing to her fall and injuries.

Joseph Howard Candee is a photogfapher and, though not an engineer, he makes measurements. He has for many years acted as a witness in cases and has acquired full confidence of the courts in his accuracy and his impartiality. His testimony in this case is undisputed. His description of the door and step is as follows:

“Mr. Hadden:
Q—Now, Mr. Candee, will you give us the measurements that you made of this doorway?
A—The doorstep from the sidewalk up to the doorway is a fivednch riser. Then the cement step is nine inches across the top, which is of a grayish material—cement I should say. Then there is a one and one'half inch black stripe that goes around of composition that is on the floor. As that on the floor is in blocks there are six'inch diameter red blocks as *306 shown in this photograph, with white division lines between them.
Q—Point that out again, please.
A—These blocks are just inside the doorway with white division lines between them.
Q—What are they made of?
A—Red composition, and the opening in the doorway is 44% inches, and the door, itself—the wooden part—is 30% inches. Then there is a flange of pliable rubber and canvas which is 2% inches wide. It is 43 inches between the doors measuring from outside to outside, the door without the flange. The grab handles are 42% inches from the floor. The glass in the doors is 18% inches in width and 51% inches in height. The bottom of' the glass is 24 inches above the floor. The wood flange on the outside of the door is 7% inches. As I said before, there are four sections of the door. Those are all the measurements that I took on that case.
Q—Now, this door, Mr. Candee, you say has four sections.'
A—Yes.
Q—¿-Which create four compartments, so to speak?
A—That’s right.
Q—It is a revolving door, and what part of the door is fastened to any other object?
A—-The center of the door.
Q—The center at the top?
A—At top and bottom on a pivot like.
Q—Did you measure how far it is from where the door is fastened on the bottom to the front edge of the step?
A—No,- I did not, but that would be about two inches and .a half to three inches beyond the width of the door and flange, which makes about 35 to 36 inches from the center of the ■door to the outside of the step.

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Bluebook (online)
11 Conn. Super. Ct. 303, 11 Conn. Supp. 303, 1942 Conn. Super. LEXIS 151, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cluett-v-toole-connsuperct-1942.