Burdeaux v. Montgomery Ward & Co.

192 So. 728
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedDecember 1, 1939
DocketNo. 5986.
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 192 So. 728 (Burdeaux v. Montgomery Ward & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Burdeaux v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 192 So. 728 (La. Ct. App. 1939).

Opinion

TALIAFERRO, Judge.

According to the allegations of plaintiffs’ petition, Mrs. Burdeaux, while a customer in defendant’s store in the City of Monroe, Louisiana, visited a ladies’ rest room therein, provided for the convenience of its customers, and as she was making exit from a booth in the rest room, in which was located a' commode, the entrance door {hereof swung violently against her, causing her to lose balance and to fall. She sues to recover damages for physical injuries sustained by her as a result of the fall. Her husband joined in the suit and prays for judgment for the amount of physicians’, hospital and medical bills incurred in treating Mrs. Burdeaux.

Defendant excepted to the petition on the grounds that it disclosed neither a cause nor a right of action. Plaintiffs then tendered and filed a supplemental petition. The exception was urged as to both petitions. It was sustained and plaintiffs prosecute appeal.

It appears from the allegations of the petition, as amended (which, for the purpose of passing on the merits of the exception, are accepted as true), that the rest room which plaintiff visited is on the second floor of defendant’s store building; that it is divided by a partition wall into two compartments, one of which contains a lavatory and two booths in which are located commodes. The booths adjoin; the floor thereof is approximately six inches above the level of the floor of the balance of this compartment, and extends a few inches beyond the front line of the doors; therefore, a person on entering a booth door has to step up said six inches; that each door is affixed with spring hinges and opens inward only. When released, the doors swing forward in place and are prevented from going farther by a stop attached to the frame.

The immediate facts of the alleged accident and the negligence accredited to defendant as the sole cause thereof, are clearly reflected from the following excerpts taken from the original and amended petitions, viz.,

“That your petitioner, Mrs. P. W. Burdeaux, without in any manner being negligent, opened the door by pulling the same inward and proceeded to go out of the booth and when she was stepping down from this raised platform, she was struck by the swinging door, which act caused her to fall by over-balancing and pushing her downward.
“That this was the first time your petitioner, Mrs. P. W. Burdeaux, had visited this booth and the action of this swinging door and spring or hinge thereon located, was unknown to her and she had no knowledge of the dangerous character or the *730 danger of being struck by the door1 while in the act of departing from the booth.”
“That this fall was caused by the force in which the spring of the swinging' door hit your petitioner when she was stepping down and off the elevated portion of the floor of the booth, and that the blow, together with the act of stepping down, over-balanced your petitioner, causing her to fall and resulting in the injury above mentioned.
“That the defendant herein was and is negligent in maintaining and operating a rest room which is so built that it is dangerous to be used by the public. That this raised platform in the floor and the spring on its swinging door is dangerous and negligent per se.”

It is also averred that plaintiff is fifty-five years old and at the time of her injury “had full control of her faculties in walking and seeing.”

Therefore, the elements of negligence charged to defendant consist of: (a) The booth door being hung with spring hinges, and (b) the booth floor being elevated six inches above the level of the floor of the other part of the rest room, and extending only a few inches beyond the door line.

Plaintiff’s position is that the physical arrangement and construction of the booth in the manner related in her petition is all wrong, and, within themselves, constitute negligence per se. In other words, if her contention be true, this booth and all others designed for like use should have floors level with other parts of the rest room and the doors thereof swung by non-spring hinges, if the owner or lessee of the building would exonerate himself from continuing negligence and from liability for damages to those patrons who unluckily should injure themselves when making use of such booths. We think this position wholly untenable.

Our own appreciation of the situation in and about said booth, gained from a study of the petitions, leads us to the definite conclusion that no negligence whatever may be properly charged to defendant on account of the method of hanging the door, nor on account of the difference in floor elevations.

We have little or no doubt that if a trial on the merits were had, it would be clearly shown that the booth in question and the floor thereof were built in accordance with generally approved standards for such, and that swinging doors are to be found in nearly all public toilets.

Plaintiff’s relation to defendant at the time of the accident was that of invitee. 45 C.J. page 835; Givens v. De Soto Building Co. et al., 156 La. 377, 100 So. 534.

The invitor is not the insurer of a patron’s physical safety while on his premises. We would have to hold the converse of this proposition to sustain plaintiff’s petition against the exception’s attack.

45 C.J. page 834 § 241, concerning the invitor’s duty toward his invitee, says: “An invitation to enter premises carries with it the duty toward the persons invited to provide reasonably safe means of ingress and egress, and where the invitation is to a particular part of the premises, there is a duty to maintain the approaches thereto in a reasonably safe condition for use. There is also a duty to provide reasonably safe passages to and from such places as are included within the scope of the invitation, and in the case of a store, reasonably safe passages or aisles in the parts of the store where goods are displayed.”

Whatever else may be said on the subject, it certainly may be said without fear of successful contradiction, that defendant furnished to plaintiff and its other customers reasonably safe means of ingress and egress in their use of the rest room and toilet.

This accident happened -in the day time. Plaintiff alleges that this was her first visit to the booth, and to some extent relies upon this fact as a reason or excuse for her not guarding against the effect of the door’s reaction, after being drawn in to allow her exit; and, also, for not bearing in mind the presence of the step-off in the floor. This position is without persuasive force.

Being in full possession of her senses of sight and touch, and having safely entered the booth in the day time, argues convincingly that plaintiff fully appreciated and had knowledge of the physical set-up thereabout, and well knew what she must do in order to assure unto herself safe return from the booth into the larger apartment of the room, which, after all is said, should have been but a' repetition of her acts and movements when entering the booth. She knew that the door, if released entirely by her, after being pulled inward' to allow her passage out, would automat *731

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Bluebook (online)
192 So. 728, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/burdeaux-v-montgomery-ward-co-lactapp-1939.