Cloverdale Homes v. Town of Cloverdale

62 So. 712, 182 Ala. 419, 1913 Ala. LEXIS 476
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedJune 12, 1913
StatusPublished
Cited by45 cases

This text of 62 So. 712 (Cloverdale Homes v. Town of Cloverdale) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cloverdale Homes v. Town of Cloverdale, 62 So. 712, 182 Ala. 419, 1913 Ala. LEXIS 476 (Ala. 1913).

Opinion

de GRAFFENRIED, J.

The quéstion involved in this case require us to construe section 6030 of the Code of 1907, which is as follows: c,,

“The acknowledgment and recording of-such plat or map shall be held in law and in equity to be a conveyance in fee simple of such portion of the premises platted as are marked or noted on such plat or map as donated or granted to the public, and the premises intended for any street, alleyway, common, or other public use, as shown in such plat or map, shall be held in trust for the uses and purposes intended or set forth in such plat or map.”

It is necessary, in order that the provisions of the above section 6030 may be fully understood, that the provisions of that section be read in connection with the following other sections of the Code:

“6028 (3899). Town lots; survey and plat. — Any person desiring to subdivide his lands into lots shall cause the same to be surveyed by a competent surveyor, if not already surveyed, and shall cause a plat or map thereof to be made, showing the subdivisions into which *429 it is proposed to divide the same, giving the length and bearings of the boundaries of each lot and its number; and if it be the purpose of the owner to divide the lands into town lots, such plat or map shall show the streets, alleys, and public grounds, and give the bearings, length, width, and name of each street, as well as the number of each lot and block. Such plat or map must show the relation of the lands so platted or mapped to the government survey.”
“6029 (3900). Plat to be certified, signed by owner, acknowledged, and recorded; evidence. — The plat or map having been completed, shall be certified by the surveyor, which certificate must also be signed by the owner, his duly authorized agent or attorney, and acknowledged by such owner, agent, or attorney, in the- same manner in which deeds are required to be acknowledged. The plat or map, together with the certificate of the surveyor and of acknowledgment, shall be recorded in the office of the judge of probate in the county in which the lands are situated, in a suitable book to be kept for that purpose; and such acknowledgment and record shall have like effect, and certified copies thereof and of such plat or map may be used in evidence to the same extent and with like effect as in the case of deeds.”

The common 'law is the base upon which all of the laws of this state have been constructed, and when our courts are called upon to construe a statute — when they are called upon to ascertain and declare the legal effect and meaning of a legislative enactment — they must read the statute in the light of the common law.

At common laAV the ultimate fee to the middle of the street Avas in the abutting landowner. There was reason underlying the above rule of the common law, for the ultimate fee in lands should reside somewhere, and, where it resides in the abutting landowner to the *430 middle of a street, it furnishes to that landowner an efficient weapon for his protection against an unwarranted appropriation of a street in the proper maintenance of which the situation of his property gives him a peculiar interest. Through this doctrine of the common law- this court has been able to meet and determine, with justice to the owners of lands abutting upon streets and to the public to whose use such streets are devoted, each question which the constant growth of municipalities and the rapid and continuing advancement of human activity has developed. In fact, through this principle, this court has, meeting the wants of the state as it has proceeded in its various stages of development, declared a system possessing sufficient elasticity, and at the same time sufficient certainty to meet any demand which each improved system of communication and transportation and each modern condition and need of human life has made upon it. — Perry v. N. O., Mobile & Chattanooga R. R. Co., 55 Ala. 413, 28 Am. Rep. 740; Western Railway of Alabama v. Ala. G. T. R. R. Co., 96 Ala. 272, 11 South. 483, 17 L. R. A. 474; Highland Ave. & Belt Ry. Co. v. Matthews, 99 Ala. 24, 10 South. 267, 14 L. R. A. 462; Birmingham Ry., L. & P. Co. v. Smyer, 181 Ala. 121, 61 South. 354. The common-law rights of a citizen occupy a high plane of sanctity for they are inherited rights.

For this reason it ip a general rule of construction of statutes that “there are certain objects which the Legislature is presumed not to intend; and a construction which would lead to any of them is therefore to be avoided. It is found sometimes necessary to depart, not only from the primary and literal meaning of words, but also from the rules of grammatical construction, when it is improbable that they express the real intention of the Legislature; it being more reasonable to hold *431 that the Legislature expressed its intention in a slovenly manner than that it intended something which it is presumed not to intend.

“One of these présumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any alteration in the law beyond what it explicitly declares, either in express terms or by unmistakable implication; or, in other words, beyond the immediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matters beyond, the law remains undisturbed. It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from the general system of law without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness ; and to give, any such effect to general words, simply because, in their widest and perhaps natural sense, they have that meaning, would be to give them a meaning in which they were not really used. It is therefore an established rule of construction that general words and phrases, however wide and comprehensive in their literal sense, must be construed as strictly limited to the immediate objects of the act and as not altering the general principles of the law; i. e., they are to be construed as near the use and reason of the prior law as may be without violation of their obvious meaning.”— Endlich, Interp. Stat. p. 151, § 113.

In the case of Cecilia Thomas v. R. H. Hunt, 134 Ma. 392, 35 S. W. 581, 32 L. R. A. 857, which is cited by counsel for appellant in his brief, the Supreme Court of Missouri, construing a statute somewhat similar to the above-quoted section 6030 of our present Code, said: “The statute in force when the plat was filed provided that such plats ‘shall be a sufficient conveyance to vest the fee of such parcels of land as are therein expressed, named, or intended for public use in the county in which such town, village, or addition is situate, in trust, and *432 for the uses therein named, express or intended, and for no other use or purpose.’ — Rev. Stat. 1855, § 8, p. 1536. Under this statute it.has been held that the fee passes from the owner by the dedication. — Hannibal v. Draper, 15 Mo. 634; Reid v. Edina Bd. of Edu., 73 Mo. 304.

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Bluebook (online)
62 So. 712, 182 Ala. 419, 1913 Ala. LEXIS 476, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cloverdale-homes-v-town-of-cloverdale-ala-1913.