Clodgo v. Rentavision, Inc.

701 A.2d 1044, 166 Vt. 548, 1997 Vt. LEXIS 181
CourtSupreme Court of Vermont
DecidedJuly 11, 1997
Docket96-211
StatusPublished
Cited by27 cases

This text of 701 A.2d 1044 (Clodgo v. Rentavision, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Vermont primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Clodgo v. Rentavision, Inc., 701 A.2d 1044, 166 Vt. 548, 1997 Vt. LEXIS 181 (Vt. 1997).

Opinions

Gibson, J.

Defendant Rentavision, Inc. appeals a decision of the Commissioner of the Vermont Department of Labor and Industry awarding workers’ compensation benefits to claimant Brian Clodgo. Rentavision argues the Commissioner erred in awarding compensation for an injury sustained while claimant and another employee were engaged in horseplay. We reverse.

On July 22, 1995, claimant was working as manager of Rentavision’s store in Brattleboro. During a lull between customers, claimant began firing staples with a staple gun at a co-worker, who was sitting on a couch watching television. The co-worker first protested, but then, after claimant had fired twenty or thirty staples at him, fired three staples back at claimant. As claimant ducked, the third staple hit him in the eye.

Claimant eventually reported the injury and filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Rentavision contested the award, arguing that claimant was engaged in noncompensable horseplay at [550]*550the time of the injury. Following a hearing in March 1996, the Commissioner awarded permanent partial disability and vocational rehabilitation benefits, medical expenses, and attorney’s fees and costs. This appeal followed.

This Court’s review is limited to questions of law the Commissioner has certified. 21 V.S.A. § 672; Goodwin v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 123 Vt. 161, 162, 184 A.2d 220, 221 (1962). Although the Court defers to the Commissioner’s interpretation of Vermont’s Workers’ Compensation Act, we will not affirm an interpretation that is unjust or unreasonable. See Bedini v. Frost, 165 Vt. 167, 169, 678 A.2d 893, 894 (1996). We look to the whole statute, its effects and consequences, and the reason and spirit of the law to determine whether the Commissioner’s interpretation conflicts with the Legislature’s intent. Spears v. Town of Enosburg, 153 Vt. 259, 262, 571 A.2d 604, 605-06 (1989).

Compensable injuries under Vermont’s Workers’ Compensation Act are those received “by accident arising out of and in the course of . . . employment.” 21 V.S.A. § 618. Although only work-related injuries are compensable, we recognize that “even [employees] of maturer years [will] indulge in a moment’s diversion from work to joke with or play a prank upon a fellow [employee].” Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 128 N.E. 711, 711 (N.Y. 1920). For such a horseplay-related injury to be compensated, however, claimant must show that it both (1) arose out of the employment, and (2) occurred in the course of the employment. 21 V.S.A. § 618; Miller v. International Business Machs. Corp., 161 Vt. 213, 214, 637 A.2d 1072, 1072-73 (1993). A nonparticipant injured by the horseplay of others will nearly always be able to meet this test, see 2 A. Larson & L. Larson, Workers’ Compensation Law § 23.61, at 5-199 (1997); cf. Myott v. Vermont Plywood, Inc., 110 Vt. 131, 134-35, 2 A.2d 204, 206 (1938) (nonparticipant compensated for injury), while a participant may or may not recover. See 2 Larson & Larson, supra, § 23.20, at 5-182 to 5-183.

In setting forth the applicable standard, the Commissioner stated that nothing short of specific intent to injure falls outside the scope of the Act. This overly broad statement was borrowed, however, from a case analyzing the exclusive-remedy aspects of workers’ compensation law, made in the context where an employee attempts to prove specific intent by the employer to injure the employee. See Kittell v. Vermont Weatherboard, Inc., 138 Vt. 439, 441, 417 A.2d 926, [551]*551927 (1980). Whether a horseplay participant is entitled to recover usually hinges on whether the injury occurred in the course of employment, which, in turn, depends on the extent of the employee’s deviation from work duties. See 2 Larson & Larson, supra, §§ 23.20, 23.61, at 5-183, 5-198 to 5-201; cf. Sekora v. Industrial Comm’n, 556 N.E.2d 285, 288-89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (claimant riding all-terrain cycle without authorization was substantial deviation from work duties and thus outside course of employment); Petrie v. General Motors Corp., 466 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Mich. Ct. App.) (claimant’s actions leading to electrocution found to be substantial deviation from work duties), appeal denied, 478 N.W.2d 141 (Mich. 1991).

•The question certified for review is whether claimant’s horseplay bars him from recovery for the resulting injury under Vermont’s Workers’ Compensation Act. Rentavision contends the Commissioner misapplied the law in concluding that claimant’s horseplay-related injury was compensable. We agree. An injury arises out of employment if it would not have occurred but for the fact that the conditions and obligations of the employment placed claimant in the position where he or she was injured. Miller, 161 Vt. at 214, 637 A.2d at 1073; Shaw v. Dutton Berry Farm, 160 Vt. 594, 599, 632 A.2d 18, 20 (1993). Thus, claimant must show that “but for” the employment and his position at work, the injury would not have happened. Shaw, 160 Vt. at 599, 632 A.2d at 20 (adopting positional-risk doctrine).

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701 A.2d 1044, 166 Vt. 548, 1997 Vt. LEXIS 181, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clodgo-v-rentavision-inc-vt-1997.