UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CLIQ INC.,
Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 26-488
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Cliq Inc. brings this suit against the Federal Trade Commission asking the Court
to require the FTC to remove a press release from its website that has harmed Cliq’s ability to
conduct its business and to enjoin the FTC from making further public statements about Cliq.
See ECF No. 3-1 (Compl.) at 20–21.
Cliq is a processor of payments for merchant accounts. Id., ¶ 7. Between 2009 and
2010, it provided services to iWorks, acting as an independent sales organization (ISO) by
helping the company register for payment-processing services. Id., ¶ 24. In 2014, the FTC
conducted an investigation and ultimately concluded that iWorks “was engaged in deceptive
practices involving ‘trial memberships’ that resulted in unauthorized recurring charges to
customers.” Id., ¶ 25. In a separate lawsuit, the FTC also alleged that Cliq’s assistance in
helping iWorks obtain payment processing services constituted an unfair practice. Id. To avoid
litigation, Cliq and the FTC resolved this dispute through a consent judgment, which required it
to “refrain from providing payment[-]processing services, or acting as an ISO for certain
1 categories of merchant accounts. It further required Cliq to perform extensive due diligence on
merchant clients that featured certain characteristics or crossed certain thresholds.” Id., ¶ 26.
In 2025, the FTC filed a sealed motion for contempt against Cliq in federal court in
Nevada, alleging that Cliq had violated the consent order by failing to conduct the required due
diligence on merchant clients. Id., ¶¶ 47–48. In 2026, this contempt motion was unsealed by the
Nevada Court, id., ¶ 55, and the FTC subsequently published a press release publicizing the
contempt filing against Cliq. Id., ¶ 56. The press release stated that Cliq and its officers “have
‘flagrantly violated’ the Consent Order and ‘systematically’ failed to ‘prevent and detect fraud.’”
Id., ¶ 57.
In bringing this suit here, Plaintiff asserts that the FTC’s press release imposes a stigma
on Cliq that the company is engaged in “systemic facilitation of fraud.” Id., ¶ 77. As a result,
Cliq contends, the FTC is “destroying Cliq’s goodwill with its banks.” Id., ¶ 79. Plaintiff filed a
Motion with this Court to seal certain portions of this Complaint that relate to its confidential
information and business practices. See ECF No. 3 (Mot.). Cliq also filed a declaration in
support of this Motion, asserting that revelation of the confidential information would “put Cliq
at a competitive disadvantage in its industry.” ECF No. 3-2 (Declaration of Joanna Oliva), ¶¶ 6.
The Court will grant the Motion, subject to any further consideration by the United States
District Judge to whom this case is randomly assigned. See LCvR 40.7(f) (providing that Chief
Judge shall “hear and determine . . . motion[s] to file a pseudonymous complaint”); id. 5.1(h)(1)
(“Absent statutory authority, no case or document may be sealed without an order from the
Court.”).
2 I. Legal Standard
Generally, a plaintiff filing a civil action must identify the parties and file on the public
docket. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a); LCvR 5.1(c)(1). “The starting point in considering a motion to
seal court records is a strong presumption in favor of public access to judicial proceedings.”
Hardaway v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 843 F.3d 973, 980 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting EEOC v. Nat’l
Children’s Ctr., Inc., 98 F.3d 1406, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). When a party seeks to overcome this
presumption and seal court records, courts engage in the six-factor inquiry described in United
States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Those factors are:
(1) the need for public access to the documents at issue; (2) the extent of previous public access to the documents; (3) the fact that someone has objected to disclosure, and the identity of that person; (4) the strength of any property and privacy interests asserted; (5) the possibility of prejudice to those opposing disclosure; and (6) the purposes for which the documents were introduced during the judicial proceedings.
Nat’l Children’s Ctr., 98 F.3d at 1409 (citing Hubbard, 650 F.2d at 317–22).
II. Analysis
Plaintiff has met its burden to overcome the presumption in favor of public access to
court records. The Court will address each Hubbard factor in turn.
The first — “the need for public access to the documents at issue,” id. — counsels in
favor of sealing. While the presumption of transparency is normally “accentuated in cases” like
this one “where the government is a party,” United States v. All Assets Held at Bank Julius Baer
& Co., 520 F. Supp. 3d 71, 81 (D.D.C. 2020) (quoting Nat’l Children’s Ctr., 98 F.3d at 1409),
Plaintiff is seeking to partially seal only certain portions of the Complaint related to confidential
business information. See Oliva Decl., ¶¶ 6–10. Partial redactions of confidential business
information are proper when the basic facts of the complaint, such as the cause of action and
3 theory of liability, remain accessible on the public docket, as is the case here. FTC v. Seven & I
Holdings, Co., 2023 WL 11730304, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2023).
The second factor similarly counsels in favor of sealing. In assessing this factor, the
court “should consider the public’s previous access to the sealed information, not its previous
access to the information available in the overall lawsuit.” CNN v. FBI, 984 F.3d 114, 119 (D.C.
Cir. 2021). There is no doubt that the public has access to the overall subject of this suit —
namely, Cliq’s alleged violation of the relevant consent order. The FTC has published a press
release informing the public that it has filed a contempt action against Cliq for violating the
consent order and that it has asked a District Court in Nevada to ensure that Cliq abides by the
consent order. See Press Release, F.T.C., FTC Asks Court to Hold Payment Processors in
Contempt for Systematically Violating 2015 Order (Jan. 13, 2026), https://perma.cc/UJR3-
DRJT. To the Court’s knowledge, however, the public has never had access to the information
hiding beneath the current redactions, which include Cliq’s confidential business information.
See Oliva Decl., ¶ 10 (“All of the information listed above is confidential and sensitive business
information.”).
The third factor also tips in favor of sealing. “[T]he fact that a party moves to seal the
record weighs in favor of the party’s motion.” Zapp v. Zhenli Ye Gon, 746 F. Supp. 2d 145, 149
(D.D.C. 2010). As is customary at this stage, no objection to the Motion has been lodged.
The fourth factor — “the strength of any property and privacy interests asserted,” Nat’l
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CLIQ INC.,
Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 26-488
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Cliq Inc. brings this suit against the Federal Trade Commission asking the Court
to require the FTC to remove a press release from its website that has harmed Cliq’s ability to
conduct its business and to enjoin the FTC from making further public statements about Cliq.
See ECF No. 3-1 (Compl.) at 20–21.
Cliq is a processor of payments for merchant accounts. Id., ¶ 7. Between 2009 and
2010, it provided services to iWorks, acting as an independent sales organization (ISO) by
helping the company register for payment-processing services. Id., ¶ 24. In 2014, the FTC
conducted an investigation and ultimately concluded that iWorks “was engaged in deceptive
practices involving ‘trial memberships’ that resulted in unauthorized recurring charges to
customers.” Id., ¶ 25. In a separate lawsuit, the FTC also alleged that Cliq’s assistance in
helping iWorks obtain payment processing services constituted an unfair practice. Id. To avoid
litigation, Cliq and the FTC resolved this dispute through a consent judgment, which required it
to “refrain from providing payment[-]processing services, or acting as an ISO for certain
1 categories of merchant accounts. It further required Cliq to perform extensive due diligence on
merchant clients that featured certain characteristics or crossed certain thresholds.” Id., ¶ 26.
In 2025, the FTC filed a sealed motion for contempt against Cliq in federal court in
Nevada, alleging that Cliq had violated the consent order by failing to conduct the required due
diligence on merchant clients. Id., ¶¶ 47–48. In 2026, this contempt motion was unsealed by the
Nevada Court, id., ¶ 55, and the FTC subsequently published a press release publicizing the
contempt filing against Cliq. Id., ¶ 56. The press release stated that Cliq and its officers “have
‘flagrantly violated’ the Consent Order and ‘systematically’ failed to ‘prevent and detect fraud.’”
Id., ¶ 57.
In bringing this suit here, Plaintiff asserts that the FTC’s press release imposes a stigma
on Cliq that the company is engaged in “systemic facilitation of fraud.” Id., ¶ 77. As a result,
Cliq contends, the FTC is “destroying Cliq’s goodwill with its banks.” Id., ¶ 79. Plaintiff filed a
Motion with this Court to seal certain portions of this Complaint that relate to its confidential
information and business practices. See ECF No. 3 (Mot.). Cliq also filed a declaration in
support of this Motion, asserting that revelation of the confidential information would “put Cliq
at a competitive disadvantage in its industry.” ECF No. 3-2 (Declaration of Joanna Oliva), ¶¶ 6.
The Court will grant the Motion, subject to any further consideration by the United States
District Judge to whom this case is randomly assigned. See LCvR 40.7(f) (providing that Chief
Judge shall “hear and determine . . . motion[s] to file a pseudonymous complaint”); id. 5.1(h)(1)
(“Absent statutory authority, no case or document may be sealed without an order from the
Court.”).
2 I. Legal Standard
Generally, a plaintiff filing a civil action must identify the parties and file on the public
docket. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a); LCvR 5.1(c)(1). “The starting point in considering a motion to
seal court records is a strong presumption in favor of public access to judicial proceedings.”
Hardaway v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 843 F.3d 973, 980 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting EEOC v. Nat’l
Children’s Ctr., Inc., 98 F.3d 1406, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). When a party seeks to overcome this
presumption and seal court records, courts engage in the six-factor inquiry described in United
States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Those factors are:
(1) the need for public access to the documents at issue; (2) the extent of previous public access to the documents; (3) the fact that someone has objected to disclosure, and the identity of that person; (4) the strength of any property and privacy interests asserted; (5) the possibility of prejudice to those opposing disclosure; and (6) the purposes for which the documents were introduced during the judicial proceedings.
Nat’l Children’s Ctr., 98 F.3d at 1409 (citing Hubbard, 650 F.2d at 317–22).
II. Analysis
Plaintiff has met its burden to overcome the presumption in favor of public access to
court records. The Court will address each Hubbard factor in turn.
The first — “the need for public access to the documents at issue,” id. — counsels in
favor of sealing. While the presumption of transparency is normally “accentuated in cases” like
this one “where the government is a party,” United States v. All Assets Held at Bank Julius Baer
& Co., 520 F. Supp. 3d 71, 81 (D.D.C. 2020) (quoting Nat’l Children’s Ctr., 98 F.3d at 1409),
Plaintiff is seeking to partially seal only certain portions of the Complaint related to confidential
business information. See Oliva Decl., ¶¶ 6–10. Partial redactions of confidential business
information are proper when the basic facts of the complaint, such as the cause of action and
3 theory of liability, remain accessible on the public docket, as is the case here. FTC v. Seven & I
Holdings, Co., 2023 WL 11730304, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2023).
The second factor similarly counsels in favor of sealing. In assessing this factor, the
court “should consider the public’s previous access to the sealed information, not its previous
access to the information available in the overall lawsuit.” CNN v. FBI, 984 F.3d 114, 119 (D.C.
Cir. 2021). There is no doubt that the public has access to the overall subject of this suit —
namely, Cliq’s alleged violation of the relevant consent order. The FTC has published a press
release informing the public that it has filed a contempt action against Cliq for violating the
consent order and that it has asked a District Court in Nevada to ensure that Cliq abides by the
consent order. See Press Release, F.T.C., FTC Asks Court to Hold Payment Processors in
Contempt for Systematically Violating 2015 Order (Jan. 13, 2026), https://perma.cc/UJR3-
DRJT. To the Court’s knowledge, however, the public has never had access to the information
hiding beneath the current redactions, which include Cliq’s confidential business information.
See Oliva Decl., ¶ 10 (“All of the information listed above is confidential and sensitive business
information.”).
The third factor also tips in favor of sealing. “[T]he fact that a party moves to seal the
record weighs in favor of the party’s motion.” Zapp v. Zhenli Ye Gon, 746 F. Supp. 2d 145, 149
(D.D.C. 2010). As is customary at this stage, no objection to the Motion has been lodged.
The fourth factor — “the strength of any property and privacy interests asserted,” Nat’l
Children’s Ctr., 98 F.3d at 1409 — weighs strongly in favor of sealing. “[C]onfidential business
information that should be kept private for competitive business reasons” has been recognized by
courts in this district as an interest strong enough to merit non-disclosure. All Assets Held, 520
F. Supp. 3d at 83; see also Vanda Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 539 F. Supp. 3d 44, 57 (D.D.C. 2021)
4 (“[T]he fourth Hubbard factor weighs strongly in favor of keeping confidential . . . proprietary
information under seal . . .”). Because the information currently redacted contains sensitive
business information that could be used by Plaintiff’s competitors, “the privacy interests are
substantial.” Michaels v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., 2023 WL 4857413, at *5 (D.D.C. July 31, 2023).
The fifth factor, which considers possible prejudice to the party seeking the seal, weighs
against granting Plaintiff’s Motion. Whether prejudice exists in this context depends on
“whether disclosure of the documents will lead to prejudice in future litigation to the party
seeking the seal.” All Assets Held, 520 F. Supp. 3d at 85 (quoting United States ex rel. Durham
v. Prospect Waterproofing, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 2d 64, 68 (D.D.C. 2011). This prejudice must be
distinct from any harm that the party seeking the seal might suffer from disclosure of business
information to competitors. Vanda Pharms., 539 F. Supp. 3d at 57 (“[Plaintiff] has not identified
any prejudice it would suffer from disclosure apart from the competitive harm discussed at
length under factor four.”). Because Cliq has not identified any prejudice to future litigation
separate from disclosure of confidential business information, this factor does not move the
needle.
The sixth and final factor concerns “the purposes for which the documents were
introduced during the judicial proceedings.” Nat’l Children’s Ctr., 98 F.3d at 1409. Disclosure
is the norm where “the parties explicitly intended the Court to rely on [the sealed] materials in
adjudicating their dispute.” Vanda Pharms., 539 F. Supp. 3d at 57 (citation omitted).
Cliq “voluntarily commenced a public proceeding . . . and invoked the jurisdiction of this Court
to do so.” Upshaw v. United States, 754 F. Supp. 2d 24, 30 (D.D.C. 2010). There is no doubt,
moreover, that it “intended for the Court to rely on the sealed documents” — the Complaint — in
deciding this case. Michaels, 2023 WL 4857413, at *5; see also Guttenberg v. Emery, 26
5 F. Supp. 3d 88, 96 (D.D.C. 2014) (“The more relevant a pleading is to the central claims of the
litigation, the stronger the presumption of unsealing the pleading becomes.”) (citation omitted).
This factor, like the previous one, weighs against sealing as Cliq is the party introducing the
document to be sealed.
At the end of the day, four of the Hubbard factors weigh in favor of sealing, while two
cut the other way. See Vanda Pharms., 539 F. Supp. 3d at 58–59 (permitting plaintiff to redact
information in complaint relating to its proprietary business information despite only satisfying
Hubbard factors three and four). It is also significant that Plaintiff seeks to seal only certain
confidential business information rather than the entire Complaint. The Court will thus grant
Cliq’s Motion to Partially Seal aspects of the Complaint concerning confidential business
information.
III. Conclusion
The Court accordingly ORDERS that:
1. Plaintiff’s [3] Motion For Leave to File Complaint Under Seal is GRANTED; and
2. Plaintiff’s [3-1] unredacted Complaint shall remain sealed, subject to any further
consideration by the United States District Judge to whom this case is randomly
assigned.
/s/ James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG Chief Judge Date: March 3, 2026