Clinkenbeard v. United States

88 U.S. 65, 22 L. Ed. 477, 21 Wall. 65, 1874 U.S. LEXIS 1341, 2 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 2321

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: November 23, 1874
• Docket: 28
• Status: Published

Opinions

Mr. Justiee BRADLEY

delivered the opinion of the court.

If the facts were as set up in the defence, it is difficult to see how the assessment in this case could have been legal. The distiller, without any fault of his own, but by the omission of the government itself, was prevented from operating his distillery for the first four days for which he was taxed, and his distillery was inactive from an accident, and in charge of a government officer, as prescribed by law, for four other days. He could not, without a breach of law, commence distilling till a storekeeper was assigned him, and he acted in. compliance with the law when his distillery was stopped 1)3’ accident. To charge him with the capacity-tax during those eight da3's was unjust and oppressive.

It is suggested by the government counsel that the case does not show that the assessment was upon the capacity of the distillery; that the quantity of material returned by him as actually used during the month may have warranted the assessment. But the offer was to show that the assessment included those eight days, and the declaration charges, as a breach, that Clinkenbeard did not pay the tax assessed upon the aggregate capacity of the distillery for the month in question. So far as appeared the facts set up in defence rendered the assessment clearly illegal.

But another point raised by the government counsel is that the assessment, not having been appealed from, was res judicata and conclusive, and defendant was precluded from showing the contrary.

It is true that the Internal-Revenue Act of 1S64 authorizes the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, on appeal to him made, to remit, refund, and pay back all taxes erroneously or illegally assessed or collected,

* and the amended act of July 13th, 1866, declares that no suit shall be maintained for the recovery of any tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected until such appeal shall have been made, and a decision had.† The suit thus prohibited is a suit brought by the person taxed to recover back a tax illegally assessed and collected. This is different from the case now under consideration, which is a suit brought by the government for collecting the tax, and the person taxed (together with his sureties) is defendant instead of plaintiff. No statute is cited to show that he cannot, when thus sued, set up the defence that the tax was illegally assessed, although he may not have appealed to the commissioner.

Is he precluded by any general rule of law from setting up such a defence? lias an assessment of a tax so far the force and effect of a judicial sentence that it cannot be attacked collaterally, but only by some direct proceeding, such as an appeal or certiorari, for setting it aside ?

It is undoubtedly true that the decisions of an assessor or board of assessors, like those of all other administrative commissioners, are of a quasi judicial character, and cannot be questioned collaterally when made within the scope of their jurisdiction. But if they assess persons, property, or operations not taxable, such assessment is illegal and cannot form the basis of an action at law for the collection of the tax, however efficacious it may be for the protection of ministerial officers charged with the duty of actual collection by virtue of a regular warrant or authority therefor. When the government elects to resort to the aid of the courts it must abide by the legality of the tax. When it follows the statute its officers have the protection of the statute, and parties must comply with the requirements thereof before they can prosecute as plaintiffs.

The JUDGMENT reversed, and

A VENIRE DE NOVO AWARDED.

Section 44.

Section 19.