Clifton Peasley v. City of Providence, by and through its Treasurer, Shomari Husband

• Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island
• Decided: January 22, 2026
• Docket: 2025-21-Appeal.
• Status: Published

Opinion

Supreme Court

No. 2025-21-Appeal. (PC 24-249)

Clifton Peasley :

v. :

City of Providence, by and through : its Treasurer, Shomari Husband.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or Email: opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. Supreme Court

City of Providence, by and through : its Treasurer, Shomari Husband.

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Justice Goldberg, for the Court. In this appeal, we consider the election of

remedies doctrine. Applying this equitable principle, the trial justice dismissed the

action for declaratory relief filed by the plaintiff, Clifton Peasley (plaintiff or

Peasley). In so doing, the trial justice reasoned that the plaintiff had already

employed the grievance process in an effort to challenge the denial of his claim for

back pay, which had been previously rendered by the City of Providence (defendant

or city). Peasley appealed. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

This case came before the Supreme Court on December 2, 2025, pursuant to

an order to show cause. Having reviewed the parties’ written and oral arguments,

-1- we conclude that cause has not been shown and we proceed to decide the appeal at

this time.

Background

We glean the relevant facts from plaintiff’s complaint as well as from

documents (the authenticity of which are not in dispute), official public records, and

documents sufficiently referenced in the complaint. See Montaquila v. Flagstar

Bank, FSB, 288 A.3d 967, 971 (R.I. 2023) (discussing “a narrow exception” for

documents outside the complaint that may be considered on a motion to dismiss).

We assume the facts averred in plaintiff’s complaint are accurate. Id.

On April 11, 2018, Peasley, who worked as a tenured teacher for the city, was

charged with second-degree child abuse. As a result of this criminal charge, the city

promptly placed him on administrative leave with pay. Over a year later, and with

the child-abuse charge still pending, the city notified Peasley on October 24, 2019,

that he remained suspended pending the resolution of the criminal charge, but that

the suspension would now be without pay. Peasley’s union, Providence Teachers

Union, Local 958, AFT, AFL-CIO (union), responded by filing a grievance alleging

that the unpaid suspension was without good and just cause (the unpaid suspension

grievance).

In due course, the unpaid suspension grievance proceeded to arbitration, and

an award issued that the city had “good and just cause to suspend the grievant,

-2- Clifton Peasley[,] without pay pending the outcome of [the] criminal charge[]

against him.” On June 29, 2021, the union filed a petition in the Superior Court

seeking to vacate the arbitration award; subsequently, the city filed an objection and

a counterclaim requesting that the arbitrator’s award be confirmed.

On February 15, 2023, the criminal charge against Peasley was dismissed by

the State of Rhode Island pursuant to Rule 48(a) of the Superior Court Rules of

Criminal Procedure.1 The city thereafter reinstated Peasley, effective April 24, 2023.

On June 15, 2023, the union filed a second grievance, seeking compensation for the

wages Peasley lost during his unpaid suspension (the back-pay grievance). The

parties agreed to proceed directly to arbitration.

While the back-pay grievance was pending in arbitration, on or about January

12, 2024, Peasley filed the action at the center of this appeal, a complaint for

declaratory relief in the Superior Court. Peasley asserted that the basis for the unpaid

suspension was the criminal charge for child abuse and that the criminal charge had

been dismissed. Accordingly, Peasley reasoned that he was “vindicated” within the

meaning of the Teachers’ Tenure Act, which provides in relevant part:

“Whenever a teacher is suspended by a school committee, the school committee shall furnish the teacher with a complete statement of the cause(s) of the suspension and,

1 Rule 48(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: “The attorney for the State may file a dismissal of an indictment, information, or complaint and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate. Such dismissal may not be filed during the trial without consent of the defendant.” -3- upon request, shall afford the teacher a hearing and appeal pursuant to the procedure set forth in § 16-13-4. If the teacher shall be vindicated as a result of the hearing or any appeal the teacher shall be paid in full for the period of suspension * * *.” General Laws 1956 § 16-13-5(b) (emphasis added).

Thus, through the declaratory relief action, Peasley sought a declaration that he was

entitled to, among other things, back pay. See id.

The city responded by filing a motion to dismiss. During the hearing on the

motion to dismiss, Peasley argued that, in addition to the contractual remedy

provided through the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), viz., arbitration, he

was also entitled to pursue the statutory remedy set forth within § 16-13-5(b).

Significantly, before the trial justice, Peasley acknowledged that the arbitration

proceeding on the back-pay grievance remained pending.

The trial justice granted the motion to dismiss and in so doing recognized that

Martone v. Johnston School Committee, 824 A.2d 426 (R.I. 2003), was “directly

applicable to this case.” He elucidated that Peasley challenged the city’s denial of

the demand for back pay and pursued arbitration; therefore, “the election of remedies

doctrine is applicable.” The trial justice also distinguished Peasley’s argument

concerning the applicability of Weeks v. 735 Putnam Pike Operations, LLC, 85 A.3d

1147 (R.I. 2014), stating, among other grounds, that unlike Weeks this case did not

concern any statutory provisions prohibiting discrimination. Judgment entered in

favor of the city and Peasley filed this appeal. -4- Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court

Rules of Civil Procedure “has a narrow and specific purpose: to test the sufficiency

of the complaint.” Doe v. Brown University, 253 A.3d 389, 394-95 (R.I. 2021)

(quoting Mokwenyei v. Rhode Island Hospital, 198 A.3d 17, 21 (R.I. 2018)). “When

deciding a motion to dismiss, the hearing justice ‘is to look no further than the

complaint, assume that all allegations in the complaint are true, and resolve any

doubt in a plaintiff’s favor.’” Id. at 395 (quoting Mokwenyei, 198 A.3d at 21).

Moreover, we have recognized that “[a] dismissal of a declaratory-judgment action

before a hearing on the merits, under Rule 12(b)(6), is proper only when the

pleadings demonstrate that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the declaration prayed for is

an impossibility.” Tucker Estates Charlestown, LLC v. Town of Charlestown, 964

A.2d 1138, 1140 (R.I. 2009).

Discussion

“This Court long has adhered to the election of remedies doctrine to ‘mitigate

unfairness to both parties by preventing double redress for a single wrong.’”

Martone, 824 A.2d at 429 (quoting State Department of Environmental Management

v. State Labor Relations Board, 799 A.2d 274, 277 (R.I. 2002)) (DEM). “Pursuant

to the election of remedies doctrine, ‘when one party to a CBA attempts to take

advantage of the grievance procedure and loses, that party is prohibited from

-5- pursuing the same dispute in the courts of this state.’” Id. (brackets and deletion

omitted) (quoting DEM, 799 A.2d at 278). Likewise, “when one party to a CBA

attempts to take advantage of a statutorily-prescribed administrative remedy and

loses, the election-of-remedies doctrine prohibits that party from pursuing the same

dispute through a grievance procedure.” Id. (quoting School Committee of North

Kingstown v. Crouch, 808 A.2d 1074, 1080 (R.I. 2002)).

In Martone, a tenured teacher was placed on leave pending the outcome of an

investigation alleging sexual harassment of a co-worker. See Martone, 824 A.2d at

428. After an investigation, Martone was permitted to return to his teaching duties;

however, a “Letter of Reprimand” was issued, which the union challenged through

the grievance process. Id. While the grievance was pending, Martone filed a petition

for a writ of mandamus in the Superior Court seeking a decree that the school

committee conduct a hearing in accordance with § 16-13-5. Id.

This Court concluded that “the election of remedies doctrine applies and is

dispositive.” Martone, 824 A.2d at 431. In so doing, we recognized that Martone

filed a grievance pursuant to the CBA, and thereafter filed a petition for a writ of

mandamus in the Superior Court. Id. at 430. We explained that “[b]y initially

electing to use the grievance process to challenge the sanction that the committee

imposed against him, Martone ‘had selected the remedy to adjudicate his claim, and

-6- he should have pursued that remedy to its conclusion.’” Id. (brackets omitted)

(quoting DEM, 799 A.2d at 278).

Martone similarly controls this matter. Before the Superior Court, Peasley

readily admitted that the arbitration proceeding on the back-pay grievance was

initially commenced and remained pending at the time he filed the action for

declaratory relief. Likewise, on appeal, Peasley recognizes that “[w]hile arbitration

on the 2023 Backpay Grievance remained pending, [he] * * * filed the action that is

the subject of this appeal * * *.” As we have explained, “the doctrine of election of

remedies is equitable in nature and has at its core the salient purpose of preventing

unfairness to the parties.” Martone, 824 A.2d at 430 (quoting DEM, 799 A.2d at

278).

Peasley endeavors to distinguish Martone by invoking Weeks and equating

the provisions of the Teachers’ Tenure Act (at issue in this case) with the Rhode

Island Civil Rights Act (RICRA), see G.L. 1956 chapter 112 of title 42, and the

Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA), see G.L. 1956 chapter 5 of

title 28 (both at issue in Weeks). In this respect, plaintiff suggests that similar to

RICRA and FEPA, this Court has determined that the Teachers’ Tenure Act is of

such critical importance that its statutory remedies cannot be waived. We reject this

absolute approach, as well as plaintiff’s efforts to compare the provisions of the

Teachers’ Tenure Act with the landmark antidiscrimination protections found in

-7- RICRA and FEPA. See Bochner v. Providence School Committee, 490 A.2d 37, 42

(R.I. 1985) (“[W]e hold that absent an express relinquishment by the petitioners of

their statutory right of appeal, the arbitration clause of the Providence teachers’

contract could not revoke their right of appeal under either § 16-13-4 or § 16-39-2.”);

see also Weeks, 85 A.3d at 1158 (“[I]t is our holding that the right to a judicial forum

for claims brought specifically under the RICRA or the FEPA can be waived in a

collective bargaining agreement if, and only if, that waiver is clear and

unmistakable.”).2

Peasley also references the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA),

G.L. 1956 § 9-30-1, which provides that the Superior Court “shall have [the] power

to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or

could be claimed.”3 (Emphasis added.) Based upon the emphasized statutory

2 On appeal, Peasley does not address whether the CBA governing the parties in this case contains such waiver language. Indeed, Peasley’s written submissions to this Court, as well as his oral argument, fails to reference any relevant provision of the CBA. Thus, we have no occasion to consider this issue. See Terzian v. Lombardi, 180 A.3d 555, 557 (R.I. 2018) (“[A] failure to raise and develop it in its briefs constitutes a waiver of that issue on appeal and in proceedings on remand.”) (quoting McGarry v. Pielech, 108 A.3d 998, 1005 (R.I. 2015)). 3 Peasley’s statement filed pursuant to Article I, Rule 12A of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure references G.L. 1956 § 9-1-30, but the context and arguments make clear that this is a scrivener’s error and Peasley intended to reference G.L. 1956 § 9-30-1. -8- language, Peasley contends that he may simultaneously pursue an action for

declaratory relief in the Superior Court and an arbitration proceeding. We disagree.

In Cranston Teachers’ Association v. Cranston School Committee, 423 A.2d

69 (R.I. 1980), the teachers’ association sought to recover back pay withheld from

its members during a wage freeze instituted pursuant to a Presidential Order.

Cranston Teachers’ Association, 423 A.2d at 69-70. After invoking the grievance

procedures set forth in the CBA, the teachers’ association filed an action for

declaratory relief in the Superior Court, seeking a determination that its members

were entitled to receive the withheld wages. Id. at 70-71. We affirmed the Superior

Court’s dismissal of the declaratory relief action, explaining that “the teachers,

through their representatives, decided that their rights to [back pay] were and are to

be initially determined through the arbitration processes set out in the agreement.”

Id. at 71. Having elected to proceed through arbitration, we concluded that the

teachers’ association and its members “were foreclosed from seeking redress in the

Superior Court” through the UDJA. Id.; see also City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket

Lodge No. 4, Fraternal Order of Police, 545 A.2d 499, 503 (R.I. 1988) (“We cannot

overlook the fact that the city submitted the dispute to grievance arbitration, received

an unfavorable decision, and returned to the courthouse to seek relief [through the

UDJA].”).

-9- Finally, Peasley argues that the trial justice disregarded the possibility that the

city may contest the arbitrability of the back-pay grievance. During oral argument,

however, we were advised that the back-pay grievance was arbitrated and that the

parties were awaiting a decision. In light of these developments, we are satisfied

that any previous concerns that the arbitration proceeding on the back-pay grievance

might be avoided have been alleviated.

Conclusion

For these reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed. The papers

in this case are remanded to the Superior Court.

- 10 - STATE OF RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE Licht Judicial Complex 250 Benefit Street Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Clifton Peasley v. City of Providence, by and through Title of Case its Treasurer, Shomari Husband. No. 2025-21-Appeal. Case Number (PC 24-249)

Date Opinion Filed January 22, 2026

Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Justices Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Joseph J. McBurney

For Plaintiff:

Vicki J. Bejma, Esq. Attorney(s) on Appeal For Defendant:

Charles A. Ruggerio, Esq.