Cliatt v. State

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Cliatt v. State

389 S.E.2d 568, 194 Ga. App. 110, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 1703

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedDecember 5, 1989

DocketA89A1445

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 389 S.E.2d 568 (Cliatt v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Cliatt v. State, 389 S.E.2d 568, 194 Ga. App. 110, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 1703 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).

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Opinions

Deen, Presiding Judge.

Prosecution of the appellant for traffic violations was initiated in the Gwinnett Recorder’s Court, which does not provide for juries in its jurisdiction. When the appellant filed a demand for speedy trial pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170, the recorder’s court transferred the matter to the Gwinnett State Court. This appeal follows the trial [111]*111court’s denial of the appellant’s subsequent motion for discharge and acquittal filed in the state court.

In Adams v. State, 189 Ga. App. 345 (375 SE2d 642) (1988), and Marks v. State, 192 Ga. App. 106 (384 SE2d 186) (1989), two cases that also originated in recorder’s courts but were transferred to state courts, this court held that the only valid demand for trial was that filed in the transferee state court. In the instant case, the appellant filed a demand for trial in the recorder’s court but not in the state court after the case was transferred. Under Adams and Marks, that demand for trial was ineffective to invoke the sanction of discharge and acquittal under OCGA § 17-7-170, and the trial court properly denied the appellant’s motion for discharge and acquittal.

Some confusion may exist as to whether Adams has any precedential value; however, the procedural ruling in Adams stated above was a common denominator for all three judges on the deciding panel and is binding authority. To further clarify the law regarding the construction and application of OCGA § 17-7-170, we hold that the proper reading of the statute is that stated by the special concurrence in Adams at 347, i.e., “that a demand for trial would be effective to invoke the statutory sanction of mandatory acquittal only if filed in a court of record having both regular terms and the authority to impanel juries.”

Judgment affirmed.

McMurray, P. J., Banke, P. J., Pope and Beasley, JJ., concur. Carley, C. J., Birdsong, Sognier and Benham, JJ., dissent.

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Deen, Presiding Judge.

Prosecution of the appellant for traffic violations was initiated in the Gwinnett Recorder’s Court, which does not provide for juries in its jurisdiction. When the appellant filed a demand for speedy trial pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170, the recorder’s court transferred the matter to the Gwinnett State Court. This appeal follows the trial [111]*111court’s denial of the appellant’s subsequent motion for discharge and acquittal filed in the state court.

In Adams v. State, 189 Ga. App. 345 (375 SE2d 642) (1988), and Marks v. State, 192 Ga. App. 106 (384 SE2d 186) (1989), two cases that also originated in recorder’s courts but were transferred to state courts, this court held that the only valid demand for trial was that filed in the transferee state court. In the instant case, the appellant filed a demand for trial in the recorder’s court but not in the state court after the case was transferred. Under Adams and Marks, that demand for trial was ineffective to invoke the sanction of discharge and acquittal under OCGA § 17-7-170, and the trial court properly denied the appellant’s motion for discharge and acquittal.

Some confusion may exist as to whether Adams has any precedential value; however, the procedural ruling in Adams stated above was a common denominator for all three judges on the deciding panel and is binding authority. To further clarify the law regarding the construction and application of OCGA § 17-7-170, we hold that the proper reading of the statute is that stated by the special concurrence in Adams at 347, i.e., “that a demand for trial would be effective to invoke the statutory sanction of mandatory acquittal only if filed in a court of record having both regular terms and the authority to impanel juries.”

Judgment affirmed.

McMurray, P. J., Banke, P. J., Pope and Beasley, JJ., concur. Carley, C. J., Birdsong, Sognier and Benham, JJ., dissent.

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Bluebook (online)

389 S.E.2d 568, 194 Ga. App. 110, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 1703, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cliatt-v-state-gactapp-1989.

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