Cliatt v. State

970 So. 2d 902, 2007 WL 4458176
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedDecember 21, 2007
Docket5D07-813
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 970 So. 2d 902 (Cliatt v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cliatt v. State, 970 So. 2d 902, 2007 WL 4458176 (Fla. Ct. App. 2007).

Opinion

970 So.2d 902 (2007)

Daniel CLIATT, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D07-813.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

December 21, 2007.

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Kevin R. Holtz, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Wesley Heidt, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Cliatt was adjudicated guilty of five first degree felonies, seven second degree felonies, and one third degree felony. The felonies occurred between October 1, 2004 and April 23, 2005. His Criminal Punishment Code scoresheet of 880.1 total sentence points created a lowest permissible prison sentence of 53.25 years. Pursuant to section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (2004), the trial court was authorized to sentence Cliatt to life imprisonment:

The lowest permissible sentence is the minimum sentence that may be imposed by the trial court absent a valid reason for departure. . . . If the total sentence points are greater than or equal to 363, the court may sentence the offender to life imprisonment. . . .

Instead, the trial court sentenced Cliatt to a composite sentence of seventy years imprisonment followed by life probation. This composite sentence was achieved by Cliatt being sentenced to thirty years on each of the first degree felonies and either ten or fifteen years on the second degree felonies with some of the sentences running consecutive and some of the sentences running concurrent. Except as to the third degree felony, life probation was imposed on each count.

Because the trial court did not exercise its discretion to impose life imprisonment, it could not impose a sentence in which the total of the incarcerative term and the probationary term exceeded the maximum sentence for a particular offense. Carter v. State, 920 So.2d 735 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).

On remand, the trial court may restructure its sentence to try to achieve its original sentencing goal; provided, that absent an intervening event which would justify a greater sentence, the new sentence shall *903 not be a more severe sentence than the sentence originally imposed. Blackshear v. State, 531 So.2d 956 (Fla.1988).

REVERSED and REMANDED for Resentencing.

PLEUS, MONACO and EVANDER, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Christopher Stonebraker v. State of Florida
District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2026
Champagne v. State
269 So. 3d 629 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2019)
RENALDO CHAMPAGNE v. STATE OF FLORIDA
District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2019
Rigueiro v. State
132 So. 3d 853 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2013)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
970 So. 2d 902, 2007 WL 4458176, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cliatt-v-state-fladistctapp-2007.