RENDERED: JULY 11, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-0128-MR
CLEYSLER RAMIREZ-GONZALEZ APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE DIANE MINNIFIELD, JUDGE ACTION NO. 21-CR-00974
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CETRULO, KAREM, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.
CETRULO, JUDGE: Following a trial in the Fayette Circuit Court, a jury
convicted Cleysler Ramirez-Gonzalez (“Ramirez-Gonzalez”) of first-degree rape,
first-degree sodomy, and second-degree strangulation and sentenced him to 13
years of imprisonment. He appeals his conviction and sentence. After careful
review, we find no reversible error and affirm his conviction and sentence. BACKGROUND
On September 14, 2021, Ramirez-Gonzalez was indicted on the
charges of first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, first-degree strangulation,
intimidating a participant in the legal process, and third-degree terroristic
threatening. The details concerning the events that led to his arrest were primarily
elucidated at trial through the testimony of the victim, hereinafter referred to as
D.D.
According to D.D., on the evening of June 7, 2021, Ramirez-Gonzalez
and D.D. arrived at her apartment in Lexington, Kentucky. Ramirez-Gonzalez
asked D.D. if he could use her shower, and she agreed to allow him into her
apartment so that he could do so. When Ramirez-Gonzalez did not take a shower
and continued to linger around the apartment, D.D. told him that he needed to
leave. D.D. then took a shower herself, and when she returned to her bedroom,
Ramirez-Gonzalez was still there. D.D. asked why he had not left the apartment,
at which point Ramirez-Gonzalez approached her and the incidents that led to
Ramirez-Gonzalez’s arrest took place.
D.D. reported those incidents to the police two days later, and she was
taken to the hospital where she was forensically examined by a sexual assault nurse
examiner. On June 13, 2021, police took Ramirez-Gonzalez into custody. After a
three-day trial in September 2023, the jury found Ramirez-Gonzalez guilty of first-
-2- degree rape, first-degree sodomy, and second-degree strangulation. Subsequently,
on the recommendation of the jury, the trial court sentenced Ramirez-Gonzalez to
13 years of imprisonment. Ramirez-Gonzalez appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Ramirez-Gonzalez did not preserve any of his arguments for appellate
review, but he asks us to review them for palpable error under Kentucky Rule of
Criminal Procedure (“RCr”) 10.26. “A palpable error is one [] that ‘affects the
substantial rights of a party’ and will result in ‘manifest injustice’ if not considered
by the court[.]” Schoenbachler v. Commonwealth, 95 S.W.3d 830, 836 (Ky. 2003)
(quoting RCr 10.26). Palpable errors are “easily perceptible, plain, obvious and
readily noticeable.” Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“When an appellate court engages in a palpable error review, its focus
is on what happened and whether the defect is so manifest, fundamental and
unambiguous that it threatens the integrity of the judicial process.” Martin v.
Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. 2006). “Implicit in the concept of palpable
error correction is that the error is so obvious that the trial court was remiss in
failing to act upon it sua sponte.” Lamb v. Commonwealth, 510 S.W.3d 316, 325
(Ky. 2017). If, after considering the entire case, “this court does not believe there
is a substantial possibility that the result would have been any different,” then a
-3- palpable error has not occurred. Schoenbachler, 95 S.W.3d at 836 (citation
omitted).
ANALYSIS
Ramirez-Gonzalez argues that he is entitled to a new trial because:
(A) his federal and state rights to due process were violated when court-appointed
interpreters would not assist in interpreting confidential communications between
him and his counsel on the first day of trial,1 and the trial court erred by not sua
sponte ordering a continuance of the trial; (B) the trial court erred by failing to
instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses that he requested; and (C) the trial
court erred by failing to properly admonish the jury at the close of the second day
of trial.
A. The Trial Court Did Not Err When It Did Not Sua Sponte Order A Continuance.
Interpreters for the Administrative Office of the Courts (“AOC”) were
present on the first day of trial, and throughout the trial, to keep Ramirez-Gonzalez
and D.D. apprised of what was happening during the trial and to translate their
statements. Before voir dire began, the interpreters approached the bench and
voiced concerns to the trial court regarding the scope of their duties. One
interpreter told the court, “we are the interpreters for the record so whenever
1 Both D.D. and Ramirez-Gonzalez spoke limited English, with their first language being Spanish.
-4- [Ramirez-Gonzalez and his attorney] go into a conversation, technically we’re not
supposed to [interpret] all that stuff . . . we will try our best and do what we can.”
Ramirez-Gonzalez did not object to or question the interpreters’ understanding of
their role.
However, for much of the jury selection process, the AOC interpreters
did assist Ramirez-Gonzalez and his attorney by translating their communications
to each other. Later, upon conferring with their supervisor, they informed the trial
court that they could not continue to facilitate communications between Ramirez-
Gonzalez and his attorney. The trial court informed the Commonwealth and
Ramirez-Gonzalez’s attorney that the AOC interpreters would still be translating
“testimony and things that [were] happening in the court room, [but] it is the
private sidebars that they’re not going to [translate].” Ramirez-Gonzalez’s
attorney responded to this by stating that the AOC interpreting service did not
“seem to be user friendly.” However, he did not ask for a continuance nor bring
the issue up again to the court. Ramirez-Gonzalez did acquire a private interpreter
to facilitate communications between him and his attorney on days two and three
of the trial.
For the first time, Ramirez-Gonzalez now argues that the trial court
erred by not sua sponte ordering a continuance, which he argues, deprived him of
due process. Conversely, the Commonwealth argues that we should not address
-5- this argument because Ramirez-Gonzalez did not preserve it, and, even if we do,
no palpable error occurred. We agree with the Commonwealth that no palpable
error occurred.
“Upon a finding of the essential fact that a party, juror, or witness
‘cannot communicate in English,’” Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 30A.410
requires the court to “appoint a qualified interpreter[,] . . . [and] [t]he trial court
possesses no discretion in the matter[.]” Commonwealth v. Abukar, 497 S.W.3d
231, 237 (Ky. 2016). Here, the trial court did appoint the AOC interpreters in
accordance with KRS 30A.410.
KRS 30A.405(2) vests the Kentucky Supreme Court with the power
to “prescribe standards . . . for appointment, qualifications, duties, and other
matters relating to interpreters.” KRS 30A.405(3) mandates that the interpreter
“rules and standards [] be administered by [AOC].” KRS 30A.425 states that
“[t]he duties of the interpreter may include . . . [i]nterpreting during court and
court-related proceedings, including any and all meetings and conferences between
client and his attorney[.]” (Emphasis added.) However, the rules developed by the
Kentucky Supreme Court and administered by AOC make clear that “[s]worn
proceedings interpreters are impartial officers of the court and may not participate
in the facilitation of confidential, privileged, or otherwise private communication
between non-Court of Justice individuals, agencies, or entities and individuals with
-6- limited English proficiency[.]” KY. ST. ADMIN. P., AP IX, § 2(35) (emphasis
added); see also id. at (10) & (26); Language Access, KENTUCKY COURT OF
JUSTICE, www.kycourts.gov/Court-Programs/Language-Access (last visited May
15, 2025).2
Here, Ramirez-Gonzalez argues that, because the trial court knew his
proficiency with English was limited, the trial court should have sua sponte
ordered a continuance. However, this argument misses the mark because the rules
our Supreme Court developed specifically instruct AOC interpreters to refrain
from translating such communications. KY. ST. ADMIN. P., AP IX, § 2(35). In his
brief, counsel for Ramirez-Gonzalez recognizes that restriction on AOC
interpreters, but argues that here the interpreters were initially assisting and then
“withdrew” their assistance with confidential communications, leaving Ramirez-
Gonzalez with no way to communicate privately with counsel for the remainder of
the first day. The record is not so clear as represented on appeal. What is clear is
that no need for further interpreting assistance was ever communicated to the trial
court. The next day, a third interpreter was seated with counsel and his client.
Furthermore, the onus was not on the trial court to provide Ramirez-
Gonzalez with an interpreter for confidential communications between him and his
2 The tab on this web page titled “The Role of the Sworn Proceedings Interpreter” reiterates the exact same language used in KY. ST. ADMIN. P., AP IX, § 2(35).
-7- attorney, and Ramirez-Gonzalez has not pointed us to any authority, state or
federal, which imposes such a duty on the court. Finally, Ramirez-Gonzalez never
requested a recess or continuance and has not pointed us to any authority that
would require the trial court to sua sponte order a recess or continuance in such an
instance.
There is no Kentucky case directly on point for this issue; however,
the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed a similar set of
circumstances in an unpublished opinion, Segura-Corro v. United States, No. 22-
6127, 2023 WL 3273103 (6th Cir. May 3, 2023). See Kentucky Rule of Appellate
Procedure 41 (We cite to this unpublished opinion merely as persuasive, not
binding, authority.).
In Segura-Corro, the court had appointed interpreters, but, on appeal,
he argued “that the limited scope of the services provided by those interpreters
prevented him from effectively communicating with his attorneys.” 2023 WL
3273103, at *2. The Sixth Circuit noted that “[t]he Supreme Court has never
recognized a constitutional right to an interpreter during a criminal proceeding[,]”
but instead “translation services are provided” in federal criminal proceedings
pursuant to statute. Id. (citations omitted). Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit found
that “the record reflect[ed] that Segura-Corro never voiced any objection regarding
the adequacy of the interpreters . . . [n]or did he provide any examples of instances
-8- where he was unable to effectively communicate with his attorneys[.]” Id. at *3.
Accordingly, the court determined Segura-Corro was not entitled to post
conviction relief. Id.
We agree with the Sixth Circuit that “[o]nly if the defendant makes
any difficulty with the interpreter known to the court can the judge take corrective
measures. To allow a defendant to remain silent throughout the trial and then,
upon being found guilty, to assert a claim of inadequate translation would be an
open invitation to abuse.” Id. (quoting United States v. Sanchez, 928 F.2d 1450,
1456 (6th Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Jackson-
Randolph, 282 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 2002)). Here, Ramirez-Gonzalez never
requested a continuance, or even a short recess, to address his interpreter issues on
the first day of trial. Defense counsel’s statements to the effect that the AOC
interpreting services were not “user friendly” were not enough to warrant reversal
now. As we noted earlier in this Opinion, palpable error can only be found when it
is obvious that the trial court was remiss in failing to act sua sponte. Lamb, 510
S.W.3d at 325. No obvious difficulty in communication between counsel and his
client was presented to the trial court, and the record before us does not provide
any obvious difficulty.
As such, Ramirez-Gonzalez failed to show an “easily perceptible,
plain, obvious and readily noticeable” error. See Brewer, 206 S.W.3d at 349
-9- (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, we cannot conclude
that the trial court palpably erred by failing to sua sponte order a continuance.
B. Ramirez-Gonzalez Did Not Preserve His Jury Instruction Issues, And We May Not Review Those Issues For Palpable Error.
Ramirez-Gonzalez argues that at trial he requested instructions on “all
lesser included offenses” and that the trial court erred by not including jury
instructions for sexual abuse and sexual misconduct as lesser included offenses of
first-degree rape and first-degree sodomy. Conversely, the Commonwealth argues
that this issue is not properly before us, and, even if it was, the facts of this case did
not warrant the lesser included offense instructions that Ramirez-Gonzalez desired.
We agree with the Commonwealth that the issue is not properly before us.
No party may assign as error the . . . failure to give an instruction unless the party’s position has been fairly and adequately presented to the trial judge by an offered instruction or by motion, or unless the party makes objection before the court instructs the jury, stating specifically the matter to which the party objects and the ground or grounds of the objection.
RCr 9.54(2) (emphasis added). Our Supreme Court has held, “[a]lthough palpable
error under RCr 10.26 may be available for certain kinds of instructional error . . .
we now conclude RCr 9.54(2) bars palpable error review for unpreserved claims
that the trial court erred in the giving or the failure to give a specific instruction.”
Martin v. Commonwealth, 409 S.W.3d 340, 345 (Ky. 2013); see also Thornton v.
-10- Commonwealth, 421 S.W.3d 372, 376-77 (Ky. 2013); Jones v. Commonwealth,
567 S.W.3d 922, 927-28 (Ky. App. 2019).
Accordingly, before we may decide whether the trial court erred by
failing to instruct the jury on sexual misconduct and sexual abuse, we must
determine if Ramirez-Gonzalez preserved the issue for our review. See Martin,
409 S.W.3d at 345. If Ramirez-Gonzalez did not properly preserve the issue, we
cannot review for palpable error. Id.
At the end of the first day of trial, the parties and the trial court
discussed jury instructions. Ramirez-Gonzalez stated that he would like “any
lessers [he] could get thrown in there,” but he indicated that he was unprepared to
have a detailed discussion about lesser included offenses at that time. On the
second day, before a lunch break, the parties and the trial court again discussed
lesser included offenses. When the trial court specifically asked about lesser
included offenses of first-degree rape, Ramirez-Gonzalez stated, “Judge I don’t
know if I can give you . . . the [] legal authority. I know that there have been
occasions when I have reached plea agreements with that rather than a rape charge,
and again I am not saying that’s controlling here.”3 The trial court reserved its
ruling on lesser included offenses of first-degree rape and first-degree sodomy until
the “conclusion of proof.”
3 It is unclear from the record whether “with that” referred to sexual misconduct or sexual abuse.
-11- Then, at the end of the second day of trial (the conclusion of proof),
the court decided what instructions the jury would receive. The court asked the
Commonwealth and Ramirez-Gonzalez if they “had an opportunity to review the
proposed instructions.” Ramirez-Gonzalez, through counsel, orally confirmed that
he had reviewed the instructions. The next morning, on the final day of trial, the
trial court tendered its final instructions to the jury. Ramirez-Gonzalez did not
object to the exclusion of sexual misconduct and sexual abuse lesser included
offense instructions at either of those junctures. Therefore, Ramirez-Gonzalez did
not satisfy the objection clause of RCr 9.54(2). Ramirez-Gonzalez only preserved
this issue if he “fairly and adequately presented [his position] to the trial judge by
an offered instruction or by motion[.]” See RCr 9.54(2) (emphasis added).
As we have already stated, after the conclusion of proof, Ramirez-
Gonzalez did not object to the final jury instructions. Ramirez-Gonzalez’s
proposed instructions are not within the record, and Ramirez-Gonzalez has not
pointed us to those proposed instructions. Likewise, we have not found a single
instance in the written record nor in the video record where Ramirez-Gonzalez
attempted to support his supposed sexual misconduct and sexual abuse instruction
requests with the facts of his case and applicable law.
We cannot hold that the scant references to sexual misconduct and
sexual abuse instructions amounted to a fair and adequate presentation of
-12- Ramirez-Gonzalez’s position to the trial court. See RCr 9.54(2); see also Pollini v.
Commonwealth, 172 S.W.3d 418, 427-28 (Ky. 2005) (holding that to preserve a
jury instruction exception a party must (1) specifically object or (2) tender the
instruction “in such a manner which presents the party’s position ‘fairly and
adequately’ to the trial judge.” Tendering of an instruction alone is not enough to
preserve the issue.). As such, we hold that Ramirez-Gonzalez failed to preserve
this issue for our review, and we are barred from reviewing the issue for palpable
error. See Martin, 409 S.W.3d at 345.
C. The Trial Court’s Failure To Admonish The Jury At The Close Of The Second Day Of Trial Did Not Amount To Reversible Error.
Ramirez-Gonzalez argues that the trial court erred by failing to
admonish the jury, in accordance with RCr 9.70, before adjourning on the second
day of trial. Again, he concedes that he failed to preserve this issue, but asks that
we review for palpable error.
In response, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court did not
palpably err because it admonished the jury, in accordance with RCr 9.70, on other
occasions, including before the lunch break on the second day of trial. Further, the
Commonwealth argues, Ramirez-Gonzalez did not show “that the jury discussed
the case” between trial day two and three; thus no palpable error occurred. We
agree.
-13- RCr 9.70 requires trial courts to admonish the jury that:
it is their duty not to permit anyone to speak to, or communicate with, them on any subject connected with the trial, and that all attempts to do so should be immediately reported by them to the court, and that they should not converse among themselves on any subject connected with the trial, nor form, nor express any opinion thereon, until the cause be finally submitted to them. This admonition must be given or referred to by the court at each adjournment.
(Emphasis added.)
Here, the trial court admonished the jury before the lunch break on
day one, at the end of day one, and before the lunch break on day two. The trial
court neglected to admonish the jury at the end of day two.
However, the Kentucky Supreme Court has held that “in the absence
of some showing of misconduct, substantial compliance with RCr 9.70 will
suffice.” Commonwealth v. Messex, 736 S.W.2d 341, 342 (Ky. 1987) (citation
omitted). While Ramirez-Gonzalez acknowledges our Supreme Court’s holding in
Messex, he argues that because the trial court’s “failure happened right when the
proof closed and the jury was excused for the day to go home before closing
arguments . . . harm should be found sufficient to warrant reversal under
RCr 10.26.” Yet, Ramirez-Gonzalez has not pointed us to any juror misconduct
that resulted from the trial court’s failure to admonish the jury at the end of trial
day two, and the trial court substantially complied with RCr 9.70 by admonishing
-14- the jury on three other occasions. See Messex, 736 S.W.2d at 342. Absent such a
showing of juror misconduct, we cannot hold that the trial court committed a
reversible error, much less a palpable one.
Finally, Ramirez-Gonzalez asks that, if we find multiple non-
reversible errors, we apply the cumulative error doctrine and reverse his conviction
and sentence and remand for a new trial. As the name suggests, the cumulative
error doctrine applies when “multiple errors, although harmless individually, may
be deemed reversible if their cumulative effect is to render the trial fundamentally
unfair.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577, 631 (Ky. 2010). Because we
have not found multiple errors, the cumulative error doctrine does not apply here.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasonings, we AFFIRM Ramirez-Gonzalez’s
conviction and sentence in the Fayette Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Brad Clark Russell Coleman Lexington, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky
Joseph A. Beckett Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
-15-