Boyle, J.
In this declaratory action, the issue before us is whether the insurance company’s obligations to its insured and the driver of an automobile in a tort action arising out of a head-on collision terminated when the insured assigned the certificate of title to the driver and allowed the purchaser to operate the vehicle with the insured’s registration plate, registration, and insurance. We [648]*648find that under these facts, the insurance policy remained in effect at the time of the accident. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
I
On Saturday, August 1, 1987, Douglas Preece and his wife traveled to Dearborn to visit with his aunt and uncle. While they were there, at Preece’s request, his aunt, JoAnn Williams, offered to sell her 1977 Pontiac to Preece, who accepted the offer and paid his aunt $100 for the automobile. Williams signed her name to the certificate of title and gave it to Preece.1 Because it was late in the day and a Saturday, Preece planned to register the car, get a new registration plate and his own insurance, the following Monday. In her deposition, Williams testified that she did not discuss the registration plate, registration certificate or insurance with Preece, nor did she recall any such discussion in her presence. She simply signed the certificate of title and her husband, whom she assumed would take care of the final details, went outside with Preece. Conversely, Preece testified that because it was the weekend, Mrs. Williams told him that he could drive with her registration plate, registration, and insurance until he could acquire his own on Monday morning when the Secretary of State’s office was opened. When Preece left Williams’ home, the registration plate was affixed to the Pontiac and the certificates of registration and insurance remained in the glove compartment.
On Preece’s drive home from Dearborn to Han[649]*649over, in Jackson County, the radiator of the car malfunctioned requiring that he stop six to eight times to allow the engine to cool down and to add antifreeze. One of the stops was at a friend’s home, where Preece consumed a beer. Shortly thereafter, Preece stopped at a party store where he purchased a six-pack of sixteen ounce beer. After drinking two beers, Preece was stopped by a Jackson County police officer because the car had only one operable headlight. After securing Preece’s promise not to drink any more beer and to drive directly home, a short distance away, the police officer allowed Preece to continue on his way. A few miles later, a head-on collision between Preece and the plaintiff, Clifford Clevenger, occurred when Preece allegedly crossed over the center line. The accident happened at approximately 2:00 a.m. on Sunday, August 2, 1987.
As a result, Clevenger suffered injuries and received first-party personal injury protection benefits under the no-fault insurance policy covering his vehicle. He later filed a third-party tort claim under MCL 500.3135(1); MSA 24.13135(1)2 against Preece and Williams for residual liability. Preece had no insurance. Williams insured the car with the Allstate Insurance Company under a no-fault insurance policy. Williams did not cancel the policy until August 6, 1987, four days after the collision, and testified that she did not become aware of the accident until two weeks after it occurred.
The plaintiff filed the instant action seeking a declaratory judgment that Allstate had a duty to defend and indemnify Williams and Preece under Williams’ no-fault policy. Clevenger and Allstate [650]*650filed cross-motions for summary disposition. The trial court ruled in favor of Clevenger and denied Allstate’s motion, finding that it had a duty to defend and indemnify Williams and Preece in the underlying tort action.
Defendant Allstate appealed as of right in the Court of Appeals. In an unpublished per curium opinion decided February 11, 1992 (Docket No. 120223), a divided panel reversed the lower court’s grant of Clevenger’s motion for summary disposition. The majority ruled that a bona fide sale had occurred and that the vehicle was no longer owned by Williams after she endorsed the certificate of title, received the full purchase price, and delivered the automobile to Preece. It reasoned that because Williams was no longer the owner of the vehicle, she was statutorily relieved of liability arising from any subsequent negligent operation of the vehicle, and, thus, Allstate had no duty to indemnify Williams.3 The Court also concluded that under the policy itself, Williams, as the former owner, could not give Preece the requisite permission to drive the automobile. Because Mr. Preece was not a "permissive driver” or an "other insured” as defined in Williams’ policy, Allstate had no duty to defend or indemnify him.
Judge Griffin dissented. He noted that Jo Ann Williams remained the registrant of the motor vehicle and, as such, was required by the no-fault act to insure the vehicle. The dissent noted that, more importantly, the vehicle remained an "owned automobile” according to the express terms of the policy and thus coverage was provided at the time the accident occurred.
We granted leave to appeal. 441 Mich 910 (1993).
[651]*651II
The legislative purpose for enacting the no-fault automobile liability act4 was to afford protection to persons suffering injury arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of an automobile, Coburn v Fox, 425 Mich 300, 309; 389 NW2d 424 (1986), and not for the protection of the automobile itself, Lee v DAIIE, 412 Mich 505, 509; 315 NW2d 413 (1982).
Under Michigan’s no-fault act, both personal injury protection (pip) and residual liability insurance is now required. Insurance coverage to protect oneself from the costs of injury through pip benefits and to protect injured third parties through residual liability insurance is compulsory. Persons violating the no-fault requirements are subject to a criminal penalty. MCL 500.3102(2); MSA 24.13102(2).
The decision by the Legislature to make residual liability coverage compulsory under the no-fault act is critical. Before 1973, motorists purchased insurance to protect themselves. Under the no-fault act, the Legislature requires pip and liability insurance to protect the members of the public at large from the ravages of automobile accidents.[5] [Coburn, supra. Emphasis added.]
Plaintiff argues that Allstate has an obligation to defend and indemnify Williams and Preece in the underlying tort action under its policy because Williams, as the registrant of the car, was required by statute to maintain insurance on the [652]*652vehicle. In addition, because Williams did not cancel the policy before the accident, according to the express language of the insurance agreement, the policy remained in effect at the time of the collision.
Allstate contends that after August 1, 1987, Williams was no longer the owner of the vehicle. It argues that it need not indemnify her for damages arising out of the accident because the motor vehicle code grants her immunity from liability resulting from Preece’s negligent operation of the automobile. Allstate also argues that the policy terminated at the time Williams ceased to be the titled owner of the vehicle.
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Boyle, J.
In this declaratory action, the issue before us is whether the insurance company’s obligations to its insured and the driver of an automobile in a tort action arising out of a head-on collision terminated when the insured assigned the certificate of title to the driver and allowed the purchaser to operate the vehicle with the insured’s registration plate, registration, and insurance. We [648]*648find that under these facts, the insurance policy remained in effect at the time of the accident. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
I
On Saturday, August 1, 1987, Douglas Preece and his wife traveled to Dearborn to visit with his aunt and uncle. While they were there, at Preece’s request, his aunt, JoAnn Williams, offered to sell her 1977 Pontiac to Preece, who accepted the offer and paid his aunt $100 for the automobile. Williams signed her name to the certificate of title and gave it to Preece.1 Because it was late in the day and a Saturday, Preece planned to register the car, get a new registration plate and his own insurance, the following Monday. In her deposition, Williams testified that she did not discuss the registration plate, registration certificate or insurance with Preece, nor did she recall any such discussion in her presence. She simply signed the certificate of title and her husband, whom she assumed would take care of the final details, went outside with Preece. Conversely, Preece testified that because it was the weekend, Mrs. Williams told him that he could drive with her registration plate, registration, and insurance until he could acquire his own on Monday morning when the Secretary of State’s office was opened. When Preece left Williams’ home, the registration plate was affixed to the Pontiac and the certificates of registration and insurance remained in the glove compartment.
On Preece’s drive home from Dearborn to Han[649]*649over, in Jackson County, the radiator of the car malfunctioned requiring that he stop six to eight times to allow the engine to cool down and to add antifreeze. One of the stops was at a friend’s home, where Preece consumed a beer. Shortly thereafter, Preece stopped at a party store where he purchased a six-pack of sixteen ounce beer. After drinking two beers, Preece was stopped by a Jackson County police officer because the car had only one operable headlight. After securing Preece’s promise not to drink any more beer and to drive directly home, a short distance away, the police officer allowed Preece to continue on his way. A few miles later, a head-on collision between Preece and the plaintiff, Clifford Clevenger, occurred when Preece allegedly crossed over the center line. The accident happened at approximately 2:00 a.m. on Sunday, August 2, 1987.
As a result, Clevenger suffered injuries and received first-party personal injury protection benefits under the no-fault insurance policy covering his vehicle. He later filed a third-party tort claim under MCL 500.3135(1); MSA 24.13135(1)2 against Preece and Williams for residual liability. Preece had no insurance. Williams insured the car with the Allstate Insurance Company under a no-fault insurance policy. Williams did not cancel the policy until August 6, 1987, four days after the collision, and testified that she did not become aware of the accident until two weeks after it occurred.
The plaintiff filed the instant action seeking a declaratory judgment that Allstate had a duty to defend and indemnify Williams and Preece under Williams’ no-fault policy. Clevenger and Allstate [650]*650filed cross-motions for summary disposition. The trial court ruled in favor of Clevenger and denied Allstate’s motion, finding that it had a duty to defend and indemnify Williams and Preece in the underlying tort action.
Defendant Allstate appealed as of right in the Court of Appeals. In an unpublished per curium opinion decided February 11, 1992 (Docket No. 120223), a divided panel reversed the lower court’s grant of Clevenger’s motion for summary disposition. The majority ruled that a bona fide sale had occurred and that the vehicle was no longer owned by Williams after she endorsed the certificate of title, received the full purchase price, and delivered the automobile to Preece. It reasoned that because Williams was no longer the owner of the vehicle, she was statutorily relieved of liability arising from any subsequent negligent operation of the vehicle, and, thus, Allstate had no duty to indemnify Williams.3 The Court also concluded that under the policy itself, Williams, as the former owner, could not give Preece the requisite permission to drive the automobile. Because Mr. Preece was not a "permissive driver” or an "other insured” as defined in Williams’ policy, Allstate had no duty to defend or indemnify him.
Judge Griffin dissented. He noted that Jo Ann Williams remained the registrant of the motor vehicle and, as such, was required by the no-fault act to insure the vehicle. The dissent noted that, more importantly, the vehicle remained an "owned automobile” according to the express terms of the policy and thus coverage was provided at the time the accident occurred.
We granted leave to appeal. 441 Mich 910 (1993).
[651]*651II
The legislative purpose for enacting the no-fault automobile liability act4 was to afford protection to persons suffering injury arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of an automobile, Coburn v Fox, 425 Mich 300, 309; 389 NW2d 424 (1986), and not for the protection of the automobile itself, Lee v DAIIE, 412 Mich 505, 509; 315 NW2d 413 (1982).
Under Michigan’s no-fault act, both personal injury protection (pip) and residual liability insurance is now required. Insurance coverage to protect oneself from the costs of injury through pip benefits and to protect injured third parties through residual liability insurance is compulsory. Persons violating the no-fault requirements are subject to a criminal penalty. MCL 500.3102(2); MSA 24.13102(2).
The decision by the Legislature to make residual liability coverage compulsory under the no-fault act is critical. Before 1973, motorists purchased insurance to protect themselves. Under the no-fault act, the Legislature requires pip and liability insurance to protect the members of the public at large from the ravages of automobile accidents.[5] [Coburn, supra. Emphasis added.]
Plaintiff argues that Allstate has an obligation to defend and indemnify Williams and Preece in the underlying tort action under its policy because Williams, as the registrant of the car, was required by statute to maintain insurance on the [652]*652vehicle. In addition, because Williams did not cancel the policy before the accident, according to the express language of the insurance agreement, the policy remained in effect at the time of the collision.
Allstate contends that after August 1, 1987, Williams was no longer the owner of the vehicle. It argues that it need not indemnify her for damages arising out of the accident because the motor vehicle code grants her immunity from liability resulting from Preece’s negligent operation of the automobile. Allstate also argues that the policy terminated at the time Williams ceased to be the titled owner of the vehicle. It, therefore, has no contractual duty to defend or indemnify Preece as a "permissive driver” of the vehicle against Clevenger’s claim. We address the parties’ arguments in inverse order.
A
The Insurance Code requires that a motor vehicle insurer provide its insured with minimum liability coverage for bodily injury, death, and property damage. This coverage must extend to all permissive drivers unless the person is expressly excluded on the face of the policy or the declaration page or certification of insurance. See MCL 500.3009; MSA 24.13009.
Under Williams’ policy, Allstate agreed to indemnify and defend the insured for "all damages which the insured shall be legally obligated to pay . . . arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use ... of the owned automobile . . . .” The persons expressly covered under the policy included the "named insured,” and "[a]ny other person with respect to the owned automobile, provided the use thereof is with the permission of the [653]*653named insured and within the scope of such permission . . . The agreement further defined " 'named insured’ ” as "the individual named in the declarations, and his spouse if a resident of the same household . . . The Williams’ policy was issued to James L. Williams and because JoAnn Williams, his spouse, resided within the household, she was also considered a "named insured.”
The insurance policy also defined the term " 'owned automobile’ ” as "the vehicle described in the declarations . . . .” In this case, the vehicle listed on the declaration sheet was the 1977 Pontiac.
Following the express language of the policy and its definitions of terms as used in the contract, the insurer agreed to indemnify and defend the insured, either named or permissive drivers if within the scope of such permission, for all damages that the insured was legally obligated to pay arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the owned automobile, which was listed on the declaration sheet. Therefore, Allstate agreed to defend and indemnify JoAnn Williams (a named insured) and Douglas Preece (a permissive driver) for damages they are legally obligated to pay as a result of the accident arising out of Preece’s use of the 1977 Pontiac (the vehicle listed on the declaration sheet) when Williams allowed him to drive the 1977 Pontiac to his home.
Allstate asserts that because Williams assigned the certificate of title to Preece, the vehicle was no longer an "owned vehicle” under the policy. It points to the general conditions section of the contract, which states that "[t]his policy applies only to losses to the automobile, accidents and occurrences, during the policy period . . . [and applies] as respects the owned automobile only while it is owned as stated in the declarations.”
[654]*654This Court has consistently adhered to the general rule of construction applicable to insurance policies that an ambiguous provision in an insurance contract must be construed against the drafting insurer and in favor of the insured. However, if the provision is clear and unambiguous, the terms are to be taken and understood in their plain, ordinary, and popular sense. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins Co of Michigan v Stark, 437 Mich 175, 181; 468 NW2d 498 (1991). In Raska v Farm Bureau Mutual Ins Co of Michigan, 412 Mich 355, 362; 314 NW2d 440 (1982), we explained:
A contract is said to be ambiguous when its words may reasonably be understood in different ways.
If a fair reading of the entire contract of insurance leads one to understand that there is coverage under particular circumstances and another fair reading of it leads one to understand there is no coverage under the same circumstances the contract is ambiguous and should be construed against its drafter and in favor of coverage.
See also Gorham v Peerless Life Ins Co, 368 Mich 335, 343; 118 NW2d 306 (1962); Century Indemnity Co v Schmick, 351 Mich 622, 626-627; 88 NW2d 622 (1958).
We observe that nowhere in the policy is the promised security conditioned upon the named insured having legal title to the vehicle. As long as the terms and conditions of the contract are adhered to and the policy is not canceled by the insurer or the insured, coverage is afforded to the "owned vehicle,” which it defines as the "vehicle described, in the declarations.” Moreover, we note that Allstate fails to recognize that the general [655]*655conditions section, which it relies on above to define the limits of the policy’s application, also provides the requisite conditions for canceling the policy:
The named insured may cancel this policy by mailing to Allstate written notice stating when thereafter such cancellation shall be effective, or by surrender of the policy to Allstate or any of its authorized agents and, if so, cancellation shall be effective at the time of surrender.[6] [Emphasis added.]
The policy does not state that liability coverage is terminated when title to the vehicle named in the declarations as the "owned vehicle” passes to another person. Although we find the policy’s cancellation provision clear and unambiguous as requiring the insured to notify Allstate that the vehicle’s insurance coverage should be discontinued, any ambiguity, as argued by Allstate concerning the limits and termination of coverage, must be construed against the insurer. Transfer of the title in this case did not terminate the insurer’s liability.
Williams notified Allstate on August 6, 1987, that she was canceling the coverage on the Pontiac because she sold the vehicle listed on the declaration sheet. Allstate removed the automobile from Williams’ policy effective August 7, 1987. Because the insurance policy covering the Pontiac was still in effect at the time. the accident occurred, August 2, 1987, by the express terms of the policy, Allstate is obligated to defend and indemnify, if necessary, Williams and Preece in the underlying [656]*656tort action.7 The rights and obligations of the parties vested at the time of the accident. Cason v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 181 Mich App 600, 609; 450 NW2d 6 (1989); Madar v League General Ins Co, 152 Mich App 734, 742; 394 NW2d 90 (1986).
B
Alternatively, defendant Allstate argues that, as the seller of a motor vehicle, MCL 257.240; MSA 9.1940 provides Mrs. Williams immunity from damages arising out of the negligent operation of a vehicle after she properly endorsed the certificate of title to Preece. Additionally, because Mrs. Williams was no longer the title holder, she no longer had an "insurable interest” in the automobile. Plaintiff counters that even if Mrs. Williams was not the titled owner of the vehicle, as the registrant, she was statutorily obligated to insure the vehicle.
Our task is to determine the underlying legislative purpose behind the no-fault act by examining various provisions of the act and other relevant statutory provisions, and to harmonize different provisions of the same statute by construing statutes in pari materia to give the fullest effect to each provision. Parks v DAIIE, 426 Mich 191, 199; 393 NW2d 833 (1986). We agree with the Court of [657]*657Appeals that, by statute, the owner of a motor vehicle is liable for its negligent operation if it is being driven with the owner’s permission, MCL 257.401(1); MSA 9.2101(1), but that the owner is not liable for such negligence subsequent to a bona fide sale of the vehicle, MCL 257.240; MSA 9.1940.8 We also do not dispute that the motor vehicle act defines "owner,” in part, as the person who holds legal title to the motor vehicle. MCL 257.37(b); MSA 9.1837(b). However, the Court failed to acknowledge that at the time of the accident, MCL 500.3101(1); MSA 24.13101(1) provided:9
The owner or registrant of a motor vehicle required to be registered in this state shall maintain security for payment of benefits under personal protection insurance, property protection insurance, and residual liability insurance. Security shall be in effect continuously during the period of registration of the motor vehicle. [Emphasis added.]
Moreover, the Legislature imposed criminal sanctions for a registrant’s failure to maintain insurance as required by § 3101(1):_
[658]*658An owner or registrant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security is required, who operates the motor vehicle or permits it to be operated upon a public highway in this state without having in full force and effect security complying with this section or section 3101 or 3103 is guilty of a misdemeanor. Any other person who operates a motor vehicle upon a public highway in the this state with the knowledge that the owner or registrant does not have security in full force and effect is guilty of a misdemeanor. A person convicted of a misdemeanor under this section shall be fined not less than $200 nor more than $500, imprisoned for not more than 1 year, or both. [MCL 500.3102(2); MSA 24.13102(2). Emphasis added.]
As pointed out by Judge Griffin in his dissent, the Court has previously determined that the terms "owner” and "registrant,” as used in the no-fault act, are not synonymous and represent separate categories of individuals, Cason, supra at 606-607; Allstate Ins Co v Sentry Ins Co, 191 Mich App 66, 69; 477 NW2d 422 (1991).10
Further review of the motor vehicle code reveals that a registration certificate must be carried at all times in the automobile to which it refers, MCL 257.223; MSA 9.1923,11 and that it is unlawful for a [659]*659person to drive, or an owner to knowingly permit to be driven, any vehicle which is required to be registered but is not registered, MCL 257.215; MSA 9.1915. Every application for renewal of registration must be accompanied by a valid certificate of insurance. MCL 257.227; MSA 9.1927.
The code also encompasses provisions for situations in which the registered vehicle is sold:
If the owner of a registered vehicle transfers or assigns the title or interest in the vehicle, the registration plates issued for the vehicle shall be removed [transferred to an immediate family member to whom title in the vehicle also is transferred], or retained and preserved by the owner for transfer to another vehicle upon application and payment of the required fees. [MCL 257.233(1); MSA 9.1933(1).]
A vehicle’s registration plate cannot be transferred or assigned to a new owner who is not an immediate family member. However, the registration plate may be transferred to another vehicle owned by the registrant or may be assigned to an immediate family member, as provided in the act, if the application to do so is filed with the Secretary of State within fifteen days of the transfer or assignment. If the application for transfer or assignment pursuant to § 233 is not made within the required time, the vehicle is considered without registration and the Secretary of State may repossess the registration plate. MCL 257.234; MSA 9.1934. Upon receiving a properly endorsed title, an appli[660]*660cation for transfer of the registration, and the required fees, the Secretary of State will transfer the registration under its registration number to the newly acquired vehicle and issue a new registration certification and certificate of title. MCL 257.237; MSA 9.1937.
The unlawful use of registrations is also discussed in the vehicle code. Except as otherwise provided in the act, a person must not operate, nor shall an owner knowingly permit to be operated upon any highway, a vehicle required to be registered unless there is attached to and displayed on the vehicle a valid registration plate issued for the vehicle. MCL 257.255(1); MSA 9.1955(1). A person also must not lend or permit the use of a registration plate issued to him if the person receiving or using the certificate or plate would not be entitled to its use. MCL 257.256; MSA 9.1956.
Finally, MCL 257.236; MSA 9.1938 provides that when the owner of a registered vehicle dies and ownership passes by operation of law, the registration plate assigned to the vehicle shall be considered a valid registration until the end of the registration year or until ownership of the vehicle is transferred.
We read these provisions of the vehicle code and the no-fault insurance act in pari materia as indicating that an unexpired registration plate affixed to the vehicle serves as presumptive evidence that the vehicle is validly registered with the Secretary of State, and that it carries the statutorily mandated no-fault automobile insurance. It logically follows that to destroy that presumption, the appropriate course of action after the sale of a vehicle is for the seller to remove the registration plate and the certificates of registration and insurance from the automobile. In this case, Mrs. Williams failed to do so. A reasonable inference can [661]*661be made that Williams voluntarily remained the insuring registrant of the Pontiac, as evidenced by the testimony and by allowing Preece to take possession and operate the vehicle on a - public highway with her plate attached and with her certificates of insurance and registration in the glove compartment. Moreover, Mrs. Williams’ failure to retain title to the automobile did not excuse her compliance with any other legislative requirements she may have had under the no-fault insurance act. As the registrant of a vehicle she permitted to be operated upon a public highway, Mrs. Williams was required by the act to provide residual liability insurance on the vehicle under the threat of criminal sanctions, §§ 3101 and 3102. In this limited context, Mrs. Williams’ insurable interest was not contingent upon title of ownership to the automobile but, rather, upon personal pecuniary damage created by the no-fault statute itself. Thus, we reject Allstate’s argument that Mrs. Williams, as the registrant of the Pontiac, had no "insurable interest” in the vehicle because she was no longer the title holder. As noted by Judge Griffin in his dissent:
As to the duty to insure, the no-fault statutory provisions at issue have superseded our previous common law. Our no-fault act not only creates new types of insurance, it also establishes new and broader responsibilities to insure. See, generally, Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554; 267 NW2d 72 (1978). The duty of a registrant to maintain statutorily required insurance on a registered vehicle is one of the new responsibilities created by the no-fault act.[12]
In short, because she voluntarily remained the insuring registrant of the automobile, Mrs. Wil[662]*662liams must be taken to have complied with the compulsory insurance statute whether she intended to or not. Our conclusion is supported by the overriding, strong public policy and the Legislature’s mandate that vehicles not be operated on Michigan’s highways without personal protection insurance, property protection insurance, and residual liability insurance.
III
We conclude that, under the unique facts of this case, Allstate has a duty to defend and indemnify, if necessary, Williams and Preece in the underlying tort action on the basis of the express language of its contract with the insured. As registrant of the automobile, Williams, intentionally or not, complied with the no-fault statute and insured the vehicle as the registrant of the vehicle during the brief period she permitted the uninsured purchaser to operate it on a public highway.
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Cavanagh, C.J., and Levin, Griffin, and Mallett, JJ., concurred with Boyle, J.