Cleveland Hearing & Balance Ctr., Inc. v. N.E. Ohio Med. Univ.

2017 Ohio 2699
CourtOhio Court of Claims
DecidedApril 5, 2017
Docket2016-00102
StatusPublished

This text of 2017 Ohio 2699 (Cleveland Hearing & Balance Ctr., Inc. v. N.E. Ohio Med. Univ.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cleveland Hearing & Balance Ctr., Inc. v. N.E. Ohio Med. Univ., 2017 Ohio 2699 (Ohio Super. Ct. 2017).

Opinion

[Cite as Cleveland Hearing & Balance Ctr., Inc. v. N.E. Ohio Med. Univ., 2017-Ohio-2699.]

CLEVELAND HEARING AND BALANCE Case No. 2016-00102 CENTER, INC., et al. Judge Patrick M. McGrath Plaintiffs Magistrate Robert Van Schoyck

v. DECISION

NORTHEAST OHIO MEDICAL UNIVERSITY

Defendant

{¶1} On January 10, 2017, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 56(B). Plaintiffs were granted two separate extensions of time, until February 23, 2017, to file a response. On February 24, 2017, plaintiffs filed a motion to deem as timely a concurrently-filed response, which is GRANTED. Also on February 24, 2017, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a reply brief, which is GRANTED. The motion for summary judgment is now before the court for a non-oral hearing pursuant to L.C.C.R. 4(D). {¶2} Civ.R. 56(C) states, in part, as follows: {¶3} “Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party’s favor.” See also Case No. 2016-00102 -2- DECISION

Gilbert v. Summit Cty., 104 Ohio St.3d 660, 2004-Ohio-7108, citing Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317 (1977). {¶4} As set forth in the complaint, plaintiff, Cleveland Hearing and Balance Center, Inc. (CHBC), was a corporation owned by plaintiff, Dr. Mohamed A. Hamid. The complaint provides that CHBC and Dr. Hamid operated a medical practice focused on “auditory and vestibular (hearing and balance) issues,” but that Dr. Hamid is now retired and CHBC has been dissolved. {¶5} It is alleged that CHBC entered into a business relationship with the Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission (SACM) under which CHBC and Dr. Hamid would provide “educational fellowship clinical training for Dr. Fuad Alghamdi, a Saudi citizen, for 3 years beginning April 1, 2012 and ending March 31, 2015.” It is alleged that CHBC separately made a subcontracting agreement with defendant, Northeast Ohio Medical University (NEOMED), under which NEOMED was to provide 20 percent of Dr. Alghamdi’s training, comprising the research component of his fellowship, and CHBC would provide the clinical component that comprised the other 80 percent of the training. {¶6} According to the complaint, the fellowship proceeded through the second year but “Dr. Alghamdi experienced some personal issues in early 2014, and eventually stopped attending the clinics with CHBC in early March 2014.” It is also alleged that “Dr. Hamid and CHBC had concerns about the level of effort and progress Dr. Alghamdi was putting into his fellowship.” The complaint states that “NEOMED used this as an opportunity to deal directly with SACM in an attempt to receive the payment CHBC would receive” for the third year of the fellowship and that NEOMED “encouraged Dr. Alghamdi to obtain a lawyer to facilitate the breach of the agreement between CHBC and SACM.” The complaint provides that ultimately “SACM and NEOMED reached an agreement that SACM would pay NEOMED directly for Dr. Alghamdi’s third year of Case No. 2016-00102 -3- DECISION

fellowship training,” but in the end “Dr. Alghamdi returned to Saudi Arabia and did not complete his fellowship.” {¶7} In their complaint, CHBC and Dr. Hamid named as defendants both NEOMED and SACM, asserting claims for breach of the contractual duty of good faith against NEOMED and SACM, declaratory judgment as to CHBC and Dr. Hamid’s rights under both the contract with SACM and the subcontracting agreement with NEOMED, and, as against NEOMED only, a claim of tortious interference with CHBC and Dr. Hamid’s business relationship with SACM. On February 16, 2016, SACM was dismissed as a party on the basis that only state agencies and instrumentalities can be defendants in original actions in the Court of Claims pursuant to R.C. 2743.02(E). {¶8} NEOMED, as the lone remaining defendant in the action, seeks summary judgment as to all claims asserted against it. In support of its motion, NEOMED submitted a transcript of the deposition of Dr. Hamid, as well as an affidavit from Jeffrey Wenstrup, Ph.D., who is employed with NEOMED as a Professor and Chair of the Department of Anatomy and Neurobiology, Associate Dean of Research for the College of Medicine, and Director of the Auditory Neurosciences Group. Attached to both Dr. Hamid’s deposition transcript and Dr. Wenstrup’s affidavit are several authenticated documents. {¶9} The court shall first address the claim that NEOMED tortiously interfered with CHBC and Dr. Hamid’s business relationship with SACM. “‘The elements of tortious interference with a business relationship are (1) a business relationship; (2) the tortfeasor’s knowledge thereof; (3) an intentional interference causing a breach or termination of the relationship; and (4) damages resulting therefrom.’” Walter v. ADT Sec. Sys., Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-115, 2007-Ohio-3324, ¶ 31, quoting Diamond Wine & Spirits v. Dayton Heidelberg Distrib. Co., Inc., 148 Ohio App.3d 596, 2002-Ohio-3932, ¶ 23 (3rd Dist.). “The preeminent difference between tortious interference with a business relationship and tortious interference with a contractual Case No. 2016-00102 -4- DECISION

relationship is that interference with a business relationship covers intentional interference with prospective contractual relations not yet reduced to contract.” Miller v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-162, 2013-Ohio-3892, ¶ 21. {¶10} There is no dispute that CHBC and Dr. Hamid had a business relationship with SACM and that NEOMED had knowledge of that business relationship. According to Dr. Hamid’s deposition testimony, he and CHBC never had any other business relationship with SACM beyond the one pertaining to Dr. Alghamdi’s fellowship. (Dep., p. 15.) The third element of the claim, going to whether there was an intentional interference on the part of NEOMED causing a breach or termination of the business relationship, is a matter of disagreement between the parties. {¶11} Regarding the course of events that led up to the termination of the fellowship, Dr. Hamid testified in his deposition that problems started to arise several months after the fellowship began. (Dep., pp. 23-24, 62.) Dr. Hamid explained that the problems were tied to the arrival of Dr. Alghamdi’s wife and children from Saudi Arabia to the United States as well as the wife’s pregnancy, as Dr. Alghamdi increasingly had to spend time going to medical appointments with his wife and driving his children to and from school, and according to Dr. Hamid these family commitments increasingly interfered with the amount of time Dr. Alghamdi could commit to his clinical training at CHBC. (Dep., pp. 23-24.) {¶12} As Dr. Hamid testified, despite his concerns about Dr. Alghamdi’s time commitments, he and CHBC renewed the agreement with SACM upon the conclusion of the first year of the fellowship, and in conjunction with renewing the agreement he negotiated an increase in compensation for the second year of the fellowship. (Dep., p. 28.) Under the terms of the agreement, Dr. Hamid testified, he was supposed to submit an annual progress report to SACM before the agreement would come up for renewal. (Dep., pp. 34-35.) According to Dr.

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Bluebook (online)
2017 Ohio 2699, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cleveland-hearing-balance-ctr-inc-v-ne-ohio-med-univ-ohioctcl-2017.