Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. Arctic Iron Co.

Supreme Court

Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. Arctic Iron Co.

248 U.S. 178, 39 S. Ct. 91, 63 L. Ed. 198, 1918 U.S. LEXIS 1660

CourtSupreme Court of the United States

DecidedDecember 23, 1918

Docket75

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 248 U.S. 178 (Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. Arctic Iron Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. Arctic Iron Co., 248 U.S. 178, 39 S. Ct. 91, 63 L. Ed. 198, 1918 U.S. LEXIS 1660 (1918).

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Opinions

Mr. Chief Justice White

delivered the opinion of the court.

The certificate upon which this case is before us contains what are denominated findings of fact grouped under eighteen paragraphs covering eight pages of the record.. Upon these findings we. are asked to instruct as to six propositions of law, really amounting to twelve since each is two-fold, that is, stated in the alternative. But we are of opinion that we may not instruct as to these propositions for the following reasons.

In the first place, because we think it is clear that the statements which áre declared in the. certificate to be findings of fact are in no true sense entitled to that characterization, since the statements amount but to a narrative of facts mixed with questions of law so interblended, the one with the other, as to cause it to be impossible to eon-cliide as to either the law'.or the facts without a separation of thé two, a duty which we may not be calléd upon to perform in giving instructions upon questions of law propounded under the statute controlling that subject.

In the second place, because even if the admixture of law and fact which inheres in the recitals in the certificate be overlooked, the recitals nevertheless, in and of themselves, fail to distinguish between facts which are merely evidential and those which are ultimate and which for that rea ion would be susceptible of furnishing support [180]*180for the legal propositions as .to which instructions are asked. -

. It is true, indeed, that the statute gives us the discretion, when a case is certified, to direct the sending up of the whole record, but.obviously the exercise of that, discretionary power is not called for by a case where the certificate is of such a character as not'to be embraced by'the statute. '

It must be, therefore, that this case affords no ground for directing the sending up of the whole record since here the certificate is inadequate to sustain the right to' answer the questions stated. To hold to the contrary would be to cause a mistaken exercise of the right to certify specific questions to become the instrument by ' which the division of powers made by the statute would be disregarded.

The views which we have stated are in accord with • the settled rules concerning the power to certify which have prevailed from the beginning. See Dillon v. Strath-earn S. S. Co., post, p. 182, and the authorities therein cited. It follows that the certificate must be and is

Dismissed.

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Mr. Chief Justice White

delivered the opinion of the court.

The certificate upon which this case is before us contains what are denominated findings of fact grouped under eighteen paragraphs covering eight pages of the record.. Upon these findings we. are asked to instruct as to six propositions of law, really amounting to twelve since each is two-fold, that is, stated in the alternative. But we are of opinion that we may not instruct as to these propositions for the following reasons.

In the first place, because we think it is clear that the statements which áre declared in the. certificate to be findings of fact are in no true sense entitled to that characterization, since the statements amount but to a narrative of facts mixed with questions of law so interblended, the one with the other, as to cause it to be impossible to eon-cliide as to either the law'.or the facts without a separation of thé two, a duty which we may not be calléd upon to perform in giving instructions upon questions of law propounded under the statute controlling that subject.

In the second place, because even if the admixture of law and fact which inheres in the recitals in the certificate be overlooked, the recitals nevertheless, in and of themselves, fail to distinguish between facts which are merely evidential and those which are ultimate and which for that rea ion would be susceptible of furnishing support [180]*180for the legal propositions as .to which instructions are asked. -

. It is true, indeed, that the statute gives us the discretion, when a case is certified, to direct the sending up of the whole record, but.obviously the exercise of that, discretionary power is not called for by a case where the certificate is of such a character as not'to be embraced by'the statute. '

It must be, therefore, that this case affords no ground for directing the sending up of the whole record since here the certificate is inadequate to sustain the right to' answer the questions stated. To hold to the contrary would be to cause a mistaken exercise of the right to certify specific questions to become the instrument by ' which the division of powers made by the statute would be disregarded.

The views which we have stated are in accord with • the settled rules concerning the power to certify which have prevailed from the beginning. See Dillon v. Strath-earn S. S. Co., post, p. 182, and the authorities therein cited. It follows that the certificate must be and is

Dismissed.

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Bluebook (online)

248 U.S. 178, 39 S. Ct. 91, 63 L. Ed. 198, 1918 U.S. LEXIS 1660, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cleveland-cliffs-iron-co-v-arctic-iron-co-scotus-1918.

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