Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Ward

45 N.E. 325, 147 Ind. 256, 1896 Ind. LEXIS 129
CourtIndiana Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 24, 1896
DocketNo. 17,658
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 45 N.E. 325 (Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Ward) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Ward, 45 N.E. 325, 147 Ind. 256, 1896 Ind. LEXIS 129 (Ind. 1896).

Opinions

Howard, J.

On January 14, 1894, at the town of Winchester, the apppellee’s decedent, a fireman on appellant’s engine No. 383, was killed by the collapse of said engine. In this action ' appellee has sought to recover damages for the death of his decedent, alleging that the same was caused by the negligence of the appellant. The jury returned a general verdict for the appellee, answering also certain interrogatories propounded to them. On this appeal, [255]*255it is contended by the appellant that the court- erred in overruling the motion for a new trial.

One cause assigned in favor of the motion for a new trial is, that the court erred in refusing to give instruction numbered 14, as requested by the appellant. There are several reasons why the question so raised 'cannot be considered. In the first place, as said in Puett v. Beard, 86 Ind. 104, “It does not appear that the instruction was asked at a proper time.” It should be shown affirmatively that the request was made in due season, that is at or immediately after the close of the evidence. Section 542, Burns’ R. S. 1894 (533, R. S. 1881); Evansville, etc., R. R. Co. v Crist, 116 Ind. 446.

Neither does it appear that all the instructions are in the record; and it must be presumed that the instruction refused, if a correct one, was embodied in some other instruction given. Puett v. Beard, supra. Finally, it is not disclosed by the record whether the instructions were ever filed, as required by the statute above cited. ' Except when instructions are brought into the record by bill of exceptions, it should affirmatively appear that they have been filed. Blount v. Rick, 107 Ind. 238; Fort Wayne, etc., R. W. Co. v. Beyerle, 110 Ind. 100; Ohio, etc., R. W. Co. v. Dunn, 138 Ind. 18.

The main contention of appellant is that the verdict is not supported by the evidence.

Engine No. 383, the collapse of which caused the death of appellee’s decedent, was purchased by appellant from reputable builders in 1887, and was repaired in appellant’s shops in 1891, the fire box being in part renewed and new stay-bolts being put in in place of those found broken. In April, 1893, nine months be[256]*256fore the accident, the engine was subjected to a hydraulic test.

After the collapse of the engine it was found that 47 of the 600, or over, stay-bolts used to hold together the outer and inner sheets of the fire-box were broken. The broken bolts were clustered together, in a square, or nearly so, close to the center and on the right side of the fire-box; and the sheet on this side was forced inward.

It would appear to have been the rule of the company to have the stay-bolts inspected as often as once a week, to discover whether any were burnt out or broken by the contraction and expansion of the inner and outer sheets of the fire-box. The test used by appellant to learn the condition of the stay-bolts is what is called the hammer test. The heads only of the bolts can be seen from the fire-box, and it is agreed that the hammer test is the best and only practicable means, and the one in general use on all railroads, to learn the condition of the part of the stay-bolts concealed between the two sheets of the fire-box.

To make the hammer test, the inspector, after the engine has cooled, enters the fire-box, carrying a torch and hammer, and taps the head of each stay-bolt, and is thus enabled, by the sound, or, as it is also claimed, by feeling the vibrations of the sheet with one hand, to tell whether the bolt is whole or broken. If, however, the bolt is freshly broken between the sheets, and the broken ends still fit close to each other, it is admitted that it may be more difficult to tell by the hammer whether the bolt is yet whole or not. No better test, though, is known, save taking the fire-box apart, which is agreed to be impracticable for ordinary and usual testing.

The last hammer test of the stay-bolts in this case was made January 11,1894, three days before the dis[257]*257aster; and the dispute between counsel is, whether the test then made was a reasonably careful one, or, rather, whether there was competent and sufficient evidence from which the jury might, as they did, infer that the test made was not a reasonably careful one.

An examination was also made on the morning of the day of the accident, by merely looking into the firebox; but it is evident that but little reliance could be placed on this examination as to the condition of the stay-bolts, only the heads of which could be seen by looking into the fire-box.

Counsel for appellant admit, that it is the employer’s duty to make reasonably careful inspection; but they contend, that if reasonable„care is used in selecting inspectors, and if the inspection is made in the usual manner, there is no breach of duty, and therefore no liability, even though it is discovered after the accident, that defects existed. They say, further, that the burden is on the plaintiff to establish negligence, and that he cannot establish negligencé except by showing the inspector’s incompetency, or by showing that there was not, in fact, a reasonably careful inspection made.' There can be no doubt that these last two propositions are correct statements of the law.

The jury find that the inspector was incompetent; but, without considering whether that finding is supported by the evidence, it may be said that the important question here is, whether there was competent and sufficient evidence to prove, or from which the jury might infer, that, on January 11, 1894, the inspection made was not a reasonably careful inspection, and such as the appellant was in duty bound to make; for, even if the inspector were competent, yet if the inspection made by him were not a reasonably careful one, or one such as is usually made by reasonably care[258]*258ful and competent- inspectors, the appellant would still be liable.

The inspection of the stay-bolts of engine No. 383, made on the night of January 'll, 1894, was by Ezra L. Lepper, a boiler maker long in the service of appellant. Taking appellant’s evidence alone, and it appears quite satisfactorily that the inspector was competent; nor is this evidence directly controverted, and, if controverted at all, it is only by inference from his own and other testimony. Mr. Lepper had no personal recollection of having made the inspection, and depended for his knowledge wholly upon the report made by him. This report, signed by him, showed that on January 11,1894, all the stay-bolts had been examined and none found broken. After the accident the condition of the fire-box and stay-bolts was examined by several skilled persons, machinists, engine and boiler makers, firemen, engineers and others, and from the evidence of these men we are of opinion that the jury might conclude that the report made by the inspector was incorrect, that many of the stay-bolts must have been broken at the time they were reported sound by him.

John Fitzmorris, a machinist of fifteen years’ experience in repairing and working on boilers, took a light and examined the fire-box immediately after the collapse. He found the right side outer sheet of the firebox torn off and thrown over toward the left, with 47 of the stay-bolts broken in two, some of the broken parts clinging to the outer sheet, and some to the inner.

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Bluebook (online)
45 N.E. 325, 147 Ind. 256, 1896 Ind. LEXIS 129, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cleveland-cincinnati-chicago-st-louis-railway-co-v-ward-ind-1896.