Clervrain v. United States of America

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: October 22, 2024
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-2049
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

____________________________________ ) MANETIRONY CLERVRAIN et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 24-02049 (CRC) ) ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al., ) ) Defendants. ) ____________________________________)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiffs, appearing pro se, filed suit in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia

against federal and non-federal defendants. The federal defendants (“Defendants”) removed the

case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) and now move to dismiss the complaint under Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a), 12(b)(1), and 12(b)(6). The complaint is incomprehensible, as are

Plaintiffs’ numerous filings, ECF Nos. 13, 15, 17, 19, 20-29, which include an 834-page

“Motion” improperly docketed as an “Amended Complaint,” ECF No. 11, and a 1,797-page

motion, ECF No. 8, which Defendants have opposed in their motion to dismiss. See Fed. Defs.’

Combined Mot. to Dismiss and Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Order, ECF No. 9. For the following

reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted. 1

1 By Order of September 24, 2024, ECF No. 14, Plaintiffs were advised of their obligations to respond to the federal defendants’ motion to dismiss by October 21, 2024, and the consequences of not responding appropriately. Plaintiffs have not filed an intelligible response to the motion. I. BACKGROUND

In a section of the 18-page Complaint designated for stating a claim, Plaintiffs write:

“MOTION FOR [“COLUMBIA ECONOMIC”] (“CE”) OR [“DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ACT”] (“DCA”) BY [‘NATIONAL AND SOCIAL BENEFITS ACT”] (“NASBA”). ECF No. 1-

1 at 1. They request as relief: MOTION FOR [“PROTECTING RIGHTS”] (“PR”) OR

[NATIONAL MATTERS” ACT (“FLA”) BY [‘COUNTRY UNION PUBLIC [“IN”] DATA

ACT”] (“CUPIDA”).” Id. The remainder of the complaint is equally bewildering. See id. at 2-

18.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Before considering Defendants’ viable grounds for dismissal based on insufficient

pleading under Rules 8 and 12(b)(6), the Court must satisfy itself that it has subject-matter

jurisdiction to consider the complaint. Lovitky v. Trump, 949 F.3d 753, 763 (D.C. Cir. 2020).

This is so because subject-matter jurisdiction “goes to the foundation of the court’s power to

resolve a case,” Doe by Fein v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and it

“can never be waived or forfeited,” Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012). Thus, lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction in this removed action would necessitate granting Defendants’ motion

to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and remanding the case to the proper forum. Republic of

Venezuela v. Philip Morris, Inc., 287 F.3d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447

(c)).

In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court must “assume the truth

of all material factual allegations in the complaint and ‘construe the complaint liberally, granting

plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Am. Nat’l Ins.

Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970,

2 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). Although the filings of pro se parties are construed liberally, see

Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999), “the non-justiciability of a case

and the absence of jurisdiction cannot be overcome by liberal construction of a pro se

complaint,” Troupe v. Attorney General of United States, 317 F.Supp.3d 350, 353 (D.D.C.

2018).

III. ANALYSIS

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” possessing “only that power authorized

by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377

(1994) (citations omitted). “Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal

Government and its agencies from suit.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). The waiver

“must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text, and [it cannot] be implied.” Lane v. Pena,

518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (citations omitted). Furthermore, “federal courts are without power to

entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction” that “are so attenuated and unsubstantial as

to be absolutely devoid of merit, wholly insubstantial, [or] obviously frivolous[.]” Hagans v.

Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974). Indeed, a “complaint may be dismissed on jurisdictional

grounds when it ‘is patently insubstantial,’ presenting no federal question suitable for decision.”

Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328,

330 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).

Plaintiffs have not established a waiver of sovereign immunity, which is reason enough to

dismiss the complaint. But a complaint, as here, that wholly lacks “an arguable basis either in

law or in fact” is a frivolous pleading, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), and the

Court envisions no “allegation of other facts” that could plausibly cure this shortcoming of the

complaint. Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam). Therefore,

3 as proposed, ECF No. 9 at 6, the complaint against the federal defendants is dismissed with

prejudice. See Juste v. Resident Agency Martinsburg, 153 F. Supp. 3d 242, 244-45 (D.D.C.

2016) (concluding that “largely incoherent allegations comprising the complaint and subsequent

pleadings warrant dismissal of the action under Rule 12(b)(1) . . . with prejudice”) (collecting

cases)).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the federal defendants’ motion to dismiss and

dismisses the complaint against those defendants. In all other respects, the case is remanded to

D.C. Superior Court.

A separate Order will issue contemporaneously.

_________/s/______________ CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER Date: October 22, 2024 United States District Judge