MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 06 2017, 8:09 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Clayton S. Lindsey Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Michigan City, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Robert J. Henke Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Clayton S. Lindsey, July 6, 2017 Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No. 46A03-1701-CR-44 v. Appeal from the LaPorte Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Thomas J. Appellee-Respondent. Alevizos, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 46C01-0909-MR-496
Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A03-1701-CR-44 | July 6, 2017 Page 1 of 7 STATEMENT OF THE CASE [1] Appellant-Defendant, Clayton Lindsey (Lindsey), appeals the post-conviction
court’s order granting the State’s motion for summary disposition.
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE [3] Lindsey presents one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the post-
conviction court erred in granting the State’s motion for summary disposition.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY [4] On September 21, 2009, the State filed an Information, charging Lindsey with
two Counts of murder, and one Count of burglary, a Class B felony. On July
18, 2011, Lindsey was sentenced to concurrent sixty-five year sentences for the
murder convictions, and a consecutive twenty-year sentence for the burglary
conviction, with ten years suspended to probation.
[5] In 2013, Lindsey obtained his general education development diploma (GED),
and completed a literacy basic life skills program. In 2016, Lindsey also
completed a welding program. On July 11, 2016, Lindsey requested the dorm
unit team office for a list of all his completed programs and their respective
earned credits. The dorm unit team office responded by advising Lindsey that
his earned credit time would be applied closer to his release date. On July 21,
2016, Lindsey filed a classification appeal with the DOC challenging the
decision rendered by the dorm unit team office. On July 26, 2016, the DOC
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A03-1701-CR-44 | July 6, 2017 Page 2 of 7 denied Lindsey’s application stating, in part, that the DOC “facility only enters
the information for the time cuts. Central [O]ffice actually process them. The
facility does not control this process.” (Appellee’s App. Vol. II, p. 38). On
August 1, 2016, Lindsey filed an offender complaint, reiterating that he had
earned additional credit time for obtaining a GED and completing two
vocational programs. On August 2, 2016, the DOC responded by stating that,
“central office will post when closer to outdate.” (Appellee’s Vol. II, p. 39).
[6] On September 14, 2016, Lindsey filed a motion for the award of additional
credit time with the post-conviction court. On October 12, 2016, the post-
conviction court denied Lindsey’s motion stating that DOC had not denied
Lindsey’s request for additional time. In addition, the post-conviction court
stated that Lindsey had not exhausted all of his administrative remedies with
the DOC. On October 19, 2016, Lindsey filed another classification appeal
with the DOC reiterating that he was entitled to the award of additional credit
time. On October 20, 2016, the DOC responded by stating:
The application of time credits for program completion is a central office function. Central [O]ffice has been consulted on this issue and they have advised that said application is arranged and applied to offenders based on their earliest projected release date. At some point in the future the credits that you have earned will be applied to your commitment(s).
Your classification appeal is hereby denied.
(Appellee’s App. Vol. II, p. 49).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A03-1701-CR-44 | July 6, 2017 Page 3 of 7 [7] Following the denial of his classification appeal, on October 25, 2016, Lindsey
filed an appeal with the Central Office. The Central Office did not respond to
Lindsey’s appeal, and on November 17, 2016, Lindsey filed a motion to show
compliance with the court order of October 12, 2016. In his motion, Lindsey
claimed that he had exhausted all administrative remedies with the DOC, and
the post-conviction court had jurisdiction to determine his appeal. On
December 2, 2016, the State responded to Lindsey’s motion by filing a motion
for summary disposition, with an attached declaration sworn by Jennifer
Farmer (Farmer), DOC’s Director of Sentence Computation and Release Unit.
In the declaration, Farmer acknowledged Lindsey’s GED award, and
completion of two other vocational programs. Farmer additionally declared
that:
7. []DOC’s Classification Division will conduct a final review of Lindsey’s request and then recalculate Lindsey’s earliest possible release date (“EPRD”).
8. []DOC’s Classification Division conducts its final review of time cut requests based on the requesting offender’s EPRD.
9. Based on Lindsey’s EPRD of 2047, his request for time cut has not been processed and applied at the time this declaration was signed.
10. As of November 29, 2016 at 3:48 p.m., there are approximately 2,802 other requests ahead of Lindsey’s awaiting final review by []DOC’s Classification Division.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A03-1701-CR-44 | July 6, 2017 Page 4 of 7 [8] (Appellee’s App. Vol. II, p. 57). On December 12, 2016, the post-conviction
court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon granting the State’s
motion for summary disposition.
[9] Lindsey now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION [10] Lindsey argues that the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion for
summary disposition. We initially observe that Lindsey is pro se on appeal. Pro
se litigants are held to the same standard as trained legal counsel and are
required to follow the procedural rules. Evans v. State, 809 N.E.2d 338, 344
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. It is an appellant’s duty to provide a record
that reflects the error alleged. Williams v. State, 690 N.E.2d 162, 176 (Ind.
1987). To the extent the record is inadequate, it results in waiver of the issue.
Id.
[11] We review the grant of a motion for summary disposition in post-conviction
proceedings on appeal in the same way as a civil motion for summary
judgment. Norris v. State, 896 N.E.2d 1149, 1151nd. 2008). Summary
disposition, like summary judgment, is a matter for appellate de novo review
when the determinative issue is a matter of law, not fact. Id. In summary
judgment proceedings, the moving party is the party that bears the burden to
demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003-04 (Ind.
2014). However, a trial court’s grant of summary judgment is clothed with a
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MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 06 2017, 8:09 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Clayton S. Lindsey Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Michigan City, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Robert J. Henke Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Clayton S. Lindsey, July 6, 2017 Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No. 46A03-1701-CR-44 v. Appeal from the LaPorte Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Thomas J. Appellee-Respondent. Alevizos, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 46C01-0909-MR-496
Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A03-1701-CR-44 | July 6, 2017 Page 1 of 7 STATEMENT OF THE CASE [1] Appellant-Defendant, Clayton Lindsey (Lindsey), appeals the post-conviction
court’s order granting the State’s motion for summary disposition.
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE [3] Lindsey presents one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the post-
conviction court erred in granting the State’s motion for summary disposition.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY [4] On September 21, 2009, the State filed an Information, charging Lindsey with
two Counts of murder, and one Count of burglary, a Class B felony. On July
18, 2011, Lindsey was sentenced to concurrent sixty-five year sentences for the
murder convictions, and a consecutive twenty-year sentence for the burglary
conviction, with ten years suspended to probation.
[5] In 2013, Lindsey obtained his general education development diploma (GED),
and completed a literacy basic life skills program. In 2016, Lindsey also
completed a welding program. On July 11, 2016, Lindsey requested the dorm
unit team office for a list of all his completed programs and their respective
earned credits. The dorm unit team office responded by advising Lindsey that
his earned credit time would be applied closer to his release date. On July 21,
2016, Lindsey filed a classification appeal with the DOC challenging the
decision rendered by the dorm unit team office. On July 26, 2016, the DOC
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A03-1701-CR-44 | July 6, 2017 Page 2 of 7 denied Lindsey’s application stating, in part, that the DOC “facility only enters
the information for the time cuts. Central [O]ffice actually process them. The
facility does not control this process.” (Appellee’s App. Vol. II, p. 38). On
August 1, 2016, Lindsey filed an offender complaint, reiterating that he had
earned additional credit time for obtaining a GED and completing two
vocational programs. On August 2, 2016, the DOC responded by stating that,
“central office will post when closer to outdate.” (Appellee’s Vol. II, p. 39).
[6] On September 14, 2016, Lindsey filed a motion for the award of additional
credit time with the post-conviction court. On October 12, 2016, the post-
conviction court denied Lindsey’s motion stating that DOC had not denied
Lindsey’s request for additional time. In addition, the post-conviction court
stated that Lindsey had not exhausted all of his administrative remedies with
the DOC. On October 19, 2016, Lindsey filed another classification appeal
with the DOC reiterating that he was entitled to the award of additional credit
time. On October 20, 2016, the DOC responded by stating:
The application of time credits for program completion is a central office function. Central [O]ffice has been consulted on this issue and they have advised that said application is arranged and applied to offenders based on their earliest projected release date. At some point in the future the credits that you have earned will be applied to your commitment(s).
Your classification appeal is hereby denied.
(Appellee’s App. Vol. II, p. 49).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A03-1701-CR-44 | July 6, 2017 Page 3 of 7 [7] Following the denial of his classification appeal, on October 25, 2016, Lindsey
filed an appeal with the Central Office. The Central Office did not respond to
Lindsey’s appeal, and on November 17, 2016, Lindsey filed a motion to show
compliance with the court order of October 12, 2016. In his motion, Lindsey
claimed that he had exhausted all administrative remedies with the DOC, and
the post-conviction court had jurisdiction to determine his appeal. On
December 2, 2016, the State responded to Lindsey’s motion by filing a motion
for summary disposition, with an attached declaration sworn by Jennifer
Farmer (Farmer), DOC’s Director of Sentence Computation and Release Unit.
In the declaration, Farmer acknowledged Lindsey’s GED award, and
completion of two other vocational programs. Farmer additionally declared
that:
7. []DOC’s Classification Division will conduct a final review of Lindsey’s request and then recalculate Lindsey’s earliest possible release date (“EPRD”).
8. []DOC’s Classification Division conducts its final review of time cut requests based on the requesting offender’s EPRD.
9. Based on Lindsey’s EPRD of 2047, his request for time cut has not been processed and applied at the time this declaration was signed.
10. As of November 29, 2016 at 3:48 p.m., there are approximately 2,802 other requests ahead of Lindsey’s awaiting final review by []DOC’s Classification Division.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A03-1701-CR-44 | July 6, 2017 Page 4 of 7 [8] (Appellee’s App. Vol. II, p. 57). On December 12, 2016, the post-conviction
court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon granting the State’s
motion for summary disposition.
[9] Lindsey now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION [10] Lindsey argues that the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion for
summary disposition. We initially observe that Lindsey is pro se on appeal. Pro
se litigants are held to the same standard as trained legal counsel and are
required to follow the procedural rules. Evans v. State, 809 N.E.2d 338, 344
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. It is an appellant’s duty to provide a record
that reflects the error alleged. Williams v. State, 690 N.E.2d 162, 176 (Ind.
1987). To the extent the record is inadequate, it results in waiver of the issue.
Id.
[11] We review the grant of a motion for summary disposition in post-conviction
proceedings on appeal in the same way as a civil motion for summary
judgment. Norris v. State, 896 N.E.2d 1149, 1151nd. 2008). Summary
disposition, like summary judgment, is a matter for appellate de novo review
when the determinative issue is a matter of law, not fact. Id. In summary
judgment proceedings, the moving party is the party that bears the burden to
demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003-04 (Ind.
2014). However, a trial court’s grant of summary judgment is clothed with a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A03-1701-CR-44 | July 6, 2017 Page 5 of 7 presumption of validity, and the party who lost in the trial court has the burden
of demonstrating that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous. FLM,
LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 973 N.E.2d 1167, 1173 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans.
denied.
[12] Lindsey maintains that his earned credit time should be applied immediately to
his sentence. In response, the State maintains the DOC’s denial of Lindsey’s
request to the immediate application of additional credit time to his sentence
was consistent with the DOC’s policies and procedures. The State argues that
the DOC did not refuse to award Lindsey’s earned credit time; rather, the DOC
indicated that it would grant him credit time at a later time as specified in its
policy. In support of its argument, the State directs us to the DOC’s response
dated October 20, 2016. In that response, the DOC informed Lindsey that
“Central [O]ffice has been consulted on this issue and they have advised that
said application is arranged and applied to offenders based on their earliest
projected release date. At some point in the future the credits that you have
earned will be applied to your commitment.” (Appellee’s App. Vol. II, p. 49).
[13] In the summary disposition order, the post-conviction court recognized that
pursuant to Indiana Code section 11-8-2-5(a)(8), the DOC is responsible for
developing policies, programs, and services for committed persons, for
administration of facilities, and for conduct of employees of the department.
Here, the evidence before the post-conviction court shows that there was no
genuine issue as to any material fact, and summary disposition was appropriate.
The record demonstrates that DOC prioritizes credit time requests based on an
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A03-1701-CR-44 | July 6, 2017 Page 6 of 7 offender’s release date. As of November 2016, there were approximately 2,802
requests ahead of Lindsey, and Lindsey’s earliest release date is 2047. As per
the DOC policies and procedures, DOC will process and complete Lindsey’s
request closer to his release date, which is thirty years away. Based on the
evidence before it, the post-conviction court properly granted the State’s motion
for summary disposition.
[14] Lindsey also asserts that the DOC’s failure to award him additional credit time
forecloses him from being “eligible for additional []DOC programs.”
(Appellant’s Br. p. 9). In addition, Lindsey claims that if the credit time is not
awarded now, it will be lost forever. Lindsey did not raise these additional
arguments in his motion with the post-conviction court. Because Lindsey raises
these arguments the first time on appeal, he waives them for appellate review.
See Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 746 (Ind. 2002)
CONCLUSION [15] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that there are no genuine issues of
material fact with respect to Lindsey’s motion seeking the calculation of his
credit time, and the post-conviction court correctly granted the State’s motion
[16] Affirmed.
[17] Najam, J. and Bradford, J. concur
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A03-1701-CR-44 | July 6, 2017 Page 7 of 7