Clayton Crowe v. United States

430 F. App'x 484
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedJuly 18, 2011
Docket09-6508
StatusUnpublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 430 F. App'x 484 (Clayton Crowe v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Clayton Crowe v. United States, 430 F. App'x 484 (6th Cir. 2011).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The petitioner-appellant, Clayton Crowe, appeals from the district court’s judgment denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We AFFIRM.

Crowe is currently serving a sixty-year sentence in federal prison. Because he suffers from heart and kidney ailments, Crowe asked the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to file a motion in federal court seeking a compassionate release as permitted under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(l)(A)(i). The BOP denied his request. After pursuing administrative remedies without success, Crowe filed a petition — styled as a § 2241 petition — in the district court, seeking an order requiring the BOP to file a motion for compassionate release with the sentencing court in North Carolina. The district court correctly determined that § 2241 does not provide subject matter jurisdiction over Crowe’s petition. The district court also correctly determined that, even if viewed as a request for review of agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701-706, Crowe’s petition lacks merit because federal courts have no authority to review or countermand the BOP’s decision not to seek a compassionate release for an inmate. Crowe filed a timely appeal to this court.

The BOP has the authority to seek a modification of a prisoner’s sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)®, which provides that a federal court “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that ... in any case ... the court, upon motion of the Director of the [BOP], may reduce the term of imprisonment ... if it finds that ... extraordinary and compelling reasons war *485 rant such a reduction.” Id. (emphasis added). The statute places no limits on the BOP’s authority to seek or not seek a sentence reduction on behalf of a prisoner, nor does it define — or place any limits on — what “extraordinary and compelling reasons” might warrant such a reduction. The BOP, in other words, has broad discretion in its decision to move the court for a sentence modification under § 3582(c)(l)(A)(i). 1

Based on this broad grant of discretion, a number of courts have determined that the BOP’s decision regarding whether or not to file a motion for compassionate release is judicially unreviewable. See Fernandez v. United States, 941 F.2d 1488, 1493 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that the BOP’s decision whether to seek a compassionate release under the predecessor to § 3582(c)(l)(A)(i) was unreviewable); Simmons v. Christensen, 894 F.2d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir.1990) (same); Turner v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 810 F.2d 612, 615 (7th Cir.1987) (same); Crawford v. Woodring, No. CV 08-362-GW, 2009 WL 6575082, at *6 (C.D.Cal. Dec. 11, 2009) (dismissing as unreviewable prisoner’s § 2241 request for an order directing the BOP to move for early release under § 3582(c)(l)(A)(i)); Gutierrez v. Anderson, No. 06-1714, 2006 WL 3086892, at *4 (D.Minn. Oct. 30, 2006) (same); see also Engle v. United States, 26 Fed.Appx. 394, 397 (6th Cir.2001) (holding that the district courts lack “jurisdiction to sua sponte grant compassionate release” and that “[a] district court may not modify a defendant’s federal sentence based on the defendant’s ill health, except upon a motion from the Director of the Bureau of Prisons”). Consistent with these decisions, we hold that a federal court lacks authority to review a decision by the BOP to not seek a compassionate release for an inmate under § 3582(c)(l)(A)(i).

The judgment of the district court denying Crowe’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is AFFIRMED.

1

. Crowe argues, on various grounds, that the breadth of discretion granted to the BOP by § 3582(c)(l)(A)(i) is unconstitutional. Crowe’s arguments in this regard are frivolous and we decline to address them.

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Bluebook (online)
430 F. App'x 484, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clayton-crowe-v-united-states-ca6-2011.