Clay v. Doe

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedOctober 20, 2020
Docket7:20-cv-07692
StatusUnknown

This text of Clay v. Doe (Clay v. Doe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Clay v. Doe, (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK --------------------------------------------------------X DANIEL CLAY, PARTIAL TRANSFER ORDER, Plaintiff, AND VALENTIN ORDER v. 20-CV-07692 (PMH) SERGEANT JOHN DOE, et al.,

Defendants. ---------------------------------------------------------X PHILIP M. HALPERN, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Midstate Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that four John Doe correction officers assaulted him at Downstate Correctional Facility (the “Downstate claims”). He also alleges that after he was transferred to Great Meadow Correctional Facility, an unnamed doctor denied him medical attention (the “Great Meadow claims”). Plaintiff names as defendants the four John Doe correction officers he alleges assaulted him, and the one John Doe doctor he alleges denied him care. By order dated October 16, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court severs the Great Meadow claims and transfers those claims to the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. The Downstate claims will remain in this District. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639

(2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

DISCUSSION Severance of the Great Meadow claims Rules 18 and 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern joinder of claims and parties, respectively. Rule 18 permits a plaintiff to join as many claims as he has against a particular defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). By contrast, under Rule 20, a plaintiff may not pursue unrelated claims against multiple defendants. Deskovic v. City of Peekskill, 673 F. Supp. 2d 154, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Rule 20(a)(2) permits a plaintiff to join multiple defendants in one action if: “(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative arising out of the same 2 transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Id. Although courts have interpreted Rule 20(a) liberally to allow related claims to be tried within a single proceeding, Barr Rubber Products Co. v. Sun Rubber Co., 425 F.2d 1114, 1126-27 (2d Cir. 1970), “the mere allegation that Plaintiff

was injured by all Defendants is not sufficient to join unrelated parties as defendants in the same lawsuit pursuant to Rule 20(a),” Deskovic, 673 F. Supp. 2d at 167. Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a party.” Id. In determining whether to sever a claim, the court considers “the two requirements of Rule 20 and additional factors, including (1) whether severance will serve judicial economy; (2) whether prejudice to the parties would be caused by severance; and (3) whether the claims involve different witnesses and evidence.” Kehr v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 596 F. Supp. 2d 821, 826 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (relying on Laureano v. Goord, No. 06-CV-7845, 2007 WL 2826649, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2007)). Put another way, courts “look to the logical relationship between the

claims and determine ‘whether the essential facts of the various claims are so logically connected that considerations of judicial economy and fairness dictate that all the issues be resolved in one lawsuit.’” Kalie v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-CV-9192 (PAE), 2013 WL 4044951, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2013) (quoting United States v. Aquavella, 615 F.2d 12, 22 (2d Cir. 1979)). Joinder of Plaintiff’s claims against the Downstate Defendants with his claims against the doctor at Great Meadow does not comport with Rule 20(a) because the allegations involve different defendants and separate events occurring at different facilities. Thus, the Downstate claims are not logically connected to the Great Meadow claims. See, e.g., Smith v. Goord, No. 04-CV-6432, 2006 WL 2850597, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Sep. 22, 2006) (disallowing joinder of claims against defendants at 3 different correctional facilities where there was no suggestion that original defendants were involved in the actions taken against plaintiff in a different facility more than one year later); Webb v. Maldanado, No. 3:13-CV-144 (RNC), 2013 WL 3243135, at *3 (D. Conn. June 26, 2013) (“Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits . . . to prevent the sort of

morass” created by a complaint with more than twenty defendants and countless unrelated claims.”) (quotation and citation omitted).

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Clay v. Doe, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clay-v-doe-nysd-2020.