Claudio Perfetto, Inc. v. Waste Management

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Claudio Perfetto, Inc. v. Waste Management

274 A.D.2d 389, 710 N.Y.S.2d 120, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7558

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJuly 3, 2000

StatusPublished

This text of 274 A.D.2d 389 (Claudio Perfetto, Inc. v. Waste Management) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Claudio Perfetto, Inc. v. Waste Management, 274 A.D.2d 389, 710 N.Y.S.2d 120, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7558 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2000).

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Opinion

—In a proceeding to discharge a mechanic’s lien, Waste Management of New York, L. L. C., appeals from an or[390]*390der of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Hall, J.), dated November 18, 1999, which granted the petition.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

We reject the appellant’s contention that it is entitled to a mechanic’s lien against the petitioner’s property. It is undisputed that, for a fee,, the appellant simply accepted the petitioner’s construction debris and waste at one of its disposal facilities. It performed none of the actual waste removal itself. Lien Law § 3 provides, inter alia, that any contractor who performs labor or furnishes material for the “improvement of real property” is entitled to a lien. While Lien Law § 3 should be liberally construed to secure the purposes for which it was intended, namely the protection of that class of people who perform services or supply the material for the improvement of realty (see, Shultz v Quereau Co., 210 NY 257; Giant Portland Cement Co. v State of New York, 232 NY 395; Fedders Cent. Air Conditioning Corp. v Karpinecz & Sons, 83 Misc 2d 720), mere acceptance of construction debris or waste does not constitute an “improvement” as that term is defined in Lien Law § 2 (4). Bracken, J. P., Joy, Thompson, Goldstein and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.

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—In a proceeding to discharge a mechanic’s lien, Waste Management of New York, L. L. C., appeals from an or[390]*390der of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Hall, J.), dated November 18, 1999, which granted the petition.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

We reject the appellant’s contention that it is entitled to a mechanic’s lien against the petitioner’s property. It is undisputed that, for a fee,, the appellant simply accepted the petitioner’s construction debris and waste at one of its disposal facilities. It performed none of the actual waste removal itself. Lien Law § 3 provides, inter alia, that any contractor who performs labor or furnishes material for the “improvement of real property” is entitled to a lien. While Lien Law § 3 should be liberally construed to secure the purposes for which it was intended, namely the protection of that class of people who perform services or supply the material for the improvement of realty (see, Shultz v Quereau Co., 210 NY 257; Giant Portland Cement Co. v State of New York, 232 NY 395; Fedders Cent. Air Conditioning Corp. v Karpinecz & Sons, 83 Misc 2d 720), mere acceptance of construction debris or waste does not constitute an “improvement” as that term is defined in Lien Law § 2 (4). Bracken, J. P., Joy, Thompson, Goldstein and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

274 A.D.2d 389, 710 N.Y.S.2d 120, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7558, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/claudio-perfetto-inc-v-waste-management-nyappdiv-2000.

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