Claspill v. Fed Ex Freight East, Inc.

360 S.W.3d 894, 2012 WL 242568, 2012 Mo. App. LEXIS 98
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedJanuary 25, 2012
DocketNo. SD 31346
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 360 S.W.3d 894 (Claspill v. Fed Ex Freight East, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Claspill v. Fed Ex Freight East, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 894, 2012 WL 242568, 2012 Mo. App. LEXIS 98 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012).

Opinion

ROBERT S. BARNEY, Judge.

Appellant Shawn Claspill (“Claimant”) appeals from the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission’s (“the Commission”) “Final Award Allowing Compensation (Affirming Award and Decision of Administrative Law Judge [“ALJ”])” which awarded Claimant 10 percent permanent partial disability of the body as a whole attributable to Employer and found no liability on the part of the Treasurer of the State of Missouri as Custodian for the Second Injury Fund (“the Fund”). In his sole point relied on Claimant maintains the Commission erred in finding Claimant “was not permanently totally disabled against the [Fund] as a result of the work injuries sustained on July 28, 2006[,] in combination with his pre-existing physical conditions ....” 1 We affirm the decision of the Commission.

Section 287.495.1 provides the standard of review for a workers’ compensation case.2 It sets out in relevant part:

[t]he court, on appeal, shall review only questions of law and may modify, reverse, remand for rehearing, or set aside the award upon any of the following grounds and no other:
(1) That the [C]ommission acted without or in excess of its powers;
(2) That the award was procured by fraud;
(3) That the facts found by the [C]om-mission do not support the award;
(4) That there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award.

§ 287.495.1; see Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220, 222 (Mo. banc 2003).3 “A court must examine the whole record to determine if it contains sufficient competent and substantial evidence to support the award.... ” Id. at 222-23. “ ‘[T]he Commission, as the finder of fact, is free to believe or disbelieve any evidence,’ and this [C]ourt is bound by the Commission’s factual determinations.” Clark v. Harts Auto Repair, 274 S.W.3d 612, 617 (Mo.App.2009) (quoting ABB Power T & D Co. v. Kempker, 236 S.W.3d [897]*89743, 49 (Mo.App.2007)). “The Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight and value to give to the evidence.’ ” Clayton v. Langco Tool & Plastics, Inc., 221 S.W.3d 490, 493 (Mo.App.2007) (quoting Blackwell v. Puritan-Bennett Corp., 901 S.W.2d 81, 85 (Mo.App.1995)). Typically, this Court reviews the findings of the Commission; however, “[i]f the Commission incorporates the [ALJ’s] opinion and decision, the reviewing court will consider the Commission’s decisions as including those of the [ALJ].” Copeland v. Thurman Stout, Inc., 204 S.W.3d 737, 740 (Mo.App.2006). “The Commission’s interpretation and application of the law ... are not binding on this [Cjourt and fall within our realm of independent review and correction.” Bowers v. Hiland Dairy Co., 132 S.W.3d 260, 263 (Mo.App.2004).

“Section 287.220.1 sets out the law governing when the second injury fund is liable.” Pierson v. Treas. of Missouri, 126 S.W.3d 386, 388 (Mo. banc 2004).

It provides for fund liability if the preexisting disability and the combined effect of it and the new injury are each of such seriousness that they are a hindrance or obstacle to employment and ‘if a body as a whole injury, equals a minimum of fifty weeks of compensation or, if a major extremity injury only, equals a minimum of fifteen percent permanent partial disability.’

Id. at 388-89 (quoting § 287.220.1). “Where the statute applies, the employer is liable only for the amount of disability caused by the current injury, and the [F]und is liable in the amount of the increase in disability caused by the synergistic effect of the two injuries.” Id.

“The type of benefits that [Claimant is entitled to recover from [the Fund] depends on the resulting combination of [Cjlaimant’s last injury and preexisting permanent partial disabilities.” Dunn v. Treas. of Mo., Second Injury Fund, 272 S.W.3d 267, 272 (Mo.App.2008). “In order for a claimant to be entitled to recover permanent partial disability benefits from the [Fund], he must prove that the last injury, combined with his preexisting permanent partial disabilities, cause[d] greater overall disability than the independent sum of the disabilities.” Id. Additionally, “in order for the claimant to be entitled to recover permanent total disability benefits from the [Fund], he must prove that the last injury, combined with his pre-existing permanent partial disabilities, resulted] in permanent total disability.” Id. “For this reason, ‘pre-existing disabilities are irrelevant until the employer’s liability for the last injury is determined.’” Birdsong v. Waste Mgmt., 147 S.W.3d 132, 138 (Mo.App.2004) (quoting Landman v. Ice Cream Specialties, Inc., 107 S.W.3d 240, 248 (Mo. banc 2003)). “If the [claimant’s] last injury in and of itself rendered [him] permanently and totally disabled, the Fund has no liability; the employer is responsible for the entire amount of compensation.” Id. “The testimony of a claimant or other lay witness can constitute substantial evidence of the nature, cause, and extent of disability when the facts fall within the realm of lay understanding.” Silman v. William Montgomery & Assoc., 891 S.W.2d 173, 175 (Mo.App.1995); see also Kuykendall v. Gates Rubber Co., 207 S.W.3d 694, 711 (Mo.App.2006). However,

[w]here the condition presented is a sophisticated injury that requires surgical intervention or other highly scientific technique for diagnosis ... the proof of causation is not within the realm of lay understanding nor — in the absence of expert opinion — is the finding of causation within the competency of the administrative tribunal.

Silman, 891 S.W.2d at 175-76.

The record reveals that on or about July 28, 2006, Employee was injured while in [898]*898the course and scope of his employment with Fed Ex Freight East, Inc. (“Employer”). Claimant, who was employed as a mechanic, claims he fell from a forklift on that date injuring his lower back and right hip. Several other employees came to his aid, but Claimant did not seek immediate medical treatment nor did he immediately report the injury to his supervisor or miss work due to the injury. Claimant saw his family physician, Dr. Kyle Smith (“Dr.

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360 S.W.3d 894, 2012 WL 242568, 2012 Mo. App. LEXIS 98, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/claspill-v-fed-ex-freight-east-inc-moctapp-2012.