EAGER, Judge.
This is a suit for the wrongful deaths of both parents of the plaintiff’s minor wards; those deaths occurred as the result of the collision of the parents’ motorcycle with a car driven by William Dee Organ, whose administratrix is the defendant here. All three persons died on Sept. 1, 1956, the date of the collision. Plaintiff is the guardian of the three minor children. Defendant was appointed administratrix of Organ’s estate on Oct. 8, 1956, and the first publication of the Notice of Letters was made on Oct. 11, 1956. This suit was instituted on Nov. 10, 1956, seeking damages of $50,000 for the death of both parents, and asserting that the deaths were caused by the negligence of decedent Organ. Service of process was had on the defendant on Nov. 23, 1956. On Jan. 5, 1957, defendant filed answer, admitting the appoint[672]*672ments of the Guardian and the Adminis-tratrix, denying all substantive allegations, and pleading negligence on the part of the minors’ parents. On Oct. 16, 1957, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the petition for failure to comply with the provisions of the Probate Code (sections 473.-360, 473.363 and 473.367, Mo.Cum.Supp. 1957, V.A.M.S.) by filing copies of the .summons and return in the probate court within nine months after the first publication of the Notice of Letters. Copies of the petition, summons and return were filed in the Probate Court of Jackson County on Nov. 18, 1957, more than 13 months after the first publication of Notice of Letters. The motion to dismiss was sustained after the introduction of evidence of a formal nature showing the facts of record in the Probate Court, largely as already ■stated. Thereafter, and on motion, the court set aside that order to permit further evidence, but again dismissed the petition on Dec. 26, 1957. This appeal followed that order. That evidence consisted of further probate files and records and the testimony of counsel for defendant (elicited over objections) that an insurance company was interested in the defense. No further facts whatever were. developed as to the insurance. The inventory of the 'estate listed personal property valued at :$125;. no claims had been filed against the estate; the public administrator had filed a petition for the issuance of letters, but the letters were issued to a sister, the defendant here. The attorneys who defend this case are also the attorneys for the estate. It is clear that neither a notice of the institution of this suit nor copies of the summons and return were filed in the Probate Court within nine months of the first publication. 'All statutory references herein are to the Mo.Cum.Supp.1957, unless otherwise stated.
The only question involved is the correctness of the dismissal, which was based upon the failure to file notice of the institution of the suit (section 473.360, subd. 2) or copies of the process and return of service (section 473.367) in the Probate Court within nine months after the first publication. We need not concern ourselves with any possible distinctions between these two requirements, for plaintiff filed neither. We first note the statutes involved; all emphasis used is ours. Section 473.367 provides that any action commenced against an executor or administrator “is considered a claim duly filed against the estate from the time of serving the original process on the executor or administrator and the filing of a copy of the process and return of service thereof in the prohate court.” Section 473.360 provides that all claims (with exceptions not important here) “ * * * whether due [or] 1 to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract or otherwise, which are not filed in the probate court within nine months after the first published notice of letters * * * are forever barred against the estate, the executor or administrator, the heirs, devisees and legatees. * * * ” Paragraph 2 of the last mentioned section expressly provides that “All actions against the estate of a deceased person, pending or filed under sections 473.363 or 473.367, shall abate or shall he barred unless notice of the revival or institution thereof is filed in the probate court within nine months after the first published notice of letters.” Section 473.367 has already been digested, supra; section 473.363 provides that a pending action becomes a claim against a decedent’s estate when it is revived “and notice of the revival is filed in the probate court.” Section 473.360, subd. 4 is as follows: “Nothing in this section affects or prevents any action or proceeding to enforce any mortgage, pledge or other lien upon property of the estate, except that attachment, judgment and execution liens shall be enforced as provided in this law and not otherwise.” Section 473.370 is as [673]*673follows: “Establishment of claim by judgment — judgment deemed filed, when.- — 1. A person having a claim against an estate may establish the same by the judgment or decree of some court of record other than a magistrate court, in the ordinary course of proceeding, upon filing a copy of the judgment or decree in the probate court. Copies of unsatisfied judgments or decrees of any court rendered in the lifetime of the decedent shall also be filed in the probate court.
“2. Except where notice of revival of an action or of institution of an action is filed as required by section 473.363 or 473.367, any judgment or decree is deemed filed within the meaning of section 473.360 as of the time a copy of the judgment or decree is filed in the probate court as required by this section.”
It should first be noted that these statutes are considerably more far reaching than the previous non-claim statutes, sections 464.020^-64.070 RSMo 1949, V.A.M. S.; for instance, the prior statutes contained saving provisions to infants, persons of unsound mind and persons imprisoned; there was no requirement of the filing of notice of suit, and no such provision as the present section 473.360, subd. 2; also, section 473.360, subd. 1 is much more inclusive than section 464.020, its earlier counterpart. Indeed the very method of consummating a claim has been changed from an exhibiting and presenting to the filing. We may also observe that the new act has not attempted to impair the general jurisdiction of the circuit courts in actions against executors or administrators. Note, for instance, sections 473.367, 473.-363, 473.370, 473.373. These sections are simply a continuation of the statutory method of liquidating claims in the circuit courts, but subject to specific limitations. Taking these statutes at their face value, they bar (or abate) all claims, whether filed in the probate court or instituted in the circuit court, unless the claim or the required notice of stdt or copies of the process and rettirn are timely filed in the pro-bate court. We have very recently held in the case of North v. Hawkinson, Mo., 324 S.W.2d 733, that an action in equity for an accounting and a money judgment was barred and properly dismissed, where filed more than nine months after the first publication of notice of letters. There is much in the two opinions in that case which is applicable here. It seems obvious that unless there is some exception not apparent on the face of these statutes, the present suit is barred and was properly dismissed.
The various theories briefed by the appellant may fairly be stated as follows : that the assets of this estate are insignificant, the estate is insolvent, and that the non-claim statutes should be broadly construed as ' applicable only to suits in which a judgment would be satisfied out of the assets of the estate, as it could not be here; that the liability insurance constitutes a “special trust fund” for the payment of plaintiff’s damages, that no assets will be impaired, and that the administra-trix is a mere formal party, necessary, however, for the institution and maintenance of the suit and “to enforce payment” from the insurer; also, that the administratrix has waived “notice of suit.” The evidence elicited here concerning insurance was most incomplete; at best, it merely indicated that a named insurer was “interested” and that defense counsel represented it, “together with the defendant * * We note here our statutes, sections 379.195 and 379.200 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.; the first provides, in substance, that on any policy of liability insurance, the liability upon the occurrence of loss “if liability there be, shall become absolute * * that the payment of the insurance shall not depend upon the payment of a judgment by the insured, and that the coverage may not be cancelled after a loss. Section 379.200 provides, in substance, that “upon the recovery of a final judgment” against an insured (including administrators or executors), and after the lapse of thirty days, the judgment creditor may proceed in equi[674]*674ty to have the insurance proceeds applied to satisfy the judgment. Since plaintiff has demonstrated no facts concerning the insurance coverage, we may assume that the policy contains the almost universal “no action” clause foreclosing all obligation to pay until after a final judgment. Cotton v. Iowa Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 363 Mo. 400, 251 S.W.2d 246. A final judgment against the insured is a prerequisite to the enforcement of the liability of the insurer. State ex rel. Anderson v. Dinwiddie, en banc, 359 Mo. 980, 224 S.W.2d 985 (construing the same insurance statutes); Haines v. Harrison, 357 Mo. 956, 211 S.W. 2d 489.
Until 1947 a cause of action for wrongful death abated upon the death of the tort-feasor unless action had previously been filed. Haines v. Harrison, supra, where the cause was held to have, abated both as to the tort-feasor and his insurer; and see Heil v. Rule, 327 Mo. 84, 34 S.W. 2d 90. See, also, 2 Laws 1947, p. 225, and as since amended in 1949 and 1955 to the present form of section 537.020, Cum.Supp. 1957, V.A.M.S.; Walker v. Ross, Mo.App., 71 S.W.2d 124. By virtue of the 1949 amendment (Laws 1949, p. 633-634) the appointment of an administrator was permitted upon the application of “any person interested in such right of action for death * * *.» since the enactment of these statutes, the executor or administrator of a deceased tort-feasor is the one and only defendant in an action such as this. This is not a suit on an insurance policy, but a tort action for death. Our courts have repeatedly held the view that the presence or absence of insurance coverage does not change the nature of an action or its issues. Nor is this a suit to trace and recover trust property or assets, as were certain of the cases cited by appellant. Cunningham v. Kinnerk, 230 Mo.App. 749, 74 S.W.2d 1107; Bond v. Unsell, Mo.App., 72 S.W.2d 871. In such cases the subject matter is generally held not properly included in the administration proceedings. And see the specific exception concerning the enforcement of liens in section 473.360, subd. 4. The cited cases concerning the enforcement of liens and secured claims are inapplicable here.
Some analogy may be found in those cases where it has been claimed that the coverage of the defendant by liability insurance should permit a recovery where the defendant would otherwise be immune. Baker v. Baker, 364 Mo. 453, 263 S.W.2d 29 (suit by infant against her father) ; Dille v. St. Luke’s Hospital, 355 Mo. 436, 196 S.W.2d 615 (suit against a charitable hospital). Our courts have consistently denied recoveries sought upon that ground. In Stedem v. Jewish Memorial Hospital Association, 239 Mo.App. 38, 187 S.W.2d 469, the court had before it the predecessor sections of our sections 379.195 and 379.200, with the argument that a recovery would not deplete the funds and assets of the defendant because of the existence of insurance. The court held that the liability of defendant was not to be increased, nor its immunity vacated, by reason of the insurance. The court said in conclusion, 187 S.W.2d loe. cit. 473: “* * * our Supreme Court does not recognize the rule of qualified liability.” The case of Miller v. Collins, 328 Mo. 313, 40 S.W.2d 1062, cited by appellant, is distinguishable. It involved an adjudication in bankruptcy after judgment, and while the case was pending on appeal. The judgment was affirmed on the merits and the statutory requirement of a judgment was met. A stay of execution against the defendant was ordered because of the bankruptcy. Incidentally, the court recognized (40 S.W.2d loe. cit. 1065) that the status of a liability insurer was, in effect, “that of a guarantor, * * * of liability determined and predicated on a judgment.”
Appellant urges upon us various rules of construction of statutes. The purport of these and of the cited cases is, generally, that all provisions of a statute or of related statutes should be harmonized, that the meaning of words may be broadened or restricted if necessary, and that the ultimate [675]*675object is to ascertain the true legislative intent and the rational meaning and object of the act. Pursuing this course, counsel urge that the trial court construed the non-claim statutes too narrowly, that such a literal interpretation is not consistent with their entire purpose and policy, and that a broad and proper construction would hold them inapplicable where, as here, the assets of an estate will not be depleted or the heirs and legatees affected; also, that the filing of the notice of suit would have been a “futile” thing, because the administratrix had already been served, and that to apply the statutes here would be wholly unreasonable. We do not question the soundness of the suggested rules of construction where properly applicable. They are not so applicable here as to be in any way controlling. There is no ambiguity in these statutes which permits the existence of liability insurance or the fact that the estate was valued at $125 to work a rejection of the plain terms of the statutes. We may not rewrite these statutes. The materiality of the insurance does not arise until there has been a valid judgment against the administratrix and there can be none on these facts.
It may be pertinent here to note that non-claim statutes, even under our former act, were held to be mandatory and in effect jurisdictional. Harrison Machine Works v. Aufderheide, 222 Mo.App. 474, 280 S.W. 711; Montelius & Fuller v. Sarpy, 11 Mo. 237; Zuckerman v. McCulley, 8 Cir., 170 F.2d 1015; Beekman v. Richardson, 150 Mo. 430, 51 S.W. 689; Curtis v. LaForce, Mo.App., 29 S.W.2d 191; Helliker v. Bram, Mo., 277 S.W.2d 556, 561. Our courts have applied the non-claim bar, to the exclusion of the general statutes of limitation, to actions of substantially all types, except to those for the recovery of specific property never properly in an estate, or for the enforcement of specific liens or trusts. There has been much discussion in the briefs of the Helliker case, supra. The court there definitely held that tort actions against the estates of deceased tort-feasors were subject to the non-claim provisions of the old Probate Code, and that a suit filed more than one year after the issuance of letters was properly dismissed. Much is made of the parenthetical assertion there that the judgment would be “a debt payable out of the assets of the estate” ; the opinion does not indicate, whether insurance was or was not present in that case, but that point was not made an issue. We do not construe the statement just quoted as controlling in that decision. The ultimate holding was and is that a judgment against an executor or administrator in a tort action is “subject to the same limitations as any other form of demand allowable against the estate. Such a construction is permissible in view of the broad and all-inclusive language contained in Chapter 464, and is in accord with the public interest which is promoted by the prompt settlement of the estates of deceased persons.” We note also that although there may be liability insurance, an estate would always be subject to a contingent liability upon a tort judgment, which liability might arise upon the insolvency of the insurer or because of the unenforcibility of the policy for violation of its provisions, or otherwise. The mere existence of insurance is not always a complete exoneration of the estate and its assets and heirs. If the courts should presume to say, as we are asked to do here, that the assets of an estate valued at $125 should be disregarded and a recovery permitted directly against the insurance, — then what, — may we ask — should we rule on an estate valued at $500, $1,000, $2,500 or $5,000, under otherwise similar circumstances? Where could one possibly draw the line, looking merely at the practical side of the question? The rulings sought here might well introduce a measure of chaos into the administration of estates (and the decisions of the courts), dependent to an extent upon the existence of liability insurance and the running of the five-year tort statute of limitations or the one-year death limitation, with all the contingencies engendered by these factors. We cannot rewrite the law for one particular set [676]*676of facts and circumstances, though the result may be harsh (Frazee v. Partney, Mo., 314 S.W.2d 915), as admittedly it is here. There is an ever present temptation to let “bad cases make bad law,” which must sometimes be resisted.
Somewhat out of context we note here the contention that section 473.370 gives the right to establish a claim by judgment “in the ordinary course of proceeding, upon filing a copy of the judgment or decree in the probate court.” Counsel say that in the ordinary course no judgment could be obtained and filed within nine months; that may often be true as to a suit instituted after the death, but the section' applies as well to judgments in suits previously instituted, and it also comprehends judgments rendered in the lifetime of decedent. Paragraph 2 of the section clearly demonstrates that a judgment only becomes a valid claim as of the time of its filing in the probate court, unless notice of the institution or revival of the suit (as required by section 473.367 and section 473.363) is filed within 9 months, in which event it relates back and becomes a claim from the time of the filing of notice (actually, copies of the process and service under section 473.-367). When section 473.370 is thus considered as a whole, it does not in any way detract from the requirement of the filing of notice as specifically required in the other sections, nor is it inconsistent with those sections. It merely preserves the concurrent jurisdiction of the circuit courts, subject to an additional and new condition, that of the filing of notice (or copies) in the probate court.
More than a century ago our court ruled in Montelius & Fuller v. Sarpy, 11 Mo. 237, 238, that where one had admittedly lost his right to a judgment in assumpsit against the estate of a decedent by reason of the three-year non-claim statute, he would not be allowed to proceed to a judgment as “the foundation of a collateral proceeding against persons who have become Chou-teau’s voluntary or fraudulent alienees in his life-time.” The court also said there, loe. cit. 241-242: “ * * * If a party, by his laches, loses his right to a judgment, he necessarily loses all contingent or collateral benefits which he might have derived from such judgment. And the question at last returns, is the statute a bar to the action? The object which the plaintiff may have in view when he institutes a suit, is of no consequence. If a bar to his recovery is presented, he cannot remove it by disclaiming any wish to use the desired judgment against the defendant. The construction of the statute of limitations must be uniform; the statute cannot be enforced or waived, according to the purposes of the suitor.” Under a statute similar to ours, the Arkansas Supreme Court strictly enforced a requirement of the filing of notice of a circuit court tort suit. Turner v. Meek, 225 Ark. 744, 284 S.W.2d 848.
It is also insisted that the adminis-tratrix has waived the requirement of filing notice, especially since section 472.130 permits a waiver in writing of notice by any person legally competent, including administrators. Pursuing the subject, counsel urge that the “tacit admissions” in defendant’s answer constituted such a waiver. The only admissions we find are of the appointments of the guardian and the administrator. We have long had a statute providing that an executor or administrator might, in writing, waive the service of a notice of demand and presentation. Section 464.190 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. The present section was enacted in 1957 (Laws 1957, p. 835, effective June 12, 1957). It is at least doubtful if the answer here would constitute a waiver even were the notice one which might be waived; but we construe section 472.130 as inapplicable to the notice required here. The statutory notice (section 473.360, subd. 2) or copies of process and service (section 473.367) were specifically required to be filed "in the prohate court,” not merely to be served on the administrator. It is a notice in an in rem proceeding, intended to afford protection as well as notice, to all interested parties and to the Probate Court. The burden of filing [677]*677the notice is upon the plaintiff, not upon the administrator. Moreover, the general statutes require service of process on the administrator, as on any other defendant, and the filing of an answer by him. If these steps constituted the required notice or a waiver of notice, then the carefully selected provisions of the present notice requirements were wholly pointless. In other words, if the filed notice was merely another notice to the administrator, there would be absolutely no point in thus giving him, or her, two notices of the suit. It is thus seen that there is an additional purpose in and reason for the filed notice. Even under the old law, which required the exhibition and filing of claims, our courts were strict in forbidding any waiver by an administrator of the time of filing claims. Harrison Machine Works v. Aufderheide, 222 Mo.App. 474, 280 S.W. 711, and cases there cited. This has some bearing, by analogy, upon the right of the administrator to waive the positive requirements of our present statutes. In the recent Arkansas case of Turner v. Meek, 225 Ark. 744, 284 S.W.2d 848, at loc. cit. 849, 850 the court said, in answer to a similar contention of waiver (adopting in part language of the trial court): “ ‘The Legislature, in enacting the remedy under Section 62-2602, seems to have had in mind that where an estate is sued some notice thereof in writing should be filed with the probate court having jurisdiction over the estate. A copy of the complaint may be filed, or, in lieu thereof, a signed statement giving all of the details ordinarily found in a complaint, may be filed. In the face of such language it is believed that if actual notice, such as the personal representative always has by service upon him of summons, were intended to suffice under this statute, that the Legislature would have so said if they wished the court to so hold.’ * * * The amended statute clearly placed the additional duty on the plaintiffs, and not upon the executor, to file either a copy of the complaint or a statement of tlie nature of the action, etc., with the probate court prior to November 27, 1952, and this was not done. In making proper determinations and orders relative to claims, family allowance, dower, etc., at the termination of the six-months period on November 27, 1952, the probate court was entitled to rely upon the statute, which was not complied with by the mere service of process on defendant in this action. * * * ” Appellant has not urged estoppel, as distinguished from waiver, but in the Harrison case, supra (280 S.W. 711, 712) it was also held that the administratrix could not, by her agreement with a claimant, estop herself from insisting upon the enforcement of the non-claim statute. We find no acts or representations of the defendant here which could legally induce plaintiff to believe that the filing of the notice was unnecessary, even if the administratrix had the authority so to act. She filed a more or less formal answer, long before the expiration of the nine-month period, and shortly after its expiration she filed her motion to dismiss. We should not lose sight of the fact that the basic purpose of the requirement of the filing of this notice is that all parties interested in an in rem proceeding, as well as the probate court, might be advised of record of all such matters affecting their interests. We rule that the requirement of the statutes was not waived, nor was there any estoppel.
We have decided to refer to one point not briefed, but directly involved, because of its importance to the Bar generally, having in mind also the possibility of remedial legislation, if such should be deemed advisable. We have ruled that ordinary tort actions are barred by a failure to comply with the non-claim statutes. The remaining question is: does the fact that this is a wrongful death action, generally governed by its own period of limitations (section 537.100 RSMo 1949, V.A. M.S.) require a different ruling? We have determined that it does not. It has sometimes been said that the limitation period of the death act is part of a substantive, new right granted by statute, and that upon [678]*678the expiration of one year from the accrual . of the cause of action, the right itself is gone. Barker v. Hannibal & St. Joseph Ry. Co., 91 Mo. 86, 14 S.W. 280; Baysinger v. Hanser, 355 Mo. 1042, 199 S.W.2d 644. But the contrary view, that the provision is a mere statute of limitation and repose, seems also to have been announced. Cytron v. St. Louis Transit Co., en Banc, 205 Mo. 692, 104 S.W. 109; Wentz v. Price Candy Co., 352 Mo. 1, 175 S.W.2d 852. As said recently in Frazee v. Partney, Mo., 314 :S.W.2d 915, 918, “* * * perhaps, for practical purposes, the distinction is more academic than real.” But as indicated ■there, the limitation of the death act is at least a special statute of limitations, now ■carrying certain tolling provisions of its •own; but the exceptions and tolling provisions of the general statutes are wholly inapplicable. When our courts have thus •spoken of “substantive rights” under the ■death act, they have ordinarily been saying, in effect, that the period of limitation provided in that act could not be extended by applying other statutory provisions or by construction. Baysinger v. Hanser, 355 Mo. 1042, 199 S.W.2d 644; Barker v. Hannibal & St. Joseph Ry. Co., 91 Mo. 86, 14 :S.W. 280; Clark v. Kansas City, St. Louis & C. R. Co., 219 Mo. 524, 118 S.W. 40; Chandler v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 251 Mo. 392, 158 S.W. 35. That is not the question which we have here. In Moore v. Stephens, 264 Ala. 86, 84 So.2d 752, a death action was held to be barred by the Alabama non-claim statutes, but the court did not discuss the distinction between death actions and ordinary tort actions.
Under our former Probate Code (sections 464.070 and 464.020, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.) all actions against an executor or administrator in which process was not served within one year from the first publication of notice of letters were presumably barred as claims against the estate. If at that time (and after the survival act was enacted) a tort-feasor was injured and died immediately, but the innocently injured party lingered for six months and then died, the period for action by the latter’s administrator against the tort-feasor’s estate (normally one year from his own death) might have been cut down to a period well under one year by the running of the one-year non-claim statute, beginning from the first publication of notice of letters. At least, we might have had the same problem under the old statutes, and the shortening of the one-year limitation for death actions is not an entirely novel thing.
We have previously noted that a cause of action for death did not survive the death of the tort-feasor .until 1947 (Laws 1947, Vol. 2, p. 225) unless suit had been filed. See Mennemeyer v. Hart, 359 Mo. 423, 221 S.W.2d 960. -The 1947 Act, amended in 1949 and again in 1955, is now part of section 537.020. In Mennemeyer, supra, it was held that this survival act created a substantive right; it has become a part of the chapter which now incorporates the death act. By the present section any party interested in a right of action for death may apply for the appointment of a personal representative for the alleged tort-feasor. Actually, the present right of action arises out of a combination of the original death act and the survival act. The legislature has provided that the suit be brought against the personal representative and has given to interested parties the right to procure such an appointment. It has now enacted all-inclusive non-claim statutes fixing certain limitations and conditions upon the maintenance of all suits which shall constitute valid claims against an estate. It might be said that the very right to sue the personal representative of a tort-feasor for wrongful death stems from the survival statute of 1947, and not from the original death act. In an old Alabama case, Fretwell v. McLemore, 52 Ala. 124, in speaking of the non-claim statutes and the attendant survival of actions, the court said: “ * * * It cannot be denied that as the causes which would survive against a personal representative were enlarged, they fell within the operation of the statute, and if not presented within the period [679]*679prescribed, they are barred.” But be that as it may, the legislature had the right and the power to prescribe the time within which, and the conditions under which, all such suits against estates could be prosecuted. It has used wording such as: “all claims * * * due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unli-quidated, founded on contract or otherwise, which are not filed in the probate court within nine months * * * are forever barred * * * ” (Section 473.360, subd. 1); “all actions * * * shall be barred unless notice of the * * * institution thereof is filed in the probate court within nine months * * * ” (Section 473.360, subd. 2); “Any action * * * is considered a claim duly filed * * * from the time of serving the original process * * * and the filing * * * in the probate court.” (Section 473.367). This language can leave no doubt as to the effectiveness of the provisions here. It makes no exceptions and its provisions are mandatory. In view of the all-pervading terms of these non-claim statutes we hold that they bar a suit for death against the estate of a deceased tort-feasor unless the conditions there imposed are complied with.
In considering the legislative intent, we note that at the 1957 session section 507.100 was amended so as to change the period permitted for the substitution of parties and revival of a pending suit, upon the death of the defendant, from “one year after notice of death is filed * * *,” to “nine months after the first published notice of letters * * *.” Likewise, section 516.240 permitting a new action after the death of a defendant (where the cause of action survived) was amended so as to change the time permitted therefor from “one year after letters * * * granted,” to “nine months after the first published notice of letters * * *.” (See Laws 1957, pp. 293-294.) These amendments were obviously made in order to conform to the reduced periods permitted by the new non-claim statutes and, to a very substantial extent, they show an intent on the part of the legislature to require conformance thereto ini all civil actions. And we note again the-omission of all saving clauses, as contained; in the non-claim provisions of the former-Probate Code.
There is no doubt of the legislative power to shorten the time for filing death actions as well as any and all other actions; it granted that right initially, provided later for its survival against a deceased tort-feasor’s estate, and it may condition or limit the right as it sees fit. We find no intent to exclude death actions from the operation: of the non-claim statutes. If the legislative intent is otherwise the statutes may be amended to express it. Incongruities may result, such as the division of the period of nine months between a widow and the surviving minor children, but we may not legislate here, and that question is not immediately involved. There have always been potential inconsistencies, as noted above. If the limitation of the death act and the non-claim statutes are regarded as conflicting special statutes of limitation dealing with the same subject matter, the non-claim statutes, being the last enacted, would control. State ex rel. Armontrout v. Smith, en Banc, 353 Mo. 486, 182 S.W.2d 571, 574;. Collins v. Twellman, 344 Mo. 330, 126 S.W. 2d 231, 233. In any event, we regard them: as controlling here.
The judgment of dismissal will be affirmed. It is so ordered.
All concur, except STORCKMAN, J., who dissents in opinion filed.