GOODWIN, J.
A prisoner serving an enhanced sentence as a habitual criminal appeals from a judgment which denied postconviction relief. The court sustained a demurrer to a petition alleging that the Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas convictions which the sentencing court had considered in applying the Oregon recidivist law were invalid because of denial of counsel and other constitutional defects.
As a preliminary question, we must decide whether the prisoner has lost his right to challenge his foreign convictions by not raising his questions at the hearing in which he was found to be a habitual criminal.
When the prisoner appeared for resentencing under ORS 168.015 to 168.085, he did not see fit to challenge any of his foreign convictions. Five foreign convictions were alleged against him, and he admitted that he had been convicted in each of the cases. He was represented by counsel at the time of the hearing, and counsel raised no question concerning alleged constitutional deficiencies. The state now argues that by failing to raise the constitutional questions at the time of his sentencing under ORS 168.085 and by failing to appeal he waived his right to raise these questions at a later time. While it would have been better procedure to have made a timely objection in the court which was considering the prisoner’s status as a habitual criminal instead of bringing these new proceedings before another circuit court, the question of waiver is controlled by statute.
[633]*633The only statutory provision concerning a waiver of defenses to former convictions is the following:
ORS 168.075. “Unless the proof shows the exception of a former conviction under subsection (1) or (4) of OES 168.015, the defendant waives the exception by failure to claim it at the hearing on the allegations of the information.”
The two subsections referred to provide:
ORS 168.015. “(1) ‘Conviction’ means an adjudication of guilt upon a’ plea, verdict or finding in a criminal proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction, but ‘conviction’ does not include an adjudication which has been expunged by pardon, reversed, set aside or otherwise rendered nugatory.
“ (4) Except under OES 166.230 and 167.050, a conviction is not a ‘former conviction of a felony’ if:
“(a) The offense was committed when the defendant was under 16 years of age;
“(b) That conviction was rendered after the commission of the principal felony;
“(c) It is the defendant’s most recent conviction described in subsection (3) of this section, and the defendant was finally and unconditionally discharged from all resulting imprisonment, probation or parole more than seven years before the commission of the principal felony; or
“(d) That conviction was by court-martial of an offense denounced only by military law and triable only by court-martial.”
The statutory language relevant to this case is that of the definition of a “conviction” which excludes “an adjudication which has been expunged by pardon, reversed, set aside, or otherwise rendered nugatory.” [634]*634The prisoner would have us construe the words “or otherwise rendered nugatory” as meaning “or otherwise adjudicated to be nugatory.” The state apparently would have us read the words as meaning “or otherwise deemed nugatory.”
Difficulty of the kind created by the ambiguity in our statute has been obviated in New York by a specific amendment in 1964, which reads:
“* * * provided however, that no previous conviction in this or any other state shall be utilized as a predicate for multiple offender treatment pursuant to * * * this article if such conviction was obtained in violation of the rights of the person accused under the applicable provisions of the constitution of the United States.
“An objection that a previous conviction was unconstitutionally obtained may be raised at this time and the court shall so inform the person accused. Such an objection shall be entered in the record and shall be determined by the court, without empanelling a jury. The failure of the person accused to challenge the previous conviction in the manner provided herein shall constitute a waiver on his part of any allegation of unconstitutionality .unless good cause be shown for his failure to make timely challenge * * *.” N Y Sess Laws 1964, ch 446, § 1.
Until our Legislative Assembly provides such clear statutory direction as has been provided in New York, we construe our present statutory language “or otherwise rendered nugatory,” in light of the terms “has been” “expunged,” “reversed,” and “set aside,” as requiring an accomplished act to relieve the prisoner of the unconstitutional judgment. The alternative would be to disregard the words “has been,” and hold that the mere failure of the prisoner to challenge a [635]*635former conviction on grounds other than those spelled out in OES 168.015 (1) and (4) is itself a waiver of the right to raise such questions. Since such an intent could have been expressed in a very few words, and was not, we do not believe such an intent can be inferred. Our construction of the statutory language is fortified by the fact that our Legislative Assembly has provided elsewhere in the code a comprehensive postconviction remedy which, on its face, appears to apply to the kind of problem now before us.
Under ORS 138.510(1)
The language of ORS 138.510 restricting post-conviction relief to persons “convicted of a crime under the laws of this state” likewise does not bar this prisoner. The principal conviction which started the chain [636]*636of events leading to the present sentence was an Oregon conviction for burglary. This is a conviction within the meaning of ORS 138.510 (1). While the principal conviction is not being challenged on the issue of guilt or innocence, the sentence ultimately entered as the result thereof is being challenged. Subsection (c) of ORS 138.530 (1) specifically makes the nnconstitntionality of a sentence a ground for post-conviction relief.
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GOODWIN, J.
A prisoner serving an enhanced sentence as a habitual criminal appeals from a judgment which denied postconviction relief. The court sustained a demurrer to a petition alleging that the Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas convictions which the sentencing court had considered in applying the Oregon recidivist law were invalid because of denial of counsel and other constitutional defects.
As a preliminary question, we must decide whether the prisoner has lost his right to challenge his foreign convictions by not raising his questions at the hearing in which he was found to be a habitual criminal.
When the prisoner appeared for resentencing under ORS 168.015 to 168.085, he did not see fit to challenge any of his foreign convictions. Five foreign convictions were alleged against him, and he admitted that he had been convicted in each of the cases. He was represented by counsel at the time of the hearing, and counsel raised no question concerning alleged constitutional deficiencies. The state now argues that by failing to raise the constitutional questions at the time of his sentencing under ORS 168.085 and by failing to appeal he waived his right to raise these questions at a later time. While it would have been better procedure to have made a timely objection in the court which was considering the prisoner’s status as a habitual criminal instead of bringing these new proceedings before another circuit court, the question of waiver is controlled by statute.
[633]*633The only statutory provision concerning a waiver of defenses to former convictions is the following:
ORS 168.075. “Unless the proof shows the exception of a former conviction under subsection (1) or (4) of OES 168.015, the defendant waives the exception by failure to claim it at the hearing on the allegations of the information.”
The two subsections referred to provide:
ORS 168.015. “(1) ‘Conviction’ means an adjudication of guilt upon a’ plea, verdict or finding in a criminal proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction, but ‘conviction’ does not include an adjudication which has been expunged by pardon, reversed, set aside or otherwise rendered nugatory.
“ (4) Except under OES 166.230 and 167.050, a conviction is not a ‘former conviction of a felony’ if:
“(a) The offense was committed when the defendant was under 16 years of age;
“(b) That conviction was rendered after the commission of the principal felony;
“(c) It is the defendant’s most recent conviction described in subsection (3) of this section, and the defendant was finally and unconditionally discharged from all resulting imprisonment, probation or parole more than seven years before the commission of the principal felony; or
“(d) That conviction was by court-martial of an offense denounced only by military law and triable only by court-martial.”
The statutory language relevant to this case is that of the definition of a “conviction” which excludes “an adjudication which has been expunged by pardon, reversed, set aside, or otherwise rendered nugatory.” [634]*634The prisoner would have us construe the words “or otherwise rendered nugatory” as meaning “or otherwise adjudicated to be nugatory.” The state apparently would have us read the words as meaning “or otherwise deemed nugatory.”
Difficulty of the kind created by the ambiguity in our statute has been obviated in New York by a specific amendment in 1964, which reads:
“* * * provided however, that no previous conviction in this or any other state shall be utilized as a predicate for multiple offender treatment pursuant to * * * this article if such conviction was obtained in violation of the rights of the person accused under the applicable provisions of the constitution of the United States.
“An objection that a previous conviction was unconstitutionally obtained may be raised at this time and the court shall so inform the person accused. Such an objection shall be entered in the record and shall be determined by the court, without empanelling a jury. The failure of the person accused to challenge the previous conviction in the manner provided herein shall constitute a waiver on his part of any allegation of unconstitutionality .unless good cause be shown for his failure to make timely challenge * * *.” N Y Sess Laws 1964, ch 446, § 1.
Until our Legislative Assembly provides such clear statutory direction as has been provided in New York, we construe our present statutory language “or otherwise rendered nugatory,” in light of the terms “has been” “expunged,” “reversed,” and “set aside,” as requiring an accomplished act to relieve the prisoner of the unconstitutional judgment. The alternative would be to disregard the words “has been,” and hold that the mere failure of the prisoner to challenge a [635]*635former conviction on grounds other than those spelled out in OES 168.015 (1) and (4) is itself a waiver of the right to raise such questions. Since such an intent could have been expressed in a very few words, and was not, we do not believe such an intent can be inferred. Our construction of the statutory language is fortified by the fact that our Legislative Assembly has provided elsewhere in the code a comprehensive postconviction remedy which, on its face, appears to apply to the kind of problem now before us.
Under ORS 138.510(1)
The language of ORS 138.510 restricting post-conviction relief to persons “convicted of a crime under the laws of this state” likewise does not bar this prisoner. The principal conviction which started the chain [636]*636of events leading to the present sentence was an Oregon conviction for burglary. This is a conviction within the meaning of ORS 138.510 (1). While the principal conviction is not being challenged on the issue of guilt or innocence, the sentence ultimately entered as the result thereof is being challenged. Subsection (c) of ORS 138.530 (1) specifically makes the nnconstitntionality of a sentence a ground for post-conviction relief.
While the Oregon postconviction statute does not, in so many words, say that the unconstitutionality of foreign judgments can be reached in proceedings brought under the statute, there is no reason for denying relief when such judgments are 'by Oregon law allowed to affect Oregon sentences. See Collins and Neil, The Oregon Postconviction Hearing Act, 39 Or L Rev 337, 345 (1960). In Minnesota, where there was no postconvietion statute, the court reached the same result by shaping habeas corpus to fit the situation. See State ex rel Holm v. Tahash, 272 Minn 466, 139 NW2d 161 (1965).
The next question is whether the courts of this state should entertain collateral attacks upon the judgments of conviction entered in the courts of other states, and if so the extent to which such judgments may be re-examined. As noted, New York has settled the question by statute.
The full-faith-and-credit clause of Article IV, § 1, of the United States Constitution is not offended by a properly limited collateral attack. No state is required to take notice of foreign convictions in sentencing those who violate its own criminal laws. Each state is free to give foreign convictions such force as it deems proper in the administration of local sen[637]*637tencing policy. The courts of each state must determine which convictions meet constitutional standards in carrying out the legislative policy of their own recidivist laws. Thus, while a challenge to a foreign conviction in a local sentencing proceeding may take the form of a collateral attack, there is no constitutional reason for disallowing such an attack. See, e.g., People v. Coffey, — Cal2d —, 430 P2d 15, 60 Cal Rptr 457 (1967); In re Woods, 64 Cal2d 3, 409 P2d 913, 48 Cal Rptr 689 (1966); State v. Dalrymple, 75 N Mex 514, 407 P2d 356 (1965); United States ex rel LaNear v. LaVallee, 306 F2d 417 (2d Cir 1962). See also cases noted in Norton, Gideon and the Habitual Criminal Statutes, 6 Washburn L J 24 (1966).
An Oregon convict, therefore, may, when charged under ORS 168.055 with being a habitual criminal, allege constitutional defects and thereby call into question one or more of his prior convictions.
If his allegations meet Oregon standards of legal sufficiency, and if his allegations are admitted or proven, the sentencing court will disregard the convictions thereby found to be constitutionally defective. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 US 448, 82 S Ct 501, 7 L Ed 2d 446 (1962).
There is no reason for treating a foreign conviction differently than an Oregon conviction in carrying out Oregon sentencing policies. The substantive question in either case is whether the former conviction being called into question is one that ought to be considered as a part of the criminal history of the prisoner for our own sentencing purposes.
Some courts have taken the position that a state which chooses to employ foreign convictions as part of its sentencing scheme should be prepared in every [638]*638ease to support the constitutionality of the foreign convictions against any challenge that might be asserted, regardless of the character of the alleged defect, the difficulty of proof, or the hazards of relying upon faulty memories. See United States ex rel Savini v. Jackson, 250 F2d 349 (2d Cir 1957). We do not believe that it is necessary at this time to adopt so sweeping a rule.
For our own purposes in administering the Oregon recidivist laws, the courts of this state can distinguish between a foreign conviction in which the prisoner alleges defects that could be reached by collateral attack if it were an Oregon judgment and one in which he alleges some other constitutional irregularity which would not constitute grounds for post-conviction relief under OKS 138.510 to 138.670. See, e.g., Guse v. Gladden, 243 Or 406, 414 P2d 317 (1966).
We now turn to the prisoner’s allegations to determine whether, upon the warden’s demurrer, the petition states one or more grounds for relief which this court would recognize as legally sufficient if alleged against an Oregon conviction.
A denial of counsel at the trial is now recognized in state and federal courts as a constitutional defect that will render a conviction void, and it is one that can be asserted in a collateral attack long after the conviction has become final. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 335, 83 S Ct 792, 9 L Ed 2d 799, 93 ALR 2d 733 (1963). A denial of counsel will also invalidate a guilty plea, and this constitutional defect can be asserted in a collateral attack. Lawson v. Gladden, 245 Or 492, 422 P2d 681 (1967); United States ex rel Durocher v. LaVallee, 330 F2d 303 (2d Cir 1964). The question now before the court is whether the petitioner [639]*639has alleged a denial of counsel in connection with each of his five former convictions.
In the ease of his two Texas convictions, the prisoner alleges that police brutality, threats, promises, and illegal interrogation were employed against him before he entered a plea of guilty. His petition also reveals, however, that in each of his Texas convictions he pleaded guilty with an attorney at his side. He seeks to avoid the effect of his pleas of guilty by alleging the inadequacy of his counsel.
The courts of this state will not entertain a factual inquiry into the pretrial conduct of a foreign prosecution when the record reveals a guilty plea made with the advice of counsel. Any meritorious questions, about pretrial irregularities could and would have been disposed of if counsel was functioning at the time of the guilty plea.
An allegation of the ineffectiveness or inadequacy of counsel, when tested by demurrer in collateral proceedings in this state, must allege disloyalty, bad faith, or some other improper conduct amounting to a substantial denial of the assistance of counsel. See Benson v. Gladden, 242 Or 132, 140, 407 P2d 634 (1965); State v. Abel, 241 Or 465, 469, 406 P2d 902 (1965).
The allegations of denial of counsel in connection with the two Texas convictions are identical in each case: “* * * that said attorney did not converse with petitioner or investigate the facts for preparation of petitioner’s defense or advise petitioner as to the meaning of said charge, what elements comprised the charge or what acts amounted to being guilty thereof or any possible defense thereto or to plead not guilty for the purpose of having a jury trial on the merits sfc # $ JJ
[640]*640We hold that when challenged by demurrer the foregoing allegation states a substantial denial of counsel, and, if proven, would be such a denial of a constitutional right as would render an Oregon conviction void. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 US 506, 82 S Ct 884, 8 L Ed 2d 70 (1962); Lawson v. Gladden, 245 Or 492, 422 P2d 681 (1967). Accordingly, even though the Texas convictions appear to have been based upon a guilty plea entered with the advice of counsel, the complaint alleges a substantial denial of counsel and therefore states a cause of action. The demurrer should have been overruled.
The Oklahoma convictions present a variation of the problem of denial of counsel. The prisoner alleges that in each of his two Oklahoma convictions he was without counsel and that he pleaded guilty without ever being advised of his right to counsel. This allegation states a valid ground for relief. Lawson v. Gladden, supra.
The prisoner also alleges that in connection with one Oklahoma guilty plea he was further induced by the police to plead guilty in exchange for a two-day conjugal visit in the local jail. This latter allegation can be regarded as surplusage. If the prisoner was denied counsel, he was also denied an effective opportunity to present objections to pretrial police misconduct. The alleged denial of counsel, therefore, presents an assertion of fact sufficient, if true, to entitle the prisoner to relief.
In the Missouri conviction, which was also on a plea of guilty, the prisoner again alleges that he entered his plea without being advised that he could have an attorney, and that he was in fact without counsel. This allegation is likewise sufficient against [641]*641the warden’s demurrer. The prisoner also alleges bargaining with police and with other officials prior to entering his plea. We disregard these latter allegations of improprieties as surplusage. They tender questions that would undoubtedly have been disposed of in the state where they allegedly occurred had counsel been provided. Since the prisoner was without counsel, his conviction is bad for that reason and it is not necessary to speculate upon the remedial actions counsel might have taken.
The warden, by demurring to the complaint, does not deny the prisoner’s allegation that he was denied counsel in one or more of his Oklahoma and Missouri convictions. The availability of counsel is a question of fact in the two Texas convictions. If the prisoner can prove his allegations concerning his denial of counsel in any of the former convictions, his present sentence is based upon one or more unconstitutional convictions.
It necessarily follows that the demurrer should have been overruled and the cause should have been allowed to proceed to a factual determination upon the issues regarding denial of counsel.
Reversed and remanded.
ORS 138.540(1). “Except as otherwise provided in ORS 138.540, any person convicted of a crime under the laws of this state may file a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to ORS 138.510 to 138.680.”