Clara Paciulete v.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: May 27, 2026
• Docket: 26-1193
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

BLD-099 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 26-1193 ___________

IN RE: CLARA C. PACIULETE, Petitioner ____________________________________

On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States District Court for District of New Jersey (Related to Civ No. 1:25-cv-18043) ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. March 19, 2026 Before: KRAUSE, MATEY, and BOVE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: May 27, 2026) _________

OPINION * _________

PER CURIAM

Clara Paciulete has filed a petition for mandamus relief. For the reasons that

follow, we will deny the petition.

In November 2025, Paciulete filed a mandamus petition in the District Court. She

alleged that the Clerk of the District Court had refused to accept her motion for

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. emergency injunctive relief. She requested that the District Court order the Clerk to

docket her motion. That same day, the Clerk docketed her motion as received.

By order entered December 9, 2025, the District Court dismissed the writ of

mandamus without prejudice for failure to state a claim. The District Court

acknowledged that Paciulete’s emergency motion was styled as a complaint and asserted

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It then declared that it could not accept or address her

motion because she had not properly initiated the action by filing a complaint. Paciulete

did not file a notice of appeal.

In February 2026, Paciulete filed in this Court an “Emergency Petition for a Writ

of Habeas Corpus (28 U.S.C. § 2241) and a Writ of Mandamus (28 U.S.C. § 1361).” She

alleged an extensive conspiracy against her and her child since 2022 by several persons

and institutions including family members, law enforcement, courts, hospitals, and school

personnel. She sought habeas relief, mandamus relief, a restraining order, appointment of

counsel, a federal investigation, and sanctions.

Paciulete seeks habeas relief in the form of an injunction against any unlawful

detention, forced commitment, or removal of her child. A habeas petition must be filed

in the District Court in the first instance. See Fed. R. App. P. 22(a); Felker v. Turpin, 518

U.S. 651, 660-61 (1996) (explaining that Rule 22(a) “bar[s] consideration of original

habeas petitions in the courts of appeals”). Moreover, while Paciulete alleges that there

have been attempts to involuntarily commit her for psychiatric treatment, she does not

allege that she is currently in custody and is not entitled to habeas relief based on any 2 speculative future confinement. See Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690,

700 (3d Cir. 1996); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (providing that one seeking habeas relief must be

in custody).

As for mandamus relief, she requests that (1) the District Court vacate its

December 5, 2025 order and grant the emergency relief she had requested; (2) law

enforcement agencies cease responding to false 911 calls; (3) hospitals delete fraudulent

mental health reports; and (4) the school district conduct a proper interview of her child

and provide services required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).

She also seeks a restraining order enjoining a long list of persons and organizations.

In order to be entitled to the extraordinary remedy of mandamus relief, Paciulete

must show that she lacks adequate alternative means to obtain the relief she seeks, and

she carries the burden of showing that her right to relief is clear and undisputable. See

Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 309 (1989). A petition for a

writ of mandamus is not a substitute for an appeal. See In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 212

(3d Cir. 2006).

Paciulete has not made the showing required for mandamus relief. She has the

alternative means of challenging the school district’s action or inaction in the District

Court after exhausting her administrative remedies under the IDEA. See J.M. v. Summit

City Bd. of Educ., 39 F.4th 126, 139 (3d Cir. 2022). And Paciulete has not shown that

she has a clear and undisputable right to an order directing law enforcement to refuse to

respond to emergency calls, the deletion of hospital records, or the restraining order she 3 requests. Nor has she shown a clear right to the appointment of counsel. See Tabron v.

Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-57 (3d Cir. 1993) (describing factors to be considered in deciding

whether to appoint counsel).

While Paciulete requests sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, that statute

provides that an attorney who unreasonably multiplies a proceeding may be required to

pay the costs caused by such conduct. As Paciulete chose to not serve the respondents

with the mandamus petition and no attorneys have participated in the proceedings,

sanctions are not available under § 1927.

As for her request for a federal investigation, an individual has no federal right to

require the government to initiate criminal proceedings. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,

410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); see also United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 173-74 (3d

Cir. 1973) (Government is permitted some selectivity in its enforcement of criminal

laws).

Paciulete also requests that we order the District Court to vacate its order. As

noted above, a mandamus petition is not a substitute for an appeal. Moreover, Paciulete

has the alternative remedy of refiling her complaint in the District Court. If the filing is

otherwise compliant, 1 we are confident that the District Court Clerk will docket the

complaint and the District Court will address it. See McDowell v. Del. State Police, 88

1 According to the District Court docket, some of Paciulete’s submissions were not accepted for failure to meet the technical requirements for the Alternate Document Submission process. 4 F.3d 188, 191 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that District Court Clerk improperly refused to open

a proceeding when the plaintiff filed a “‘Motion for Compensation,’ which in substance,

if not form, appeared to be intended as a complaint”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d)(4)

(providing that “[t]he clerk must not refuse to file a paper solely because it is not in the

form prescribed by these rules or by a local rule or practice”); Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (explaining that pro se complaints are to be liberally

construed and held to less stringent standards than those drafted by lawyers).

For the above reasons, we will deny the petition for mandamus. To the extent

Paciulete has requested any other relief, it is denied.