Claim of Gaddis v. Board of Education, Central School District No. 1

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Claim of Gaddis v. Board of Education, Central School District No. 1

278 A.D. 1038, 106 N.Y.S.2d 915, 1951 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5619

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedSeptember 19, 1951

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 278 A.D. 1038 (Claim of Gaddis v. Board of Education, Central School District No. 1) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Claim of Gaddis v. Board of Education, Central School District No. 1, 278 A.D. 1038, 106 N.Y.S.2d 915, 1951 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5619 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1951).

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Opinion

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court made at a Rensselaer County Special Term. The order granted an application to serve a notice of a claim for personal injuries against defendant pursuant to section 50-e of the General Municipal Law on behalf of an infant. The claim is in tort. The notice of motion was served twelve days after the expiration of the statutory period of ninety days. The infant is under sixteen years of age. Under the facts shown we cannot say that the Special Term abused the discretion accorded it by the broad provisions of subdivision 5 of the aforesaid section of the statute. Order unanimously affirmed, with $10 costs. Present — Foster, P. J., Heffernan, Brewster, Bergan and Coon, JJ. [200 Mise. 44.]

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Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court made at a Rensselaer County Special Term. The order granted an application to serve a notice of a claim for personal injuries against defendant pursuant to section 50-e of the General Municipal Law on behalf of an infant. The claim is in tort. The notice of motion was served twelve days after the expiration of the statutory period of ninety days. The infant is under sixteen years of age. Under the facts shown we cannot say that the Special Term abused the discretion accorded it by the broad provisions of subdivision 5 of the aforesaid section of the statute. Order unanimously affirmed, with $10 costs. Present — Foster, P. J., Heffernan, Brewster, Bergan and Coon, JJ. [200 Mise. 44.]

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278 A.D. 1038, 106 N.Y.S.2d 915, 1951 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5619, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/claim-of-gaddis-v-board-of-education-central-school-district-no-1-nyappdiv-1951.

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