Claim of Fredenburg v. Empire United Railways, Inc.

168 A.D. 618, 154 N.Y.S. 351, 1915 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8975
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedJuly 1, 1915
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 168 A.D. 618 (Claim of Fredenburg v. Empire United Railways, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Claim of Fredenburg v. Empire United Railways, Inc., 168 A.D. 618, 154 N.Y.S. 351, 1915 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8975 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1915).

Opinion

Lyon, J.:

This is an appeal from awards made by the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. The facts are undisputed. The claimant at the time of receiving the injuries, November 7, 1914, was a motorman on a trolley express car of the defendant, and had been in its employ for seven years. He was injured while standing on top of the car, removing the trolley pole from its socket. One end of the trolley pole came in contact with the trolley wire while his right foot was against the socket, severely burning both hands and both feet, and less seriously injuring other portions of his body. These injuries necessitated the amputation of his right foot, and at least temporarily totally incapacitated him from using his left foot [620]*620or either hand. At the time of sustaining the injuries he had worked for one month and two days, Sundays excluded, as the motorman of the express car, receiving $3.50 for each day he worked. Prior to taking service as a motorman upon an express car he had worked for the defendant for some years as a motorman upon passenger cars, receiving thirty cents per hour for the time he worked. During the twelve months preceding taking service upon the express car, he had worked 343 days and had received $961.85. Each six months, the employees of the defendant were allowed to choose their runs in the order of seniority of service. When the claimant, who was the seventh on the list, came to make his choice, the express run seemed to him to be the most desirable of those left, and he chose that. Whether upon a new choosing at the end of six months, the express run might be chosen before it came his turn to make a choice, and he be compelled to return to a passenger run at thirty cents per hour, but with the opportunity of making overtime, was, of course, uncertain. Upon a hearing had before a Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner January 12, 1915, an award was made claimant for the loss of his foot; and upon a hearing had before Deputy Commissioners January 26, 1915, an award was made for injuries other than the loss of a foot.

The Commission by decision of date January 28, 1915, approved and confirmed said two awards and formally awarded the claimant compensation for the loss of his right foot for 205 weeks from November 21, 1914, at the rate of thirteen dollars and forty-six cents per week, which was two-thirds of his weekly wages, fixing his average weekly wages at twenty dollars and fourteen cents, or upon the basis of three dollars and fifty cents per day; and also awarded the claimant compensation of thirteen dollars and forty-six cents per week, for fourteen weeks, from November 21, 1914, ending February 27, 1915, for disability caused by injuries other than the injuries to and the amputation of his foot, and continued the case for further hearing. In its conclusions of fact upon which the awards were based, the Commission found that the injuries to his right foot and its amputation would have disabled him from working, had he received no other injuries, from November 7, [621]*6211914, until the date of the award; and that the remaining injuries, had he received no injuries to his right foot, would have disabled him from working from November 7, 1914, until the date of the award. The correctness of these findings cannot be questioned, nor, doubtless, could one that the disability caused by injuries other than the injuries to and the amputation of the right foot would continue until February 27, 1915.

We shall treat such as the conceded facts. The defendant makes no objection to the award of 205 weeks for the loss of the foot. It bases its appeal upon the claim that claimant’s average weekly wages should have been computed upon his earnings upon the passenger run rather than upon the express run; and that no award whatever should have been made in addition to the award of 205 weeks for the loss of his right foot.

As to the computation of claimant’s wages, section 14 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law (Consol. Laws, chap. 67; Laws of 1914, chap. 41) provided that, except as otherwise provided in that chapter, the average weekly wages of the injured employee at the time of the injury should be taken as the basis upon which to compute compensation or death benefits, and should be determined as follows: If the injured employee shall have worked in the employment in which he was working at the time of the accident during substantially the whole of the year immediately preceding his injury, his average annual earnings shall consist of three hundred times his average daily wage. If he shall not have so worked, his average annual earnings shall consist of three hundred times the average daily wage which an employee of the same class working substantially the whole of such immediately preceding year in the same or in a similar employment in the same or a neighboring place, shall have earned when so employed. If either of the foregoing methods of arriving at the annual average earnings cannot reasonably and fairly be applied, such annual earnings shall be such sum as, having regard to the previous earnings of the injured employee, and of other employees of the same or most similar class, shall reasonably represent the annual earning capacity of the injured employee in the employment in which he was working at the time of the accident.

The employment of the claimant as motorman on the [622]*622express car was assured for at least six months from the time he entered upon it, and there was a reasonable possibility of his continuing on that run. Although he had not worked as motorman on the express car for the year immediately preceding the accident, it appears from the affidavit of the secretary of the defendant that it was the custom of the defendant to pay an employee who had been in the service of the company as long as the claimant, thirty-five cents per hour upon a freight run. This tended to fix the average daily wage of a motorman in such employment prior to the time the claimant took that run, as well as to fix the average earnings of other employees in the same position. We think the finding of the Commission as to the average weekly wages of the claimant was fully warranted by the evidence.

As to the award of thirteen dollars and forty-six cents for injuries other than the loss of the right foot, consisting mainly of injuries to the hands, the claimant was given by the two awards, which ran concurrently, twenty-six dollars and ninety-two cents per week, or six dollars and seventy-three cents more than his average weekly earnings, the second award being, as stated in the brief of the Commission, for temporary total disability because of injuries sustained by the claimant other than those resulting in the loss of his foot.

Making the second award was, we think, plainly contrary to the intent of the Workmen’s Compensation Law. The purpose of that statute as expressed in the report of the legislative commission upon which it was mainly founded, was not to furnish full compensation “but a sum payable weekly, in general half wages, which we believe will keep him and those dependent on him out of absolute destitution.” (See First Report, 1910, p. 50.) While the Legislature has provided for more liberal treatment of the injured employee than that suggested in this report of the Wainwright Commission, there is nothing to be found in the act justifying the allowance of concurring compensation for temporary total disability when the employee is already receiving a weekly compensation of two-thirds of his average weekly wages, or full compensation for total disability.

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Bluebook (online)
168 A.D. 618, 154 N.Y.S. 351, 1915 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8975, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/claim-of-fredenburg-v-empire-united-railways-inc-nyappdiv-1915.