[421] LENT, J.
This case involves the construction and application only of a Clackamas County Zoning Ordinance (Ordinance) as it pertains to defendants’ mobile home. In 1975, Clackamas County filed suit to enjoin defendants’ use of their mobile home as a residence and to abate such use as a public nuisance pursuant to ORS 215.180 (1975) and 215.185 (1975).1 The trial court found that defendants’ use of their mobile home as a residence violated the Ordinance, declared it a public nuisance and ordered it enjoined and permanently abated. The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, by a divided court, reversed, Clackamas County v. Dunham et ux, 30 Or App 595,567 P2d 605 (1977), and held that defendants’ mobile home was an outright permitted use under the Ordinance. We allowed review to address an apparent inconsistency between this result and that reached in Clackamas County v. Ague, 27 Or App 515, 556 P2d Í386, S Ct rev den (1976).
The essential facts are undisputed. Prior to October [422]*4221, 1972, defendants owned a 8-acre parcel in eastern Clackamas County, which bore the zoning designation of "RR” (Recreational Residential). This designation allowed a "single family dwelling” as the only outright permitted use.2 The Ordinance, passed in 1960, defines "single family dwelling” as:
"A detached building containing one kitchen, designed for and occupied exclusively by one family and the household employes of that family, but not a trailer housed (emphasis added) Clackamas County Zoning Ordinance, § 3.2.
A "trailer house,” in turn, is defined by the Ordinance as a:
"* * * building designed in such a manner that it may be moved from one location to another.” (§ 3.2)
Finally, a "building” is defined as:
"* * h= any structure built for the support, shelter, or enclosure of any person, animals, chattels or property of any kind.” (§ 3.2)
On October 1, 1972, the defendants installed the structure which is the subject of this suit on their land. The structure, which is known as a "double wide mobile home,” consists of two units which are bolted together and measures 68 feet by 24 feet (approximately 1500 square feet of usable living space). Each unit was manufactured with a chassis which included [423] a tongue with springs and three axles attached. Two wheels were attached to each axle. Each unit was delivered independently to the defendants’ property behind a diesel tractor. The defendants had poured a concrete foundation prior to the delivery of the two units. When the units arrived, the defendants removed the tongue, axles, wheels and springs with a cutting torch and had the emits placed side by side on the foundation. The units were then bolted together and anchored down. The structure contains a kitchen, living room, dining area, family room, utility room, three bedrooms and two bathrooms. It has self-contained heating, plumbing and electrical systems.
Defendants immediately began to reside in the structure and, with their children, have been its only occupants. The structure was skirted, and a front porch and backyard patio were added. Defendants’ property was landscaped and fenced. A circular unpaved driveway leads from a two-lane highway to the defendants’ structure.3
In September 1973, plaintiff’s agents investigated the structure in question, identified it as a "trailer house” under the Ordinance, and informed defendants that they were in violation thereof. In April 1975, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking an injunction against defendants’ further use of their mobile home as a residence in violation of the Ordinance and a permanent abatement of the public nuisance which defendants’ use allegedly constituted. Defendants denied the violation and interposed various affirmative defenses, including allegations that their house was a single-family dwelling and thus an outright permitted use, that the Ordinance was void for vagueness, that the Ordinance was void as applied as violating ORS [424]*424215.055 (1975),4 that the Ordinance was unconstitutional as applied as creating an impermissible classification in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Art I, § 20, of the Oregon Constitution, and that the Ordinance as applied violated the policy provisions of the Clackamas County Comprehensive Plan.
The trial court issued a decree permanently abating defendants’ use of the structure as a residence as a public nuisance and enjoining such use. Defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, assigning as error (1) the trial court’s failure to invalidate the application of the Ordinance to the present case as a violation of ORS 215.055 and the policies set out in the Clackamas County Comprehensive Plan; (2) the trial court’s failure to deny plaintiff’s requested injunction based on plaintiff’s "unclean hands”; (3) the trial court’s failure to find the Ordinance inapplicable to defendants’ particular "mobile home”; and (4) the trial court’s failure to find the Ordinance unconstitutional as applied to the defendants as a denial of equal protection.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defendants’ structure was not a "trailer house” under [425] the definition in the Ordinance, that it was a single-family dwelling and thus an outright permitted use.5
In his dissent, Chief Judge Schwab, decrying the result of the majority’s holding — "that mobile homes, once the axles, wheels, etc., are removed, are an outright permitted use in all Clackamas County single-family residential zones” — 30 Or App at 608, opines that the definition of "trailer house” in the Ordinance accomplishes what Columbia County had failed to accomplish in Columbia County v. Kelly, 25 Or App 1, 548 P2d 163, S Ct rev den (1976) (dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Schwab): to embody the principle "once a mobile home [or trailer house], always a mobile home.” Plaintiff’s petition for review seeks reversal of the Court of Appeals’ determination that the defendants’ structure was not a "trailer house” as defined by the Ordinance. We reverse and reinstate the trial court decree.
The tenor of the majority opinion below indicates that the decree was being reversed for plaintiff’s failure to prove that the structure in question was movable as it sat on its foundation and therefore a "trailer house” under the ordinance definition. We conceive of this case, not as one involving an assessment of the evidence as such, but as one involving the construction of the pertinent sections of the Ordinance and their application to the basically undisputed facts.
We repeat here the definition of "trailer house” given in the Ordinance:
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[421] LENT, J.
This case involves the construction and application only of a Clackamas County Zoning Ordinance (Ordinance) as it pertains to defendants’ mobile home. In 1975, Clackamas County filed suit to enjoin defendants’ use of their mobile home as a residence and to abate such use as a public nuisance pursuant to ORS 215.180 (1975) and 215.185 (1975).1 The trial court found that defendants’ use of their mobile home as a residence violated the Ordinance, declared it a public nuisance and ordered it enjoined and permanently abated. The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, by a divided court, reversed, Clackamas County v. Dunham et ux, 30 Or App 595,567 P2d 605 (1977), and held that defendants’ mobile home was an outright permitted use under the Ordinance. We allowed review to address an apparent inconsistency between this result and that reached in Clackamas County v. Ague, 27 Or App 515, 556 P2d Í386, S Ct rev den (1976).
The essential facts are undisputed. Prior to October [422]*4221, 1972, defendants owned a 8-acre parcel in eastern Clackamas County, which bore the zoning designation of "RR” (Recreational Residential). This designation allowed a "single family dwelling” as the only outright permitted use.2 The Ordinance, passed in 1960, defines "single family dwelling” as:
"A detached building containing one kitchen, designed for and occupied exclusively by one family and the household employes of that family, but not a trailer housed (emphasis added) Clackamas County Zoning Ordinance, § 3.2.
A "trailer house,” in turn, is defined by the Ordinance as a:
"* * * building designed in such a manner that it may be moved from one location to another.” (§ 3.2)
Finally, a "building” is defined as:
"* * h= any structure built for the support, shelter, or enclosure of any person, animals, chattels or property of any kind.” (§ 3.2)
On October 1, 1972, the defendants installed the structure which is the subject of this suit on their land. The structure, which is known as a "double wide mobile home,” consists of two units which are bolted together and measures 68 feet by 24 feet (approximately 1500 square feet of usable living space). Each unit was manufactured with a chassis which included [423] a tongue with springs and three axles attached. Two wheels were attached to each axle. Each unit was delivered independently to the defendants’ property behind a diesel tractor. The defendants had poured a concrete foundation prior to the delivery of the two units. When the units arrived, the defendants removed the tongue, axles, wheels and springs with a cutting torch and had the emits placed side by side on the foundation. The units were then bolted together and anchored down. The structure contains a kitchen, living room, dining area, family room, utility room, three bedrooms and two bathrooms. It has self-contained heating, plumbing and electrical systems.
Defendants immediately began to reside in the structure and, with their children, have been its only occupants. The structure was skirted, and a front porch and backyard patio were added. Defendants’ property was landscaped and fenced. A circular unpaved driveway leads from a two-lane highway to the defendants’ structure.3
In September 1973, plaintiff’s agents investigated the structure in question, identified it as a "trailer house” under the Ordinance, and informed defendants that they were in violation thereof. In April 1975, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking an injunction against defendants’ further use of their mobile home as a residence in violation of the Ordinance and a permanent abatement of the public nuisance which defendants’ use allegedly constituted. Defendants denied the violation and interposed various affirmative defenses, including allegations that their house was a single-family dwelling and thus an outright permitted use, that the Ordinance was void for vagueness, that the Ordinance was void as applied as violating ORS [424]*424215.055 (1975),4 that the Ordinance was unconstitutional as applied as creating an impermissible classification in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Art I, § 20, of the Oregon Constitution, and that the Ordinance as applied violated the policy provisions of the Clackamas County Comprehensive Plan.
The trial court issued a decree permanently abating defendants’ use of the structure as a residence as a public nuisance and enjoining such use. Defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, assigning as error (1) the trial court’s failure to invalidate the application of the Ordinance to the present case as a violation of ORS 215.055 and the policies set out in the Clackamas County Comprehensive Plan; (2) the trial court’s failure to deny plaintiff’s requested injunction based on plaintiff’s "unclean hands”; (3) the trial court’s failure to find the Ordinance inapplicable to defendants’ particular "mobile home”; and (4) the trial court’s failure to find the Ordinance unconstitutional as applied to the defendants as a denial of equal protection.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defendants’ structure was not a "trailer house” under [425] the definition in the Ordinance, that it was a single-family dwelling and thus an outright permitted use.5
In his dissent, Chief Judge Schwab, decrying the result of the majority’s holding — "that mobile homes, once the axles, wheels, etc., are removed, are an outright permitted use in all Clackamas County single-family residential zones” — 30 Or App at 608, opines that the definition of "trailer house” in the Ordinance accomplishes what Columbia County had failed to accomplish in Columbia County v. Kelly, 25 Or App 1, 548 P2d 163, S Ct rev den (1976) (dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Schwab): to embody the principle "once a mobile home [or trailer house], always a mobile home.” Plaintiff’s petition for review seeks reversal of the Court of Appeals’ determination that the defendants’ structure was not a "trailer house” as defined by the Ordinance. We reverse and reinstate the trial court decree.
The tenor of the majority opinion below indicates that the decree was being reversed for plaintiff’s failure to prove that the structure in question was movable as it sat on its foundation and therefore a "trailer house” under the ordinance definition. We conceive of this case, not as one involving an assessment of the evidence as such, but as one involving the construction of the pertinent sections of the Ordinance and their application to the basically undisputed facts.
We repeat here the definition of "trailer house” given in the Ordinance:
«* * * building designed in such a manner that it may be moved from one location to another.”
Does "designed” refer to design for the manufacture of the building or design for the installation of the building?
[426] The Court of Appeals chose the latter; i.e., if portability is destroyed by the manner of installation, the "building” is no longer a "trailer house.” This would have the effect of allowing the owner of the smallest highway travel trailer containing a kitchen to avoid the proscription of the ordinance by simply affixing the trailer to his RR land in such manner as permanently to destroy its portability. We cannot believe that the framers of the ordinance intended that absurdity.
We choose the former; i.e., we find it more logical that "designed” refers to design for the manufacture of the building. It is true that this probably means that, as it leaves the manufacturer, a "building” which is a mobile home is forever a mobile home.6 If the authors of the ordinance intended otherwise, it would have been easy so to say. We hold, therefore that a building is a trailer house within the meaning of this ordinance if the building is designed to be manufactured in such a manner that it may be moved from one location to another. Such a structure, being expressly excluded from the definition of a single-family dwelling, is not an outright permitted use in the RR zone.7
[427] The Court of Appeals decision is reversed, and the trial court decree reinstated.8
Defendants claim that the Ordinance should not be enforced against them as it is inconsistent with the mandates of state law, ORS 215.055(1), see n. 5, supra, requiring it to "promote the public health, safety and general welfare,” such welfare including the encouragement of low cost housing. However, the same statute also requires consideration of "property values” and "the public need for healthful, safe, aesthetic surroundings and conditions.” The choice of how to balance these potentially conflicting considerations is a legislative one and cannot prevent enforcement of the Ordinance in this particular case.
Defendants also claim that the enforcement of the Ordinance against them is inconsistent with the Clackamas County Comprehensive Plan, which states as a general policy that "[m]obile and modular homes should be encouraged where appropriate, as a means of fulfilling limited income housing needs.” (emphasis added) The italicized language again indicates legislative discretion about where the encouragement of mobile homes is or is not appropriate. It is not for the courts to disturb the exercise of this legislative judgment in a case such as this one.
Defendants claim plaintiff was guilty of "unclean hands.” This appears to be merely a repeat of the argument discussed above.
Defendants claim the Ordinance is inapplicable to defendants’ structure, since such a structure (double wide mobile home) was unknown at the time the Ordinance was drafted in 1960. The fact that defendants’ structure was wider and longer than those which existed in 1960 does not mean that it does not fall within the definition set out at the earlier date. As demonstrated in the text of this opinion, it does fall within the cited definition. The result of defendants’ argument would be to leave such structures totally unregulated, a result so unreasonable as to compel its rejection.
Finally, defendants claim that the enforcement of the Ordinance against them constitutes an impermissible classification of mobile homes as distinct from conventionally constructed homes, thus denying them the equal protection of the laws. That classification, as such, however, is not subject to the protection of the equal protection clauses of the Oregon (Art I § 20) or the United States (14th Amendment) Constitutions, since it involves the classification of things, not persons. Defendants, however, claim that the underlying classification is one based on wealth, since mobile homes provide housing primarily for low-income persons. Even assuming the efficacy of the latter classification, it passes the equal protection tests both under the Oregon Constitution, Olsen v. State ex rel Johnson, 276 Or 9, 20, 554 P2d 139 (1976), and under the United States Constitution, San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411US 1, 40-44, reh den 411 US 959 (1973).