NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2771-13T3
C.J.R., a minor, by his father and guardian ad litem, CHRISTOPHER REES, and CHRISTOPHER REES, individually, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiffs-Appellants, December 8, 2014
v. APPELLATE DIVISION
G.A.,
Defendant-Respondent,
and
GERALD J. ALESSI,
Defendant.
____________________________________
Argued November 17, 2014 - Decided December 8, 2014
Before Judges Sabatino, Simonelli, and Guadagno.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, Docket No. L-0576-12.
John D. Borbi argued the cause for appellants (Borbi, Clancy & Patrizi, attorneys; Mr. Borbi, on the brief).
Ann L. Longo argued the cause for respondent (Naulty, Scaricamazza & McDevitt, LLC, attorneys; Gerald X. Smith, of counsel and on the brief; Ms. Longo, on the brief). The opinion of the court was delivered by
SABATINO, P.J.A.D.
With his Medford youth lacrosse team in the lead, less than
twenty seconds remaining on the game clock, and the ball nestled
in the basket of his stick, a Medford player was struck in the
forearm by an opposing player on the Marlton team. The blow
knocked the Medford player to the ground. Referees whistled
play to a halt and ended the game. The Medford player was taken
to a hospital, where he was treated for a fracture.
Seeking to recover damages for his personal injuries, the
Medford player, a minor, and his father filed suit in the Law
Division against the opposing player, who was eleven years old
at the time of the incident. Plaintiffs also named the Marlton
player's father as a co-defendant. The trial court granted
summary judgment to both defendants. The court concluded that
the facts relating to the conduct producing this youth sports
injury, even when viewed in a light most favorable to
plaintiffs, were insufficient to support this cause of action.
Plaintiffs now appeal, solely challenging the dismissal of their
claims against the other minor.
We affirm the entry of summary judgment in this case of
first impression under New Jersey law. We concur with the
motion judge that the defendant minor breached no legal duty in
2 A-2771-13T3 causing the plaintiff minor to sustain this unfortunate sports-
related injury.
We reach our conclusion by applying a double-layered
analysis, one which counsel on appeal mutually accepted as an
appropriate distillation of the relevant tort principles
separately pertaining to adult sporting activities and to the
conduct of minors. The inquiry we have fashioned examines: (1)
whether the opposing player's injurious conduct would be
actionable if it were committed by an adult, based on sufficient
proof of the defendant's intent or recklessness as required by
the Supreme Court's case law; and, if so, (2) whether it would
be reasonable in the particular youth sports setting to expect a
minor of the same age and characteristics as defendant to
refrain from the injurious physical contact.
For the reasons we explain in this opinion, the record in
this case reflects that, at the very least, the second query
must be answered here in the negative. Summary judgment was
therefore appropriately granted to the defendant minor.
I.
The facts presented to us are not complicated. We derive
them substantially from the deposition testimony of plaintiff
3 A-2771-13T3 C.J.R.,1 his parents, and his team's coach.2 We consider those
facts in a light most favorable to plaintiffs. Brill v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995); see also W.J.A.
v. D.A., 210 N.J. 229, 237 (2012) (applying the same standard on
appeal of a summary judgment order).
In 2011, C.J.R. and defendant G.A. were each enrolled by
their respective parents in a recreational lacrosse league. At
the time of the game incident in question, C.J.R. was twelve
years old and G.A. was eleven years old. G.A. was five feet
tall and weighed seventy-six pounds. C.J.R. was two to four
inches taller and about fourteen pounds heavier than G.A.
Based on their relative skill levels, C.J.R. and G.A. were
assigned to the league's "5/6 combination" division, which was a
level composed of youths who were not assigned to either the
sixth grade "A" teams or the fifth grade "A" teams. As C.J.R.'s
coach Brian Bennett explained in his testimony, the "5/6
combination" level essentially involved what is commonly known
as a "B" team level, meaning that the skill sets of the players
1 We have elected to use initials for the plaintiff minor ("C.J.R.") and the defendant minor ("G.A."). The record does not provide a middle initial for G.A. 2 No depositions were taken of any other parties or witnesses, including the defendant minor, the defendant minor's parents, the opposing coach, the referees, or any spectators.
4 A-2771-13T3 in that division generally were not as advanced as those who
were on the "A" teams. C.J.R. played for the Medford team and
G.A. played for the Marlton team.
The physical contact between G.A. and C.J.R. occurred near
the end of a game on May 7, 2011. The Medford team was in the
lead.3 C.J.R. received the ball at midfield with less than twenty
seconds left on the game clock. As described by Coach Bennett,
C.J.R. began running towards the sideline. According to
Bennett, C.J.R. was trying to keep possession of the ball and
maintain the lead until time expired.
As described by C.J.R.'s mother,4 who had been watching from
the sidelines, G.A. was running "full force" diagonally across
the field towards C.J.R. As she phrased it, G.A. was also
"roaring" unintelligibly. She observed that G.A. had his head
"tucked down," with his arms at his side. C.J.R.'s mother did
not see the moment of the ensuing collision of the two boys
3 At the motion argument in the trial court counsel for both parties agreed that the score was then 5-4, consistent with defendant's interrogatory answers. C.J.R.'s mother vaguely asserted at her deposition that C.J.R.'s team was "up by several points," but that is not corroborated or substantiated. 4 C.J.R.'s father did not attend the game.
5 A-2771-13T3 because she had averted her attention to pick up some empty cups
on the sideline.5
Coach Bennett also observed G.A. approach C.J.R. According
to Bennett, G.A. "left his feet" and "hit [C.J.R.] with either
his helmet or his stick right across the midsection." As Bennett
recalled it, G.A. had both hands on his stick. Bennett observed
that G.A. simultaneously hit not only the back6 of C.J.R.'s torso
but also C.J.R.'s left arm, because C.J.R. had been "rocking his
stick" and "twisting."
According to Bennett, upon impact, C.J.R. left his feet and
immediately went to the ground. G.A. "bounced off" C.J.R. and
also went to the ground. C.J.R. then got back up and began to
take off his gloves to "see how [his] arm was, [discovering] it
was broken." C.J.R. was conscious the entire time.
Up until that point in the game, C.J.R. had no interactions
with G.A. that he could remember. Indeed, according to C.J.R.,
he had no idea who G.A. was prior to their collision. He could
5 C.J.R.'s mother was a parent designated to pick up cups and debris left on the sidelines that day. 6 In his own deposition, C.J.R. recalled that G.A. had approached him from the front, not the back. Given our obligation to consider the record in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, we ignore this discrepancy and accept the contrary testimony that G.A. had approached C.J.R. from the rear.
6 A-2771-13T3 only recall that G.A. was wearing an orange jersey bearing the
number thirty-six.
Following the collision, the two referees threw down
penalty flags. G.A. was escorted off the field, and an ambulance
was called for C.J.R. Soon thereafter, the referees declared the
game over, allegedly without explaining why, even though about
seven seconds were left on the game clock.7 No penalty was
called or imposed.
An ambulance arrived at the field, and C.J.R. was brought
to a local emergency room. He underwent an open reduction
surgery to repair his left arm the same day. According to
plaintiffs' medical expert, C.J.R. had "both bones of forearm
fracture treated with intramedullary rodding of the radius."
C.J.R.'s forearm was kept in a long-arm cast for several
weeks, and thereafter in a short-arm cast. He missed about a
week to ten days of school but, according to C.J.R.'s deposition
testimony, he was otherwise unaffected. The surgery left him
with a four-centimeter scar. In addition, C.J.R. claims that his
7 In a signed statement, Coach Bennett suggested that the reason the referees terminated the game was due to a "Warrior Lacrosse" rule, a copy of which is contained in plaintiffs' appendix. As is relevant here, the rule provides that "[o]fficials will have authority to terminate a boys' youth game in response to flagrant acts of unsportsmanlike behavior including excessively rough play[.]"
7 A-2771-13T3 forearm periodically aches. His doctor notes that he has some
residual difficulties with flexion and dorsiflexion, which
particularly affect him when wrestling.
Subsequently, C.J.R.'s father Christopher Rees filed a
personal injury action on C.J.R.'s and his own behalf in the Law
Division, naming as defendants G.A. and G.A.'s father, Gerald
Alessi. As to G.A., the complaint alleged that he "acted
negligently and impacted with [C.J.R.] during the course and
play of the lacrosse game, so as to cause [C.J.R.] injury."
Plaintiffs subsequently amplified their claims against G.A.,
contending that the defendant minor had been "reckless" and
thereby would be liable under tort liability principles
established by the Supreme Court in adult sport-related
contexts. See, e.g., Schick v. Ferolito, 167 N.J. 7 (2001);
Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494 (1994). G.A.'s father, meanwhile,
was claimed to be liable for C.J.R.'s injury under a theory of
negligent parental supervision.
Defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court
granted summary judgment to G.A.'s father, a ruling which
plaintiffs have not appealed.8 However, the court denied the
8 The father's dismissal was consistent with principles of law that restrict a parent's liability for injuries inflicted by his or her child to limited circumstances in which the parent "knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his (continued)
8 A-2771-13T3 motion as to G.A. without prejudice, allowing plaintiffs to take
additional depositions. When those depositions were completed,
G.A. renewed his motion, and plaintiffs filed opposition. Among
other things, plaintiffs stressed that G.A. had violated the
rules of the game by approaching C.J.R. in a blind-side manner
from the rear, leaving his feet with his arms down, and engaging
in what is known as a disallowed "take-out check."9
Based on the record after fuller discovery had been
completed, the motion judge, Judge Marc M. Baldwin, granted
summary judgment to G.A. and dismissed plaintiffs' claims
against that minor. In his oral ruling, Judge Baldwin concluded
that plaintiffs had failed to create a genuine issue of material
fact to establish that G.A. had engaged in a reckless form of
conduct of a degree or nature sufficient to justify imposing
(continued) child" and also "knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control." Mazzilli v. Selger, 13 N.J. 296, 302 (1953); see also Buono v. Scalia, 179 N.J. 131, 143 (2004) (noting the scope of a parent's immunity from tort liability as to his or her conduct implicating "legitimate child-rearing issues"). Here, the record is bereft of evidence that G.A.'s father had the capacity to control his son's on-the- field conduct during the lacrosse game, let alone proof that the father knew or should have known that he possessed such control and that it was necessary to exercise it. 9 According to the rules of the game reproduced in plaintiffs' appendix, a "take-out check" is defined as "any body check in which the player lowers his head or shoulder with the force and intent to put the other player on the ground."
9 A-2771-13T3 liability upon a minor of his age in this sports-related
setting.
The judge indicated that G.A.'s age was "critical" to his
analysis. The judge noted that he might have denied the motion
if, hypothetically, G.A. had been seventeen years old at the
time of the incident and had a more mature understanding of the
consequences of his behavior. However, given that G.A. was much
younger than that at the time of the game, the judge ruled that
he had not acted with the level of recklessness required under
the law to create liability.
Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, clarifying for the
court that G.A. was eleven years old at the time of the
incident, and not age ten as had been suggested at the prior
motion argument. The court denied the motion, finding the one-
year difference in age inconsequential. This appeal followed.
II.
To date, there are no reported opinions in our State
analyzing the alleged tort liability of a minor who inflicts an
injury upon another minor while they are participating in a
youth sports activity. Two distinct strands of the law guide
our analysis: (1) the cases establishing the liability of adults
who intentionally or recklessly injure another person in a
sporting activity; and (2) the cases that limit the potential
10 A-2771-13T3 tort liability of minors, depending upon their age and other
characteristics.
A.
Our Supreme Court has issued two seminal opinions
explicating the standards for tort liability of adults who
injure others while engaging in a sporting activity: Crawn,
supra, 136 N.J. at 494, and Schick, supra, 167 N.J. at 7.
The plaintiff's complaint in Crawn concerned injuries
arising from a defendant crashing into a plaintiff at home plate
during an adult "pickup softball game." Crawn, supra, 136 N.J.
at 496-99. After canvassing the relevant law of various other
jurisdictions, the Court adopted a standard that requires a
plaintiff to demonstrate a defendant's intentional infliction of
injury or recklessness in order to establish tort liability in
the context of recreational sports. Id. at 501-08. As the Court
recognized in Crawn, "[p]hysical contact is an inherent or
integral part of the game in many sports." Id. at 504. "In
addition, the physicality of sports is accompanied by a high
level of emotional intensity." Ibid. Consequently, the Court
imposed a high burden on plaintiffs seeking tort recovery for
injuries they sustain as mutual participants in adult sporting
events. "The heightened recklessness standard recognizes a
commonsense distinction between excessively harmful conduct and
11 A-2771-13T3 the more routine rough-and-tumble of sports that should occur
freely on the playing fields and should not be second-guessed in
courtrooms." Id. at 508.
The Court reaffirmed and applied these tenets in Schick, a
case in which the plaintiff, a golfer on a course, was injured
after being hit in the head by another golfer's errant tee shot.
Schick, supra, 167 N.J. at 11-13. In determining that summary
judgment was inappropriate, the Court relied on several key
facts that could show defendant's "disregard of a high and
excessive degree of danger." Id. at 19. Specifically, the Court
noted that the defendant had waved the plaintiff off in an
effort to induce him to move from his location in proximity to
the tee box, and that the defendant then hit his tee shot anyway
without assuring that the plaintiff had moved safely out of the
way. Id. at 21.
As the Court ruled in Schick, this tee-box scenario
presented "a set of facts that a jury could find constitutes
reckless conduct because it may reflect a conscious choice of a
course of action with knowledge or reason to know that the
action will create serious danger to others." Ibid. (emphasis
added). The Court elaborated on the meaning of this
"recklessness" standard in the sports context:
an actor acts recklessly when he or she intentionally commits an act of an
12 A-2771-13T3 unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow, and which thus is usually accompanied by a conscious indifference to the consequences. The standard is objective and may be proven by showing that a defendant proceeded in disregard of a high and excessive degree of danger either known to him or her or apparent to a reasonable person in his or her position. Reckless conduct is an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation in which a high degree of danger is apparent. Reckless behavior must be more than any mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement or confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simple inattention[.]
[Id. at 19 (emphasis added) (citations and internal alterations omitted) (quoting Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 34 at 212 (5th ed. 1984)).]
So defined, this recklessness standard of care "has been applied
in New Jersey to sporting environments that span team
competitions, one-on-one competitions, and individualized
sporting endeavors." Id. at 14.
B.
The second strand of precedent that must be considered in
this youth sports injury context is the law generally governing
the potential tort liabilities of minors. In New Jersey,
children under the age of seven are protected by a rebuttable
presumption that they are incapable of negligence. See Bush v.
N.J. & N.Y. Transit Co., 30 N.J. 345, 358 (1959); see also
13 A-2771-13T3 Berberian v. Lynn, 179 N.J. 290, 298 (2004) (noting that long-
standing presumption). Above this seven-year-old line of
demarcation, our law applies a fact-sensitive and context-
specific approach, examining the age and other characteristics
of the defendant minor, and the surrounding circumstances.
As the Supreme Court has instructed, "a child's conduct
should be measured in light of his or her capacity to exercise
care under all attendant circumstances." Berberian, supra, 179
N.J. at 298 (citing Cowan v. Doering, 111 N.J. 451, 459 (1988)).
Underpinning this modified standard for minors is the notion
that "the younger the child, the greater the risk, for younger
children are less able -- and less likely -- to discern danger."
Jerkins v. Anderson, 191 N.J. 285, 295 (2007) (citing Bush,
supra, 30 N.J. at 355).
In this regard, the Court has observed that "'[c]hildren
have a known proclivity to act impulsively without thought of
the possibilities of danger,' and '[i]t is precisely th[at] lack
of mature judgment which makes supervision so vital.'" Id. at
296-97 (quoting Titus v. Lindberg, 49 N.J. 66, 75 (1967)
(alterations in original)).
This restrictive approach to the liability or comparative
fault of children is further reinforced in the current model
14 A-2771-13T3 civil jury charges applicable to minors who are seven years and
older. As the charges explain:
[a] child, old enough to be capable of negligence, is required to act with the same amount of care as children of similar age, judgment and experience. In order for you to determine whether a child has acted negligently, you should take into consideration the child's age, intelligence and experience. Also you must consider the child's capacity to understand and avoid the danger to which he/she was exposed in the actual circumstances and situation in this case. You, the jury, must decide the factual question of whether this child was comparatively negligent.
[Current N.J. Model Jury Charges (Civil) § 7.11(A) (1991) (emphasis added).]
Although the model charge refers to concepts of a child's
"negligence" rather than his or her "recklessness," we discern
no reason to apply a different approach when deciding if a given
set of facts satisfies the latter standard of conduct. In each
instance, one must consider the child's age, characteristics,
and the surrounding circumstances.
We now consider the interplay between the recklessness
standard applied in adult sports injury cases and the standards
governing child tort liability. The closest published case on
point in our state is Calhanas v. South Amboy Roller Rink, 292
N.J. Super. 513, 522 (App. Div. 1996). In Calhanas, the adult
plaintiff was skating at a roller rink when he was cut off by a
15 A-2771-13T3 zig-zagging child skater and thereafter sustained injuries. Id.
at 516-17. In determining whether the trial court's grant of
summary judgment for the defendant roller rink was appropriate,
we were called upon to interpret certain portions of the New
Jersey Roller Skating Rink Safety and Fair Liability Act,
N.J.S.A. 5:14-1 to -7.
Of particular import in Calhanas was N.J.S.A. 5:14-6, a
provision which, in essence, immunizes a roller rink from
injuries sustained by skaters arising from "inherent risks of
roller skating, insofar as [those] risks are obvious and
necessary." Calhanas, supra, 292 N.J. Super. at 521 (quoting
N.J.S.A. 5:14-6). In construing that provision, we observed that
a "similar standard was enunciated in [Crawn, supra, 136 N.J. at
508]." Calhanas, supra, 292 N.J. Super. at 521.
Upon concluding that summary judgment was improvidently
granted on the record facts in Calhanas, we reasoned that the
child
who collided with Manuel Calhanas had been skating in an obviously reckless manner for some minutes before the collision. They both testified that the child was skating at a high rate of speed with no one accompanying him, weaving in front of people and cutting across the rink, rather than proceeding around the rink in a circular fashion as he should have.
[Id. at 522 (emphasis added).]
16 A-2771-13T3 Although perhaps illustrative of a roller rink's potential
liability that can stem from a child's recklessness under the
roller rink statute, Calhanas does not resolve the present
question of a minor's own common law duties in the context of a
youth sporting game. Rather, Calhanas only signifies that the
reckless acts that may give rise to tort liability cannot be
acts which are "inherent" in a recreational activity. Notably,
the minor who caused the accident in Calhanas was not identified
or sued. Id. at 517-18
Cases in other states have applied a comparable
recklessness standard, or its equivalent, in ascertaining
whether a minor can be liable for personal injuries that he or
she inflicts during a youth sporting activity. See, e.g.,
Keller v. Mols, 509 N.E.2d 584, 584-86 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)
(holding that a fourteen-year-old plaintiff injured by a
thirteen-year-old defendant in a floor hockey game on a
neighbor's patio was precluded from recovery for injuries on a
simple negligence theory); Ramos v. City of Countryside, 485
N.E.2d 418, 418-20 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (concluding that a
fourteen-year-old boy who struck an eight-year-old boy in the
eye with a ball while playing the game of "bombardment" could
not be held liable for the younger boy's injury on a theory of
negligence, since both youths were participating in a sporting
17 A-2771-13T3 event); Leonard ex rel. Meyer v. Behrens, 601 N.W.2d 76, 81
(Iowa 1999) (applying the recklessness standard to two fifteen-
year-old litigants for injuries occurring during their paintball
game); Kabella v. Bouschelle, 672 P.2d 290, 294 (N.M. Ct. App.
1983) (holding that a minor plaintiff could not sue another
minor for mere negligence for injuries sustained in an informal
game of tackle football; a viable claim must be predicated upon
reckless or intentional conduct); Marchetti v. Kalish, 559
N.E.2d 699, 703-04 (Ohio 1990) (applying a recklessness standard
to a fifteen-year-old defendant who collided with a thirteen-
year-old plaintiff causing a broken leg).
Distilling these authorities to a cohesive rule of law to
apply when, as here, a minor injures another minor in a sporting
activity, we adopt a "double-layered" approach. The two layers
of that analysis are as follows: (1) whether the opposing
player's injurious conduct would be actionable if it were
committed by an adult, evaluating whether there is sufficient
proof of the defendant player's intent to inflict bodily injury
or recklessness; and, if so, (2) whether it would be reasonable
in the particular youth sports setting to expect a minor of the
same age and characteristics as the defendant to refrain from
the injurious physical contact.
18 A-2771-13T3 This dual-tiered approach captures the essence of two
strands of law that we have previously outlined. Moreover, the
approach reflects the long-standing public policies that
disfavor the unfettered tort liability of fellow sporting
participants, and also curtail the tort liability of children
who cause third parties to sustain personal injuries.
We can readily take judicial notice that children,
particularly younger children, often need years of training,
coaching, and experience to learn and adhere to the rules of a
competitive sport. Children will inevitably commit fouls in
sporting activities out of inexperience, youthful exuberance,
lack of self-discipline, clumsiness, immaturity, frustration, or
some combination of those traits.10 Their propensity to make
physical and mental errors is compounded in sports such as
lacrosse, which have complicated rules and which inherently
involve a high degree of physical contact with opposing players.
It would be unfair to hold children who engage in such sporting
10 This principle is recognized in the U.S. Boys Youth Lacrosse Rules. Under the paragraph titled "Violent Collisions," the Rules provide that "[s]ome body contact is permitted at all levels of boys' youth lacrosse, with progressively more age- appropriate contact permitted as players become more physically mature and learn proper checking techniques." U.S. Lacrosse, 2014 U.S. Lacrosse Boys Youth Rules, http://www.uslacrosse.org/ portals/1/documents/pdf/participants/players/2014-boys-youth- rules.pdf.
19 A-2771-13T3 activities to the same expectations and standards of conduct as
adult athletes.
Nor should the prospect of a lawsuit crop up every time
that a referee calls a foul on a child who is learning how to
play the game. The law should not unduly discourage our youths
from taking advantage of opportunities through organized sports
to appreciate and cultivate the virtues of teamwork and physical
conditioning.
That said, we are cognizant of the serious and sometimes
long-lasting injuries that can be suffered by children when they
take part in sporting activities with their peers. For instance,
we are well aware of the heightened public attention that has
recently been focused upon concussions and similar injuries to
young athletes. In light of those legitimate safety concerns,
we by no means intend by this opinion to endorse or promote a
laissez-faire attitude that is oblivious to the risks of such
injuries. Nor do we overlook the efforts of coaches, parents,
referees, and equipment manufacturers who are striving to make
youth sports safer.
All we have done in this opinion is to attempt through our
double-layered analysis to integrate established rules of law,
rules that already regulate the liability of adult sport
participants and of child defendants in tort cases. If new or
20 A-2771-13T3 different liability principles would be preferable, the
Legislature is free, of course, to enact them.
Applying the well-settled general legal principles here,
and viewing the record in a light most favorable to plaintiffs,
we are satisfied that the trial court correctly granted summary
judgment to the defendant minor in this case. G.A. was only
eleven years old when this incident took place. He was playing
in a program level designed for less-experienced or less-
proficient lacrosse players of his age. Although he may well
have committed a foul by approaching C.J.R. in the manner that
has been described, that mistake must be considered in context.
The game was apparently close, and time was running down.
G.A.'s team could not tie or win the game unless it got control
of the ball back. There was no proof of any pre-existing enmity
between C.J.R. and G.A. earlier in the game. In fact, C.J.R. did
not even realize at the time of the collision who the opposing
player was that hit him.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, there could be a
triable issue of recklessness here if the boys had been adults,
we are satisfied that there is no need to try this case when one
necessarily considers the second layer of analysis that takes
into account their status as minors. A reasonable jury could
not find the facts of this particular case here rising to a
21 A-2771-13T3 level of recklessness that would or should make this eleven-
year-old lacrosse novice monetarily liable for his misguided
actions on the field. Although C.J.R.'s injury is regrettable,
it is one of those unfortunate occasional consequences of minors
playing in a rough-and-tumble sport.
Affirmed.
22 A-2771-13T3