City of Virginia Beach v. Marine Resource Commn

Court of Appeals of Virginia·Decided April 22, 2003·No. 2549021·Unpublished

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Bumgardner, Felton and Senior Judge Overton Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia

CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH AND SCOTT AYERS

v. Record No. 2549-02-1

VIRGINIA MARINE RESOURCES COMMISSION, GEORGE WILKIE AND ELTON TURPIN MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY JUDGE WALTER S. FELTON, JR.

APRIL 22, 2003

SCOTT AYERS AND CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH

v. Record No. 2630-02-1

VIRGINIA MARINE RESOURCES COMMISSION, GEORGE WILKIE AND ELTON TURPIN

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH Edward W. Hanson, Jr., Judge

Richard H. Matthews (Mary M. Kellam;

Pender & Coward, P.C., on briefs), for appellants.

John K. Byrum, Jr., Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee Virginia Marine Resources Commission.

Glenn R. Croshaw (Kimberly L. Stegall;

Wilcox & Savage, P.C., on brief), for appellees George Wilkie and Elton Turpin.

Scott Ayers, representative of forty-four freeholders, and the City of Virginia Beach (collectively "Ayers") appeal the

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.

judgment of the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach affirming the decisions of the Virginia Marine Resources Commission ("VMRC") and the Virginia Beach Wetlands Board ("Wetlands Board") granting applications of George Wilkie and Elton Turpin to construct a total of three duplex residences affecting a coastal primary sand dune. The circuit court consolidated the review of the applications of Wilkie and Turpin prior to this appeal.

Ayers contends that the trial court erred in affirming the decisions granting these applications because (1) the Wetlands Board and VMRC failed to properly interpret Code §§ 28.2-1403 and 28.2-1408, which define "coastal primary sand dune" and to establish standards for the disturbance of coastal primary sand dunes, and (2) the evidence on the record as a whole did not adequately support Wetlands Board's and VMRC's granting of the permits and their decisions were arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I. BACKGROUND

Wilkie and Turpin own three adjacent, undeveloped waterfront lots on the Chesapeake Bay in Virginia Beach. Each of the three lots contains both natural sand dunes and dunes developed as a result of beach replenishment efforts. Both Wilkie and Turpin have owned their respective properties for

over thirty years, and the properties are immediately seaward of both Wilkie's and Turpin's residences.

Pursuant to Title 28.2 of the Code of Virginia, Wilkie and Turpin applied for dune disturbance permits from the City of Virginia Beach Wetlands Board in order to develop a total of three duplex residences with decks, paved parking and utilities on the properties. In its June 18, 2001 meeting, the Wetlands Board considered reports from the City of Virginia Beach Planning Department and the Virginia Institute of Marine Science recommending against the approval of Wilkie's and Turpin's applications. Both reports expressed that the proposed construction would encroach upon and destroy portions of the coastal primary sand dune in violation of Code §§ 28.2-1403 through 28.2-1408. The Wetlands Board also considered exhibits presented by applicants Wilkie and Turpin, neighboring landowner Scott Ayers, and VIMS, including photographs of the properties and surrounding areas, detailed plans of the proposed construction on the property, and letters from interested parties.

The properties in questions involved two sets of dunes, a natural sand dune ("landward dune") and a second dune ("seaward dune"), the latter being the result of beach replenishment efforts over the prior fifteen years. Ayers argued that the landward dune was the primary sand dune for the purposes of Title 28.2 and that, because the proposed construction would

directly impact the primary sand dune, the construction permits were subject to the requirements of Code § 28.2-1408. Ayers argues that there is no credible evidence in the record to support a finding that either (1) no significant adverse ecological impact would result from the proposed construction or (2) that granting the permits was necessary and consistent with the public interest. Wilkie and Turpin argued that the seaward dune was actually the coastal primary sand dune and, thus, because the proposed construction did not directly impact the coastal primary sand dune, approval of their applications did not require findings under Code § 28.2-1408. After imposing seven conditions, 1 the Wetlands Board found the permits met the requirements of Code § 28.2-1408, and approved both applications by 4-3 votes.

Ayers appealed the decisions of the Wetlands Board to the VMRC pursuant to the Administrative Process Act, Code §§ 2.2-4000 through 2.2-4033, and Part 2A of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. The VMRC reviewed the decisions on August 28, 2001. At the hearing, the Habitat Management Division of VMRC presented a report advising that the evidence

1 The Wetlands Board required (1) cantilevered decks, (2)

replanting for any part of the dune that is disturbed and bonding for two growing seasons, (3) the minimum parking required by the Zoning Ordinance, (4) that materials used for parking or driveways be approved by the Coastal Zone Administrator, (5) that no sand leave the site, (6) a new site plan submitted prior to the issuance of any permits, and (7) the only access-way will be an exterior stairway.

in the record, considered as a whole, did not support the issuance of the permits by the Wetlands Board. Notwithstanding this recommendation, VMRC affirmed the decisions of the Wetlands Board by a 7-0 vote.

On appeal to the circuit court, Ayers contended that VMRC lacked substantial evidence upon which to affirm the issuance of the permits and that in issuing the permits, the Wetlands Board exceeded its statutory authority, failed to follow lawful procedure, committed errors of law, lacked supportive evidence, and abused its discretion. Finding that the Wetlands Board and VMRC had carefully considered the record before them, and noting that the Wetlands Board had attached conditions to Wilkie's and Turpin's original proposed construction permits, the court upheld the lower decisions in their entirety. This appeal followed.

II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION Ayers first contends that the Wetlands Board and VMRC failed to properly interpret Code §§ 28.2-1403 and 28.2-1408, which define "coastal primary sand dune" and establish standards for determining when construction may disturb coastal primary sand dunes.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Where . . . the issue concerns an agency decision based on the proper application of its expert discretion, the reviewing court will not substitute its own independent judgment for that

of the agency but rather will reverse the agency decision only if that decision was arbitrary and capricious." Johnston-Willis, Ltd. v. Kenley, 6 Va. App. 231, 246, 369 S.E.2d 1, 9 (1988). A decision is arbitrary and capricious only if there is no credible evidence in the record to support the finding and the Wetlands Board and VMRC "'arbitrarily disregard[ed] uncontradicted evidence.'" City of Bristol Police Department v. Broome, 7 Va. App. 161, 167, 372 S.E.2d 204, 207 (1988) (quoting Morris v. Badger Powhatan/Figgie Int’l, Inc., 3 Va. App. 276, 279, 348 S.E.2d 876, 877 (1986)).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

City of Virginia Beach v. Marine Resource Commn, (Va. Ct. App. 2003).

City of Virginia Beach v. Marine Resource Commn (City of Virginia Beach v. Marine Resource Commn) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Holtzman Oil Corp. v. Commonwealth
529 S.E.2d 333 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 2000)
James v. Capitol Steel Construction Co.
382 S.E.2d 487 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1989)
City of Bristol Police Department v. Broome
372 S.E.2d 204 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1988)
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Musick
376 S.E.2d 814 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1989)
Morris v. Badger Powhatan/Figgie International, Inc.
348 S.E.2d 876 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1986)
Wagner Enterprises, Inc. v. Brooks
407 S.E.2d 32 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1991)
Johnston-Willis, Ltd. v. Kenley
369 S.E.2d 1 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1988)