City of Tampa v. City Nat. Bank of Florida

974 So. 2d 408, 2007 WL 1484488
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedMay 23, 2007
Docket2D06-1383
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 974 So. 2d 408 (City of Tampa v. City Nat. Bank of Florida) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Tampa v. City Nat. Bank of Florida, 974 So. 2d 408, 2007 WL 1484488 (Fla. Ct. App. 2007).

Opinion

974 So.2d 408 (2007)

CITY OF TAMPA, a Florida Municipal Corporation, Petitioner,
v.
CITY NATIONAL BANK OF FLORIDA, a National Banking Corporation, Trustee, and Citivest Construction Corporation, a Florida for Profit Corporation, Respondents.

No. 2D06-1383.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 23, 2007.
Rehearing Denied August 30, 2007.

*409 David L. Smith, City Attorney, and Jerry M. Gerwitz, Chief Assistant Attorney, City of Tampa, Tampa, for Petitioner.

Scott A. McLaren and Marie A. Borland of Hill, Ward & Henderson, P.A., Tampa, for Respondents City National Bank of. Florida, a National Banking Corporation, Trustee, and Citivest Construction Corporation, a Florida for Profit Corporation.

Robert L. Rocke, Jonathan B. Sbar and Jodi L. Corrigan of Rocke, McLean & Sbar, P.A., Tampa for Amiens Curiae National Trust for Historic Preservation; Florida Trust for Historic Preservation, Inc.; Tampa Preservation, Inc.; Historic Hyde Park Neighborhood Association, Inc.; East Ybor Historic and Civic Association, Inc.; Old Seminole Heights Neighborhood Association, Inc.; and Southeast Seminole Heights Civic Association, Inc.

James R. DeFurio of James R. DeFurio, P.A., Tampa for Amicus Curiae Bayshore Royal Condominium & Company, Inc.

Valerie A. Fernandez and Steven G. Gieseler of Pacific Legal Foundation, Coral Gables, for Amicus Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation.

PER CURIAM.

The City of Tampa has petitioned for certiorari relief from an order of the circuit court that effectively reverses the City's denial of a certificate of appropriateness (COA) for the respondents, City National Bank of Florida and Citivest Construction Corporation (hereinafter, Citivest), to build a multistory residential condominium tower on Bayshore Boulevard in Tampa. Bayshore Boulevard overlooks Tampa's Hillsborough Bay. Every day, hundreds of people enjoy its long, continuous sidewalk for walking, jogging, rollerblading, and bicycling. The homes on the inland side of the boulevard present a mix of stately older houses, low-rise apartments and condominiums, opulent new mansions, and high-rise condominiums. One section of Bayshore Boulevard, approximately three miles long, forms an outer edge of the Hyde Park Historic District.

The lots on which Citivest proposes to build are zoned to permit a high-rise multifamily structure, but they are located at the southern end of the Hyde Park Historic District, which consists predominantly of one- and two-story single-family homes and *410 a few small low-rise apartment complexes. When Citivest appeared before the Architectural Review Commission (ARC) and then the City Council, the discussion focused almost entirely on the height of the proposed structure—a building twenty-four stories high, which would be located immediately adjacent to an eleven-story condominium built in the 1920s and a two-story apartment complex of similar vintage. Located across a side street from Citivest's corner lot is one of the oldest homes on Bayshore Boulevard—a two-story single-family house.

This case raises complex questions of statutory construction and asks whether the underlying zoning laws and the authority of the ARC over Citivest's buildable lots in the Hyde Park Historic District can be reconciled. In its review of the City's action, the circuit court concluded that the City departed from the essential requirements of law when it applied the Hyde Park ARC guidelines to conflict with and alter the building envelope that was contemplated by the applicable zoning ordinance and at least preliminarily approved by the zoning administrator. The COA was denied on the basis that the proposed structure violated the historic district guidelines. This case now comes to us on second-tier certiorari, and we deny the City's petition.

It is important to define what, this case does not involve. This is not a takings case, nor does it involve a challenge to the zoning ordinances, the architectural review criteria, or the design guidelines. In fact, at this juncture, this court is powerless to comment upon or decide the validity of the ordinances involved. Nor is this court empowered to review the record to determine whether the City's decision was supported by competent, substantial evidence. See Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla.2003). The district court of appeal is simply the next step up the ladder of review—up from the ARC, to the City Council, and to the circuit court Although the City Council apparently reviewed the ARC decision de novo, the circuit court's jurisdiction was through certiorari, and this court now must view this case through the very narrow lens of second-tier certiorari. "As a case travels up the judicial ladder, review should consistently become narrower, not broader." Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523, 530 (Fla.1995).

"As a practical matter, the circuit court's final ruling in most first-tier cases is conclusive, for second-tier review is extraordinarily limited." Fla. Power & Light Co. v. City of Dania, 761 So.2d 1089, 1092 (Fla.2000). In a second-tier certiorari proceeding, the appellate court is limited to considering whether the circuit court afforded the parties due process and applied the correct law. Id. To apply the correct law means to observe the essential requirements of law. Heggs, 658 So.2d at 530. As recently explained by the supreme court in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Kaklamanos, 843 So.2d 885, 890 (Fla. 2003):

"[C]learly established law" can derive from a variety of legal sources, including recent controlling case law, rules of court, statutes, and constitutional law. Thus, in addition to case law dealing with the same issue of law, an interpretation or application of a statute, a procedural rule, or a constitutional provision may be the basis for granting certiorari review.

Furthermore, evaluation of an alleged departure from the essential requirements of law requires consideration not only of whether a legal error has occurred but also of whether the error is so serious as to constitute a "`violation of [a] clearly *411 established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice.'" Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 So.2d 679, 682 (Fla.2000) (quoting Heggs, 658 So.2d at 528). Thus, we are mindful that even though our scope of review is narrow, we are nevertheless charged with ascertaining whether the circuit court, by overlooking sources of established law or applying an incorrect analysis to those it considered, committed a serious error of fundamental dimensions. Our review convinces us that the circuit court's decision does not depart from the essential requirements of law.

The ARC, and subsequently the City, denied Citivest a COA for its proposed condominium project essentially on the basis that the structure was too tall for its historic-district location. As the circuit court found, the City departed from the essential requirements of law when it concluded that the Hyde Park Design Guidelines, as applied by the ARC, effectively "trump" the zoning administrator's review of the plans for compliance with the zoning dictates. The RM-75 zoning designation of the property determines the maximum height of the building. Section 27-77 (Table 4-2) of the City of Tampa's Zoning Code specifies that buildings in the RM-75 district are limited in height by a 4:1 ratio of height to setback from the lot line.

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Bluebook (online)
974 So. 2d 408, 2007 WL 1484488, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-tampa-v-city-nat-bank-of-florida-fladistctapp-2007.